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ABSTRACT
COMPOSITION AS A MODE OF BEING:
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND HISTORY IN 
THE WRITING CLASSROOMS OF POSTMODERNITY
by
Lance Michael Svehla 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1997
Henry Louis Gates Jr. once commented that while he did not 
"deny the importance, on the level of theory, of the [postmodern] 
project," such a project did not help him when he was "trying to get a 
taxi on the corner of 125th and Lenox Avenue" (Loose Canons 37- 
38). The postmodern project lacked what Gates calls "practical 
performative force." The purpose of this dissertation is to establish 
postmodernity's practical perfomative force for the composition 
classroom. It addresses four central questions: What is
postmodernity? What is its relationship to composition? Why should 
composition teachers and students care about this relationship? How 
might composition use postmodernity to create new classroom 
practices and deal with reoccurring classroom problems?
I believe that postmodern theory, if it can be refigured to 
match our current historical moment, offers composition two 
powerful discourses for creating practice and crossing disciplinary 
boundaries: an epistemological frame that allows for a plurality of
diverse and even contradictory pedagogies in one classroom, and a 
theory of culture(s) that can help teachers negotiate the academic, 
political, and ethical challenges of today's classrooms. Postmodernity
v i i i
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is not. as Lester Faigley’s work implies, an abstract theory or 
research method that composition teachers apply to composition but. 
as Louise Wetherbee Phelps argues, a cultural condition in which we 
live.
i x
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INTRODUCTION
DARKNESS M ADE VISIBLE
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can 
take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the 
one . . . .  Let us wage war on totality. — Jean-Francois Lyotard The Postmodern 
Condition
The political challenge is to articulate universality in a way that is not a mere 
smokescreen for someone else's particularity. We must preserve the 
possibility of universal connection. That's the fundamental challenge. Let’s 
dig deep enough within our heritage to make that connection to others . . . .  The 
quest for knowledge without presuppositions, the quest for certainty, the quest 
for dogmatism and orthodoxy and rigidity is over.
—Cornell West "Diverse New World"
[W]hat I sense at the present moment is a shift in the critical mass toward 
commitment, vocation, social responsibility. For us as scholars, teachers, and 
students, this shift has meant a growing legitimacy (once again) for questions 
of ethics and politics, of agency and action, of intention and meaning. It has 
meant the insistent return of urgency, of a sense that our intellectual work 
matters—or at least that it should matter, must matter, in the arena of cultural 
production and social change.
—Susan Stanford Friedman "Post/Poststructuralist Feminist Criticism"
It has become almost a cliche amongst scholars, intellectuals, 
and pundits of the popular culture to write that we are living in a 
postmodern age. From MTV. to the United Nations, to the hallowed 
halls of academia, there is a sense that things are fragmented, devoid 
of overarching meaning, and ultimately beyond our ability to control; 
that our agency is an illusion and perhaps even culpable in our 
impotency. In the South a young mother drowns her children in a 
station wagon but blames it on a black carjacker; in Bosnia- 
Hertzogovina Muslims suffer genocide while Western diplomats 
negotiate with the engineers of ethnic cleansing; in L.A. cheering 
spectators wave signs reading "Go O.J. Go!" as Simpson’s previously
1
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blood stained Bronco slowly flees down the freeway. Everywhere we 
turn the media betrays and portrays the crumbling metanarratives 
that once offered at least the hope of meaning, progress, and justice.
We w atch—literally—as the once sacred programs and 
institutions of modernism fall apart. The rule of law fades under the 
light of courtroom cameras as Mark Furhman swears he never used 
the "n-word." The sanctity of family drowns in Susan Smith's TV 
generated tears as she begs the carjacker not to harm her children. 
The promise of Western civilization and the utopia of Marxism are 
mutually stripped of credibility as journalists uncover the mass 
graves of the former Yugoslavia. From Rodney King's beating, the 
L.A. riots, the burning of Malcolm X's widow, and the Menendez 
brother's trails for murder to the massacres in Rwanda, drug 
resistant viruses, massive deforestation, and overpopulation: the
world, more than ever, seems "a darkling plain . . . where ignorant 
armies clash by night"—the "confused alarms of struggle and flight" 
(Arnold 649) made visible this time, however, not by a poet's pen 
but by the light of a CNN camera. The technology that was supposed 
to increase our ability to control the world has instead left us feeling 
overwhelmed.
And yet, what exactly all this fragmentation means and, more 
importantly, what we are supposed to feel and do about it is not 
clear. Indeed, there are almost as many views on the postmodern 
condition, as many opinions on the usefulness or futility of 
postmodern theory, as there are theorists. For Baudrillard and 
Derrida the inescapability of our condition becomes license to "play 
'with the pieces' of the deconstructed universe" (Faigley 210), to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
embrace postmodernity as "neither optimistic nor pessimistic" but as 
"a game with the vestiges of what has been destroyed . . . .  an
attempt to rediscover a certain pleasure in the irony of things, in the 
game of things" (Baudrillard B a u d r i l la r d  95). We are either to 
endlessly deconstruct, defer, and pun with meaning and presence as 
Derrida would have us do or accept, as Baudrillard does, that
pleasure in irony is more "sane" than a search for meaning in a world 
where simulacrums, where images of the real, are realer than real.
For other theorists like Foucault, whose language of power and 
confession belies any attempt to play with our condition, there is a 
hesitancy to theorize any large plan of action, any politics of 
consensuality, any universal form of agency for fear that "any global 
political theory of resistance . . . would inevitably reproduce what it 
set out to eliminate" (Faigley 44). While for theorists such as Fredric 
Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard, theorists who helped establish 
the postm odern critique, postm odernism represents either a 
challenge to be contained or a hope for a new kind of justice. For
Jameson, belief in a postmodern condition and adherence to classical
Marxism is not a contradiction but a kind of theorizing that sees 
postmodernism as a transitional stage from which we have not yet 
e m e rg e d .1 Despite postmodernism's devastating critique of Marxist 
theory, Jameson is "convinced that this new postmodern global form 
of capitalism will now have a new class logic about it, but it has not 
yet completely emerged because labor has not yet reconstituted 
itself on a global scale" (Hall and Jameson 31). His attempt, 
therefore, to create an overall theory of differentation is "little more 
than the making of connections between various phenomena"
3
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(Jameson "Afterward" 376). Lyotard, on the other hand, sees 
postmodernism not as a transitional stage but as an "overarching" 
(and in that sense paradoxical) condition of heterogeneity in which 
certain notions of universal justice are still possible.2 In T h  e 
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard calls for a "multiplicity of finite meta- 
arguments" over "grand narratives" because the former are more 
receptive to heterogeneity and unassimilated otherness (65). Justice 
within these multiple "little narratives" is not based on truth or 
consensus but on an "invention . . . born of dissension" (xxv). 
Postmodernism becomes a frame for a unity of contradictions.
For still other theorists, postmodernism and its specific 
manifestation as poststructuralism3 represent a questionable attempt 
to remove notions of agency, social justice, and identity just at the 
moment when marginalized groups have attained the power to use 
them. For example, Terry Eagleton initially rejected postmodernism 
as nothing more than another "bourgeois mystification."4 Barbara 
Christian sees postmodernism as the "production of a theoretical elite 
at precisely the time 'when the literature of peoples of color, of black 
women, of Latin Americans, of Africans, began to move to 'the 
center"’ ("The Race" 229). And Ann duCille's critique of the 
camouflaging effect of postcolonialism echoes the fear many theorists 
have about postmodernism. duCille believes that "False universals
such as 'the postcolonial woman,' 'the postcolonial condition,' and 
even 'the postcolonial critic' camouflage the variety of neocolonial 
circumstances in which masses of people live, work, and theorize" 
("Postcolonialism" 33). In a similar way, it could be argued that 
terms such as "the postmodern condition," "postmodern theory." and
4
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"the postmodern critic" camouflage the hunger, color, and gender 
inequalities that make it impossible or unpalatable for the
marginalized to fully enter the postmodern discursive universe. In 
short, there is a required level of privilege necessary to play with the 
pieces of the deconstructed universe. Finally, for theorists like
Jurgen Habermas postmodernism is not simply endlessly critical, 
paradoxical, or a mark of privilege but an abandonment of the goals 
of the Enlightenment: truth, rationality, and social justice. Fully
understanding and appreciating the postm odern critique of 
modernity, Habermas, nevertheless, believes that it "is made at the 
expense of any beneficial concept of reason" (Faigley 41). However, 
rationality for Habermas is no longer the product of an inner logic or 
unified
subject but the potential of a "pragmatics of language use" (41). He
maintains that a just society must be based on a comprehensive 
notion of rationality relocated in our "potential for communicative 
action" (41). In direct contrast to Lyotard, Habermas does not see 
the horrors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the result of 
the Enlightenment but as the result of leaving the Enlightenment an 
"incomplete project."5
Clearly, whatever one's feelings on the phenomenon of 
postmodernism, on its usefulness as a project for political change, or 
on the extent of the postmodern condition, the previous center 
provided by the modern project—"the domination of nature, the
primacy of method, and the sovereignty of the individual" 
(Borgmann C r o s s in g  5)—no longer holds, no longer persuades 
theoretically or pragmatically, no longer provides a common life.
5
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And yet, as Albert Borgmann argues, the postmodern theory that has 
arisen to describe our condition offers little comfort and even less 
direction: "the idiom we have favored since the beginning of the
modern era fails to inspire conviction or yield insight; the language of 
those proclaiming a new epoch seems merely deconstructive or 
endlessly prefatory" (2). Borgmann believes, therefore, that the 
"language of postmodernism has crucial critical force. But much of it 
seems idle; very little of it gives us a helpful view of the postmodern 
divide or of what lies beyond it (3-4). In other words, the 
postmodern critique reveals previously unproblematized power 
relations, offers the grounds for critiquing those relations, but leaves 
no way to move beyond those insights. It has produced no theory of 
agency that might lead to political action and change. It cannot seem 
to "articulate" Patricia Bizzell's call for "a positive program 
legitimated by an authority that is nevertheless non-foundational" 
("Beyond" 671). In essence, postmodernism seems like the great 
furnace in Milton's hell. It casts flames "on all sides round . . .  I yet 
from those flames / No light, but rather darkness visible / Serv'd 
only to discover sights of woe, / Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, 
where peace / And rest can never dwell, hope never comes" (Milton 
qtd. in Masello 36).
Yet this cliche, the now casual, commercial, and controversial 
use of the term postmodernism, still marks a very real sense that 
something important has changed in the understanding of ourselves 
and the world--a change found not so much in our fear of 
fragmentation and incoherence but in our fear of powerlessness in 
the face of that fragmentation, in the relationship of our agency.
6
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individually and collectively, to that incoherence. From philosophers 
like Nietzsche, Rousseau, and Kierkegaard to artists like Camus, 
Arnold, Kafka, and Joyce, feelings of fragmentation have been 
identified before. Indeed, the ultimately fragmented state of nature 
and society is a fundamental conceit of high modernism. The 
difference between their state and the postmodern is their belief in 
the ability of the artist, the agent, the individual to resist, as a moral 
project, this fragmentation, to stand in opposition to it, to form within 
one's self a consciousness that derives its wholeness from its ability 
to critique. This lack of faith in or concern with the ability of the 
individual to resist, perhaps more than anything else, marks 
postmodern theory. As David Harvey argues, "postmodernism 
swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of 
change as if that is all there is" (The Condition 44).
I would argue, however, that what has been abandoned or 
destroyed in theory may be found in our lived lives. While 
resistance or agency may no longer emanate from a distanced self 
and may no longer be leveled against easily discernible and 
monolithic power structures, it can still exist, individually and 
collectively, in the multiple and fractured things we do: write a
book, protest clear cutting, raise a child. It is a theory of agency and 
resistance that has passed through the postmodern critique yet 
retains many of its insights. It is a theory that does not hold out 
hope for a unified self but examines actions to see how a multiple, 
fractured, and fluid self might be manifested effectively. Like 
Friedman I believe that we have moved beyond the hegemony of 
postmodern theory but not its formative influence. Friedman, as my
7
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epigraph implies, sees us as having moved into a post-poststructural
period. Concerns for "ethics and politics, agency and action, intention
and meaning" are once again legitimate, but now must be seen and
performed in the presence of a feeling that poststructuralism is
historically past yet still crucially, if differently, present. She writes:
A f t e r  suggests . . . that we are beyond poststructuralism, that
p osrs truc tu ra l ism  is p a s t ,  still inevitably part of our present, but 
present different than it was before, present as a significant vestige 
of our immediate past, but fundamentally altered by its new context 
in the present. ("Post/Poststructuralism” 465-66).
This new context is one in which postmodernism must either help us
to fulfill a desire for a new kind of self, resistance, ethics, and history
or get out of the way.
We live in a moment when many of us want to reclaim 
important yet theoretically discredited ideas from modernism. But 
we want to reclaim them as vastly different practices. It is a time 
when "Agency involves action that is not separate from, but also not 
reducible to, language" (Friedman 472); when the self is not 
autonomous but still exists as dialogic and intersubjective; when 
resistance is not limited to the domain of subjectivity but must take 
other forms as the situation demands; when ethics is not seen as 
above ideology but somehow before it; and when, above all else, 
history is not seen as rationally progressive but still provides a sense 
of pattern, a sense of meaning rendered from experience, a sense of 
communicative possibility. For it is ludic p o s t m o d e r n i s m ' s  
abandonment of historical consciousness that cripples our ability to 
move beyond the postmodern divide. In surrendering history we 
surrender not only what we have been, what we are, and what we 
might be, but the struggle over who gets to decide those questions.
8
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It is historical consciousness that allows us to see our present
condition, to alter that condition, and to place ideology itself within a 
larger frame.
Moreover, it is a moment, a time, when the implicit morality of 
postmodern theory is pushing to the fore. As Kate Sopher does, I
find in much of postmodernism a covert desire to make the world 
and our students' lives better, but it is a desire that has been down­
played due to postmodernism's initial role as critic of supposedly 
moral systems. She writes:
Why, for example, lend ourselves to the politics of "difference” if not 
in virtue o f  its enlightenm ent—what is permits in the way of 
releasing subjects from the conflations o f  imperializing discourse 
and the constructed identities o f  binary oppositions? Why lend 
ourselves to the deconstruction o f  liberal-humanist rhetoric if not to 
expose the class or racial or gender identities it occludes? . . . Why 
call science into question if not in part because of the military and 
ecologica l ca tas trophes  to which the b lind  pursu it  o f  its
instrumental rationality has delivered us? Why problematize the
artistic canon and its modes of aesthetic discrimination if not to draw 
attention to the ways in which art can collude with the values of the 
establishment and serve to reinforce its power elites. (qtd. in 
Faigley 21)
Presently, therefore, I would argue that postmodernism need lead 
neither to an impasse nor a "wallowing” but, instead, could lead to 
new ethical ways of teaching and evaluating writing, new ways of 
relating to our students and colleagues, new ways of using the 
classroom to help interpenetrate divergent politics, new ways of 
sensing history that enable us to see that where we stand in the 
present is constituted by the past. In short, the historical moment 
offers us the possibility of using the moral potential of 
postmodernism to create composition studies as an ethical space in 
which multiple and new ways of being are enacted to solve 
immediate problems in specific situations.
9
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The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to help map this 
sense of a new post-postmodern identity, ethics, and "experience  of 
history"--not by ignoring or embracing the postmodern critique but 
by engaging it (Friedman 469). In my first chapter I will examine 
the problems involved in trying to use postmodernism in such a way 
for the field of composition. Specifically, I will review the ways that 
theorists such as James Berlin, Lester Faigley, Maxine Hairston, 
Patricia Harkin, Susan Miller, Victor Vitanza, and others have 
constructed the relationship of composition to postmodernity— 
constructions that either enable or harm composition's ability to use 
postmodernism in the manner I hope for. In chapter two. I will 
show that the postmodern impasse of agency is more a problem of 
theory than an actual condition. The impasse is neither a barrier to 
writing resistance nor for using postmodernism to explain that 
resistance. The chapter focuses on the writing of a lower caste, 
Indian, woman immigrant who confronts both caste prejudice and 
sexism through the anonymity of the internet. Resistance and 
agency for Malathi are not matters o f subject position but of 
refiguring object status through writing, personal history, and 
technology. Malathi will show us that the historical grounds for 
resistance, and thus the preeminent need for subjectivity to resist 
oppression, have changed or at least become more complex.
Chapter three is the first of two chapters that will focus on the 
issue of politics in the classroom. Having established the possibility 
of resistance, I begin to examine how composition tries to both deal 
with and encourage student resistance in the classroom by teaching 
the political. In this chapter I critique the critical democracy
1 0
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pedagogy advanced by such diverse theorists as James Berlin. 
Patricia Bizzell, Alan France, Karen Fitts, Charles Payne, James 
Laditka, C. H. Knoblauch, Ira Shor, John Clifford, and Donald Morton to 
name a few. Disturbed by the authoritarian approach that some
critical pedagogues take yet dedicated to the idea of the classroom as 
a place for social progress, I use postmodernism to reject the false 
choice of either having to leave one's politics at the door or using 
one's authority to try and force ideological change. Having critiqued
current pedagogy on the use of politics in the classroom, I use
chapter four to offer a postmodern ethics of the political as a 
substitute. Borrowing from the works of Michel Foucault, Gerald 
Graff, Patricia Harkin, and Mikhail Bakhtin, I construct an ethics of 
the political based on experimentation, pragmatism, Bakhtinian 
answerability, and respect for the incommensurability of the other.
Then, in the spirit of Foucault, I put this ethics to the test against 
examples of offensive student writing. It is my contention that 
offensive writing is often an act of legitimate resistance and should 
be treated as such.
Finally, in the last chapter I try to recapture a notion of history 
that acknowledges the postmodern critique of teleology yet sees 
history as having a pattern that, if traced, allows us to forge 
connections and resist inequities. I reject both the radical 
postmodernists who claim that we are living in a post-historical era 
and the Hegelian or Marxist historians who refuse to see that history 
is not marked by an inherent plan or progression. Specifically, I try 
to recapture a sense of history and community through the concept 
of intertextuality. I examine the strange echoes I hear between the
I I
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work of Michel Foucault and the work of Plato—echoes that make
Plato relevant and Foucault useful to the projects of social progress. 
My belief is that while texts do not represent a space outside of
cultures from which to judge practices, they do represent a shared, if 
conflicted, space among communities where standards of ethics, 
politics, and aesthetics can be debated and altered, a web of
connections for dialogue.
in general, the project can be summed up in a quote from 
Henry Giroux:
Rather than proclaiming the end of reason, postmodernism can be 
critically analyzed for how successfully it interrogates the limits of
the p ro jec t o f  modernist rationality and its universal claims to 
progress, happiness, and freedom. Instead o f  assum ing that
postmodernism has vacated the terrain o f  values, it seems more
useful to address how it accounts for how values are constructed
historically  and relationally  . . . .  instead of claim ing that
postmodernism's critique of the essentialist subject denies a theory 
o f  subjectivity, it seems more productive to examine how its claims 
about the con tingen t character o f  iden tity , cons truc ted  in a 
multiplicity of social relations and discourse, redefines the notion of 
agency. ("Slacking O ff ’ 350-51)
I believe composition, more than any other field, has the capacity to
use postmodernism in the way Giroux recommends. Composition is,
in some sense, both within and larger than postmodernism. It is a
mode of being, a way of writing self, resistance, ethics, experience,
and history into tangible, alterable, communal existence. It deals
with learning, literacy, knowledge making, and critique. It is literacy
as a material action in the world that has real effects on real bodies.
After all, the putting together of parts preceded the postmodern
condition and will outlive it (though composing too has passed
through the altering of postmodernity). Still, this altering does not
have to be restrictive or destructive. The altering caused by
I 2
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postmodernism should result in more not less—more ways of writing, 
more ways of creating practice and play, more ways of making 
connections, and more ways of negotiating the academic, cultural, 
political, and e th ica l challenges of today 's  classroom s. 
Acknowledging the failure of subject-centered rationality does not 
necessitate nihilism or relativism nor does it necessitate the 
destruction of all notions of truth or justice. Instead, it represents 
the need to enter a relationship of respectful listening when trying to 
forge a relationship, a politics, an ethics, or a history of self to other. 
The influence of postmodernity could be the celebration of the 
failure of the Enlightenment and of modernism to banish, destroy, or 
assimilate the incommensurability of the other.
Before I turn to the first chapter though, I feel compelled to 
make a small digression. A devoted liberal humanist, I have 
wrestled, painfully at times, with postmodernism's devastating 
critique of that tradition. In this struggle I have not been alone. For 
many the theories of postmodernity represent a persuasive body of 
knowledge but also a serious threat to hard won advances in human 
rights, academic freedom, the rule of law, and other "sacred" 
humanist principles. This dissertation represents my attempt to ally 
my own and others' fears concerning the worth of the postmodern 
project for the teaching of writing and the writing of social change. I 
still deeply believe in concepts such as truth, subjectivity, human 
rights, history, and the importance of the relationship of words to 
things and actions. I have merely come to believe that truth is 
negotiated within historical and institutional moments, that subjects 
who write are also written, that history is often written by the
1 3
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winners, and that discursive signs are unstable and institutionally 
specific.
More importantly, I have come to learn that I will not and 
cannot sacrifice a vision of a better world simply because it has 
become theoretically difficult to justify notions of progress, justice, 
and universal human rights. My response to the most radical 
postmodernists, trapped as they are in a world of discursive illusions, 
is that they do not understand that language does not determine the 
experience of the world but constitutes it; that other things, often 
more important things such as the body, rupture the ability of 
language to neatly package experience. As Elaine Scarry argues in 
The Body in Pain, "physical pain does not simply resist language but 
actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state 
anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes 
before language is learned" (4). It is these things which radical 
postmodernism often tries to "flick" away—the story of those who 
cannot argue using the technology of the present, the parts of 
experience that overwhelm language, the worth of good will in 
attempting to construct universal justice—that I will try to recover. I 
end my introduction, therefore, with a poem by Allen Ginsberg. I 
think that sometimes in our discussions of power, language, and 
politics we forget the responsibility, the necessity, of love. We forget 
that in our relationships with others the burden is not only political, 
economical, and pedagogical but emotional. We must, in some sense, 
love those whom we would teach, argue with, and live amongst. For 
in that love it is impossible to remove humanity and our 
responsibility to it.
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The weight of the world 
is love.












c o n s t r u c t s  
a miracle,
in imagination 
a n g u i s h e s
till born 
in hum an—
looks out of the heart
burning with purity— 
for the burden of life 
is love, 
but we carry the weight 
w e a r i  ly 
and so must rest 
in the arms of love 
at last,





o f  love—
be mad or chill 
obsessed with angels 
or machines, 
the final wish 
is love 
—cannot be bitter, 
cannot deny, 
cannot w ithhold 
if denied:
the weight is too heavy 
—must give
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the hand moves 
to the center
of the flesh, 
the skin trembles
in happiness 
and the soul comes








where I was born.
SanJose, 1954
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INTRODUCTION NOTES
1. See Bizzell’s "Marxist Ideas in Composition Studies" pages 55-57 and 67-68 for 
a further discussion o f  how Jameson attempts to maintain both a classical 
Marxist hope for the future and a postmodern sensibility of the present.
2. Lyotard admits in Just Gaming  that his "justice of multiplicity" (100) rests on 
the con trad ic t ion  o f  a un iversa l p rinc ip le  that language  gam es are 
incommensurable and singular. In effect, he admits that his theory against 
meta-narratives rests on a meta-narrative. This contradiction, however, does 
not bother him because it is itself emblematic of the postmodern cond ition -  
living with fragm entation and contradiction without feeling the need to 
assimilate it. He argues that postmodernism "refines our sensitivity  to 
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its 
principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s para logy” (T h e  
Postmodern Condition xxv).
3. Though com position  often uses postm odernism  synonym ously  for 
posts tructura lism  and pos tco lon ia lism , I recognize that there  are key 
differences among these terms. Yet because of current parlance and the 
legitimacy of seeing postmodernism, in its broadest sense, as a critique of 
modernism in which both poststructuralism and postcolonialism participate. I 
feel comfortable in using the quotations of these authors to discuss the larger 
phenomenon of postmodernism. See Kwame Anthony Appiah’s "Is the Post-in 
Postmodernism the Post-in Postcolonial?" for a discussion o f  differences 
between the two terms.
4. See James Berlin’s Rhetorics. Poetics, and Culture page 64.
5. See Jurgen Habermas' "Modernity—An Incomplete Project."
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CHAPTER I
STRANGE BEDFELLOW S?: COM POSITION AND  
POSTM ODERNITY
Critics of postmodernism are fond of pointing out the disparities of
usage in the term and that any concept of postmodernism is itself 
contradictory. Both caveats should be kept in mind. There is no way 
o f  w orking quickly through the con trad ic t ions  d e sc r ib e d  in 
discussions o f  postmodernity as a cultural condition. Indeed, the
assertion that there is no satisfactory definition o f  postmodernism is 
a positive expression of postmodernism. When it can be defined, the 
provocativeness of postmodernism will have long since ended. 
Lester Faigiey Fragments o f  Rationality
The shepherd, qua shepherd, acts for the good of the sheep, to
protect them from discomfiture and harm. But he may be identified
with a project that is raising the sheep for market. —Kenneth Burke 
R h e t o r i c
If the larger culture’s relationship to postmodernism is 
complex, then the specific cultural site of composition and its 
relationship to postmodernism is even more so. Indeed, 
composition's relationship to postmodernity may be more convoluted 
than any other discipline's relationship given our intimacy with that 
most postmodern nexus of language/writing/self. In response to this 
complexity composition has developed multiple ways of defining its 
relationship with postmodernity—each with distinct ramifications for 
how useful the theories of postmodernity can be for solving the 
dilemmas of our field. In general, composition seems to have defined 
five ways of using or relating to postmodernism: epistemological,
cultural, utilitarian, radical, and adversarial.
I 8
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The first way of understanding postmodernism and its 
relationship to composition is encapsulated nicely by Lester Faigiey. 
In Fragments o f  Rationality Faigiey argues that "The disruptions of 
postmodern theory that have caused major upheavals in other 
disciplines in the humanities and interpretative social sciences have 
had far less effect on composition studies" (xi). Faigiey explains this 
lack of upheaval by pointing to "the conservatism of composition 
studies in the face of postmodern theory" (xi). Composition as a 
discipline, according to Faigiey, has been reluctant to surrender its 
modernist "belief in the writer as an autonomous self" (15). This 
reluctance has caused composition to lag far behind other fields in 
reaping the epistem ological and pedagogical challenges of 
postmodern theory. Faigiey is, therefore, "ambivalent about claims 
that we have entered an era of postmodernity" (21). Instead he 
believes that "while composition studies is concurrent with some 
characterizations of an era of postmodernity, it has by and large 
resisted the fragmentary and chaotic currents of postmodernity" (xi).
For Faigiey, then, postmodernism is a theory that composition 
teachers and scholars must appropriate and apply to their research 
and teaching, even if they have lagged behind their colleagues in the 
social sciences and humanities in doing so. Postmodernism is seen as 
something outside composition, something that "coincides" with it, 
but that can only be fully incorporated into composition through a 
shift in composition's epistemological assumptions. If composition 
continues to refuse to surrender its belief in the writer as an 
autonomous self, then postmodernism will continue to have only a 
marginal effect on teaching, evaluation, and research. Much like
1 9
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Stephen North's view of composition as a discipline marked by 
incompatible research communities due to different epistemological 
assum ptions, F a ig ley 's  postm odernism  rep re se n ts  another 
incompatible epistemology that must compete with already existing 
composition epistemologies.
But other theorists, most notably Louise Weatherbee Phelps. 
Patricia Harkin, John Schilb, and Susan Miller, contend that 
composition studies is always already postmodern, is already and has 
always been "fragmented" in the ways Faigley's metaphor suggests. 
For these theorists postmodernism is a cultural condition in which we 
live and not a theory that we apply. Phelps, for example, introduces 
her book Composition as a Human Science with the observation that 
"composition awakens in the initial moment of its disciplinary project 
to find itself already situated, prereflectively, within a specific 
cultural field of meaning—that of postmodern thought, with its 
characteristic preoccupations and world vision" (3). Harkin, alluding 
to Foucault, claims that composition studies is more properly 
understood as "post-disciplinary," a cultural practice rather than a 
discipline or even an interdisciplinary field of inquiry and teaching 
(“The Postdisciplinary" 126). And Schilb, while not going as far as 
Harkin, argues that "the field [of composition studies] currently 
comprises diverse topics and methods and has ties to numerous 
disciplines"("Cultural Studies" 176).' For Phelps et al, postmodernism 
is not a theory that composition teachers and scholars must 
appropriate but an intellectual movement in which they have always 
already participated (albeit with varying degrees of awareness) by 
virtue of composition's subject(s). so that composition is leading the
20
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way for postmodern inquiry and teaching in other academic 
disciplines.
Postmodernism is not "out there," not a theoretical abstraction 
to explain our condition; it is our condition. The reason why
postmodernism has not resulted in acknowledged classroom
practices, therefore, is not because we cling to a previous and 
incompatible epistemology, as Faigiey contends, but because we need 
to make explicit a condition that we already implicitly live. The
problem of turning theory into practice is not one of translation but 
of awareness. Thus, despite Faigley's ambivalence, composition's 
multiplicity of research methods and methodologies, epistemologies. 
and practitioners are themselves manifestations of postmodernity.
A third view, or in this case I should stress use. of
postmodernism, began with theorists like Kenneth Bruffee, Karen 
LeFevre and Charles Bazerman and culminated in the work of 
theorists like Patricia Bizzell, John Trimbur, John Clifford, and James 
Berlin. These theorists employed and employ, to varying degrees, 
aspects of postmodern theory to critique previous composition 
epistemologies and rhetorics in order, ultimately, to advance more 
ideologically "enlightened" ones. In the late 70's and early 80's 
Bruffee, influenced by the work of Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, and 
Clifford Geertz, developed a pedagogy of "collaborative learning" for 
viewing and teaching writing as socially negotiated knowledge. 
Rather than seeing writing as the individual act of an autonomous 
self, Bruffee attempts to locate writing and the self within Rorty's 
normal and abnormal discourses. He argues that "entities we 
normally call reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so
2 I
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on are constructs generated by communities of like-minded peers” 
("Social Construction" 774). Crucial to Bruffee’s pedagogy of writing, 
therefore, are the ideas of community and collaboration as ways of 
forming consensus and writing critique.
Karen LeFevre, influenced by George Herbert Mead, continues 
this line of reasoning by arguing that invention itself is a social act. 
the "symbolic interactions of a group of people" (I n v e n t io n  I). 
LeFevre believes that too many theorists, influenced by Plato, see 
invention "as the private act of an individual writer" (I). While 
LeFevre acknowledges the usefulness of this view for encouraging 
self expression and self-confidence in writers, she nonetheless 
maintaines that it sketches "an incomplete picture of what happens 
when writers invent, and it may unduly constrain the development 
of processes of invention" ( l ) . 2 Teaching writing, according to 
LeFevre, is not merely a matter of allowing an innate self to speak or 
of developing mental models for problem-solving but of a communal 
negotiation of social spaces.3 Hence, community and collaboration 
are once again of crucial importance.
These early social constructionist pedagogies would seem 
postmodern in that they down-play the romantic notion of the 
discrete individual and advance a "communitarian notion of the 
subject . . . [located] in terms of the shared discursive practices of a 
community" (Faigiey 17). However, postmodernism "works to 
unravel existing categories rather than to reify them" (17). These 
social constructionists restrict their use of postmodernism to the 
discursive yet shared nature of language, knowledge, and writing. 
They explode the romantic and cognitive conceptions of individuality
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but replace it with an equally idealistic shared community, ignoring 
the more disruptive and power laden aspects of postmodern theory. 
In short, their theories of writing slight the more contested, 
conflicted, and competing aspects of the writing classroom. It is an 
ideal use of postmodernism that does not remain unchallenged for 
long.
The best critique of the early social constructionist ideas of 
community and writing is made by Joseph Harris. Influenced by the 
more disruptive elements of postmodernism, Harris argues that 
"recent theories have tended to invoke the idea of community in 
ways at once sweeping and vague: positing discursive utopias that
direct and determine the writings of their members, yet failing to 
state the operating rules or boundaries of these communities" ("The 
Idea" 12). In essence, Harris believes that social construction 
theories conflate the idea of a linguistic speech community (speakers 
in close geographical location) with the idea of an interpretive 
community from literary theory (diverse readers linked by shared 
ideas concerning texts). As Lester Faigiey further argues, this 
conflation results in "the uncritical use of community for suppressing 
the conflicts that exist within any social group." It is a "holistic and 
closed notion of community [that] encourages a simplified view of a 
discursive field, where the influences of the contradictory and 
multiple discourses that one encounters in everyday life are 
minimal." Further, the social constructionist "subject becomes a 
participant within a language game on a contained field of play. 
Postmodern theory, on the other hand, would situate the subject
23
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among many competing discourses that precede the subject” (226- 
27).
Into the space opened by this critique will walk the critical 
democracy pedagogy of such theorists as James Berlin, Patricia 
Bizzell, John Clifford, and John Trimbur. They will keep the ideas of 
community and subject but stress their ideological, competing, and 
even contradictory natures. Rather than trying to erase social 
differences, these theorists want "Representation of any kind . . .  to 
be viewed as implicated in social and political relations" of power 
(Faigiey 15). As John Clifford argues, "Our beliefs about rhetoric, 
finally, do not originate in an authentic, voiced consciousness: do not 
exist primarily in enlightened cognition; and are certainly not the 
cumulative result of consensual, transcendent scholarship, research, 
and intellectual will" ("The Subject" 51). However, the inescapability 
of power does not mean that critical democracy theorists see all 
ideologies and structures of power as equally just. Indeed, they see 
the classroom as a place to aggressively reform the social inequities 
caused by the larger culture's unjust structures and applications of 
power. What teachers must do in classrooms is "the intellectual 
work" they "know best: helping students to read and write and think
in ways that both resist domination and exploitation and encourage 
self consciousness about who they are and can be in the social world" 
(Clifford 51).
Consequently, these theorists borrow ideas from Paul de Man, 
Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, and others to advance a socio- 
ideological and rhetorical view of the individual, the act of writing, 
and the purpose of the writing classroom. It is a view, they feel.
24
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previous rhetorics have ignored "For perhaps obvious political 
reasons" (Clifford 51). For example, Berlin argues that the
"expressionist" rhetoric of theorists like Donald Murray and Peter 
Elbow "is inherently and debilitatingly divisive of political interest 
. . . .  [and] easily co-opted by the very capitalist forces it opposes" 
("Rhetoric" 491). Patricia Bizzell criticizes the "inner directed," 
cognitive rhetoric of Flower and Hayes as slighting the "outer 
directed" rhetoric of theorists who maintain that "thinking and 
language use can never occur free of a social context that conditions 
them" ("Cognition" 217). Difficulties in writing, Bizzell argues, should 
not be seen as signs of cognitive deficiencies but "as difficulties with 
joining an unfamiliar discourse community" (227).4 She believes, in 
essence, that cognitive rhetoric, to the detriment of the students, 
dismisses the ideological why of how students must write. Hence, in 
her later work she argues that "We must help our students . . .  to 
engage in a rhetorical process that can collectively generate . . . 
knowledge and beliefs to displace the repressive ideologies an unjust 
social order would prescribe" ("Beyond" 670). Finally, John Trimbur. 
influenced by Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard, criticizes 
the social constructionist rhetoric of Bruffee as relying too heavily on 
consensus. For Trimbur collaborative learning can only effectively 
locate students within social structures by holding a rhetoric of 
consensus in dialectic tension with a rhetoric of dissensus. Only then 
can consensus "be a powerful instrument for students to generate 
differences, to identity the systems of authority that organize these 
differences, and to transform the relations of power that determine
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
who may speak and what counts as a meaningful statement" 
("Consensus" 603).5
These critical democracy theorists, then, use postmodernism to 
construct writing courses as places for open ideological conflict, 
critique of the dominant culture, and as potential sites for liberation 
from that unjust culture. Previous rhetorics are not criticized for 
being ineffectual at the teaching of writing but for not fulfilling the 
potential of the classroom as a place, in the spirit of Paulo Freire. for 
social reformation. They are, therefore, more postmodern in that 
they embrace the more disruptive aspects of postmodern theory and 
have a more ideological and discursive understanding of the subject, 
but they break with postmodernism by retaining an authoritative 
and rational pedagogy. Postmodernism is used as a way of turning 
the writing classroom into a site for reasoned, critical, participatory 
democracy.
Consequently, these critics will soon find their own use of 
postmodernism the subject of criticism by even more radical 
postmodern theorists. For theorists like Thomas Kent and Victor 
Vitanza, the very "notion of 'participation' itself becomes problematic 
in its implication that the subject can control its location and moves 
within a discourse" (Faigiey 227). These theorists stress the more 
radical aspects of postmodernity—sheer heterogeneity, continual 
flux, anti-pedagogy, anti-rationality—that theorists like Berlin back 
away from. For example, in Paralogic Rhetoric: A Theory of
Communicative Interaction, Thomas Kent, influenced by Donald 
Davidson, rejects expressivist, cognitivist, social constructionist, and 
critical democracy pedagogies on the grounds that they all construct
26
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the mind and external reality as separate entities by creating a gap 
in which interpretation stops and advocacy begins. Instead. Kent, 
like Rorty, believes that "interpretation goes all the way down" ("The 
Hope" 427). Interpretation does not stop. There is no space outside 
the flow of interpretation from which we can critique its rules of 
behavior or advocate new ones. Thus, any rules we find through 
interpretation are only authentic and applicable to the immediate 
situation. But the other theorists, according to Kent, do not see this 
inescapability. Instead, they create a Cartesian gap and then attempt 
to negotiate this gap through mediating structures such as universal 
forms or experiences, cognitive processes, the conventions of 
discursive communities, or enlightened ideologies. However, these 
mediating structures ultimately disable our mind's effort to make 
contact with other minds; we cannot bridge the gap because the 
structures themselves are in the way. Hence, these theorists 
condemn us, according to Kent, to live either in a state of unrelenting 
subjectivity and/or a mode of colonization of the other.
Indeed, Kent finds it hypocritical and authoritarian, as Vitanza 
does, to argue that all teaching and writing is ideological and then to 
privilege writing that defies the "unjust social order"—two 
determinations, the privileging and the unjust order, that themselves 
would have to be the product of ideology. Any critique of ideology is 
merely another interpretation based on a cultural situatedness that 
is also understood through interpretation. Therefore, any pedagogy 
that pretends to be more than that, more just or more ethical, is for 
Kent, as it was for Nietzsche, the imposition of the ideology of the 
powerful on the weak. Kent rejects these dualistic models in favor of
27
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seeing communication as a triangulated process in which people 
enter a conversation based not on shared discursive practices but on 
shared sensory impressions. We communicate by using the "data" of 
the sensory impression to try and guess what is in the mind of the 
other person. This guessing game does not ensure communication, 
but it offers the hope of communication. How well we communicate 
depends on how well we guess and how open we are to listening to 
the reactions provided by the other. Kent "jettisons" both language 
and discourse community, as these are currently understood, but 
keeps rhetoric as a practice, a form of play, that also interprets all 
the way down and so forces us to remain in the immediacy of the 
moment.
Kent's theory has radical implications for the teaching and 
evaluating of writing. Neither writing nor any other communication 
process can be taught because there are no rules to teach. The 
guessing game is paralogical rather than logical. Indeed, Kent's 
critique of other rhetorics is that they all try to follow some form of 
preexisting rules, be they transcendent, cognitive, discursive, or 
ideological, and so block out the hope of communication and impose 
the terror of abstraction. Further, evaluating writing becomes a 
minefield of potential oppression. Since we cannot apply preexisting 
rules, we must search for them dialogically with the student and the 
text. We must simply be as open and present to the immediate 
situation as we can be. We can only practice and play together and 
hope to communicate.
However, as radical as Kent’s postmodern theory is for the 
teaching of composition, Victor Vitanza, influenced by Lyotard, is
2 8
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perhaps the most radical of all current theorists. As Faigiey says. 
"Vitanza finds a great reluctance among composition theorists to 
acknowledge the radical questioning and deferral of a course of 
action in postmodern theory. He places nearly everyone in 
composition, ranging from Berlin to Flower, in the same leaky boat of 
modernism" (244 n. 8). In other words, Vitanza thinks we make the 
mistake of desiring and enacting closure based on reason. Thus, the 
problems of our classrooms are largely self-imposed through our 
refusal to give up reason—be it individual or social. For example, he 
writes that "Berlin is never suspicious enough; for he never simply 
’drifts' far enough" ("Three" 142). Berlin still tries to use reason, 
albeit a social reason, to guide actions and determine outcomes. 
Vitanza sees Berlin as having merely shifted the site terror off the 
individual and onto the social and ideological. It is a move that 
Vitanza suspects as "both dangerously utopian and blindly 
ideological, it is, as Stanley Fish says, 'nothing more or less than a 
reinvention of foundationalism'" (143). Therefore, Vitanza rejects 
"'rational' thinking and acting, especially about language." He feels 
that it "only further remystifies and disempowers students and us 
all...Why? Because as Lyotard says, 'Reason and power are one and 
the same thing. You may disguise the one with dialectics . . . .  but 
you will still have the other in all its crudeness: jails, taboos, public
weal, selection, genocide"’ (qtd. in Vitanza 142). Although Vitanza 
agrees with "Berlin and Company" in being "against founding a 
pedagogy on capitalism," he is "still unequivocally contra to these 
social-consensual theory-hopeful rationalists, who through social
29
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reengineering and instrumental reason . . . want to cure society and 
make the world into a great, good place" (143).6
Thus, these radical postmodern theorists would eliminate both 
the validity of rational pedagogy and the desire for social 
reformation--at least as these are usually conceived. They abandon 
what Vitanza calls "pedagogy hope": the belief that we can construct
a pedagogy in theory that will not brutalize our students in practice 
(143). Instead, they want our classrooms to stress radical 
heterogeneity, sheer difference, and continuous play. They 
encourage us not to fall into the "traps" of skills, self-expression, 
cognitive processes, or social causes but to simply drift in the 
classroom as a means of "finding" new ways of writing tied to the 
immediacy of the situation and the irreducibile difference of 
s tudents .
These theorists have, as I have written, the most radical view 
of composition's relationship to postmodernity, and this radicalism 
helps explain why, as Faigiey argues, so many composition theorists 
are frustrated with postmodern theory. He writes:
By divorcing the subject from prevailing notions of the individual, 
e i th e r  the freely choosing  ind iv idua l  o f  cap ita lism  or the 
interpellated individual of Althusserian Marxism, postmodern theory 
understands subjectivity as heterogeneous and constantly in flux.
The present frustration of those who have followed the course of 
theory . . . —those who have used notions of community as a critique 
o f  the autonomous individual, but then have had these notion of 
community unravel into complex sets o f  power relations—is where to 
locate agency in a postmodern subjectivity. (227)
For Vitanza the desire for rational agency, individual or communal, is
itself part of the problem. It represents composition's inability to
differ a course of action. Yet for many other compositionists.
Vitanza's drifting sounds like his own form of hegemony. As
3 0
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Friedman says of the poststructuralists, Vitanza has "made taboo . . . 
terms . . . such as self, author, work, experience, expression, meaning, 
authority, origin, and reference" ("Post/Post structural" 473). This 
tainting of so many important terms helps to explain the resistance 
so many compositionists have towards radical postmodern theory. It 
seems to take away the very things that give us authority, purpose,
and hope and so helps to explain why the final way composition
constructs its relationship to postmodernity is adversarial.
Some have conceptualized the relationship of composition to 
postmodernism not as useful, problematic, or even frustrating but as
dangerous and bogus, as the colonization of composition studies by
literary theory. Maxine Hairston encapsu lates this argument with 
the most feeling. In "Breaking Our Bonds and Reaffirming Our 
C on nections,"  H airston w arn s  c o m p o sit io n  t e a c h e r s  about  
"politically active literary critics . . . 'full of passionate  intensity'" 
(276). To Hairston these critics represent an "intimate enemy." The 
incorporation of their postmodern theory would turn the classroom 
from a student-centered, low risk, safe place for exploring writing 
"into a forum for debate on social issues" ("Required Writing" Bl). It 
would harm composition's authority, according to Hairston, to decide 
for itself what students need in order to write and think critically— 
critically being defined outside the domain of ideology. It would 
force us to share our classrooms with theorists who do not 
understand or appreciate writing process. Hairston, therefore, 
chastises compositionists who bring in "the magic names" of 
postmodern literary theory in order to "signal that they have not 
abandoned the faith" ("Breaking" 274). Instead, according to
3 1
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Hairston, they have abandoned their own discipline and surrendered 
their students’ educations to the "academic elite." "If we are going to 
hold our own against them," Hairston writes, then we must "rally our 
forces against" their influence ("Breaking" 277). Ironically, like 
Vitanza, but for diametrically opposed reasons, Hairston also sees 
many of compositions' current problems as stemming from our own 
inability to trust ourselves and our students, and from having 
incorporated into composition studies something that does not 
belong.
I do not share Hairston's view of literary theory as the enemy: 
I do not see the philosophers of postmodernity as belonging solely to 
literary studies in the first place. However, I do share her concern 
over what postmodern theory, as it has manifested itself in 
composition, is doing to the teaching of writing or, more specifically, 
to writing teachers. With the exception of the cultural position, the 
positions I have outlined do not, in my opinion, present postmodern 
theory as a very attractive body of w ork—especially  for 
practitioners. Practitioners, according to Stephen North, are 
interested in practice, in what writing does, in techniques, in what he 
calls lore: "the accumulated body of traditions, practices, and beliefs
in terms of which Practitioners understand how writing is done, 
learned and taught" (The Making 22). Some of these traditions 
include: workshops, journals, the valuing of voice and revision,
exploration and discovery, authenticity and community, clarity, and 
getting the job done. Practitioners have a strong sense of community 
and of writing as a way to resist dehumanizing structures of power. 
All these characteristics add up to a pragmatic ethos that not only
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doesn't mind contradiction but thrives on it. "Literally anything." 
North writes, "can become part of lore," and "nothing can ever be 
dropped from it either" (24). Practitioners are not concerned,
therefore, with hard and fast rules or with theoretical abstractions,
and they dislike rigidity.
Some of these characteristics, obviously, would seem open to 
or, if Phelps is right, reflective of a postmodern sensibility, a 
sensibility that would run counter to much of the way
postmodernism has been presented to practitioners. For example, 
critical democracy theorists offer practitioners an authoritarian 
postmodernism that discredits much of what they do in the
classroom; radical theorists offer teachers a dense, jargony 
postmodernism that rejects many things—authorship, self expression, 
authentic voice, intention, meaning—that practitioners hold dear: 
adversarial theorists offer practitioners a postmodernism that they 
should fear and avoid; and theorists like Faigiey present a
postmodernism that, if the practitioners refuse to change, is
supposedly foreign to their constitution. In short, the theorists I
have outlined either use parts of postmodernism to advance 
authoritarian classroom practices, reject postmodernism outright and 
so leave practitioners defenseless to its critique and bereft of its 
potential, or wallow in a kind of postmodernism that does not
recognize the current situation as one of trying to pick up rather than 
play with the pieces of the deconstructed universe. None of these 
views, in other words, make postmodernism seem a very credible or 
useful body of knowledge for teachers who want the classroom to be
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student-centered, craft based, socially critical, and process oriented 
all at the same time.
Indeed, of all the positions I have outlined, only Phelps et al's 
comes close to presenting postm odernism  in a way that 
acknowledges, at least implicitly, the importance of practioner 
knowledge. Presenting postmodernism as a cultural condition in 
which we have always already participated gives immediate 
legitimacy to practioner methods. After all, if we have always 
already been postmodern, then practioner knowledge as the first 
way of making knowledge in our field would reflect an intimacy with 
postmodernism rather than an incom patibility—an intimacy of 
practice that most of the acknowledged postmodern pedagogies lack. 
Therefore, Phelps et al's position forces the lettered class of 
composition to reevaluate the postmodern potential and complexity 
of what composition teachers have always already been doing in the 
classroom. Instead of dismissing practioner knowledge as naive, 
conservative, or devoid of political consciousness, Phelps' 
postmodernism forces us to reconsider practitioners as the field’s 
first postmodern teachers.7
However, I think that we must now acknowledge that the 
cultural condition of which Phelps writes has changed in character. 
This historical moment suggests
that a f te r  nearly  two decades o f  the g row ing  pow er o f  
poststructuralist theory as the most authoritative and prestigious 
discourse of the profession, this developing hegemony is being 
called into question by a wide range o f  crit ics—from those who 
advocate a return to an ideal realm of canonical classics and fixed 
meaning; to those who attack intellectual elitism and exclusionary 
power relations endemic in the sheer difficulty o f  poststructuralist 
discourses: to those who insist that what Barbara Christian calls "the 
race for theory" involves a retreat from the insistent and growing
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presence of women, people of color, and Third world people on the 
literary  and crit ica l scene; and to those writing w i t h i n  a 
p o s ts tru c tu ra l is t  fram ew ork who are inc reas ing ly  c r i t ica l  o f  
poststructuralism 's tendency toward ahistoricism , indifference, and 
disengagement on the one hand and. on the other hand, to totalizing 
orthodoxies and master-disciple psychodynamics. (Friedman 466)
Therefore, we cannot merely claim that composition inhabits a 
postmodern condition. We must define what that condition is, the 
impact it has on practice, what we agree and disagree with in the 
condition, and how the condition changes and has changed— 
especially for practitioners who have been locked out of most 
debates on what postmodernism is and what it is worth. In short, 
postmodernism as a theory of our cultural condition is too vague to 
win over and empower composition's practitioners. As Patricia 
Harkin argues, "we need to have models of knowledge production- 
concrete accounts of proposed changes in institutional procedures 
that tell us what kind of knowledges teachers make, how they make 
it, and why it should count" ("The Postdisciplinary" 125). To assign 
practitioners to a vague condition of postm odernity only 
disempowers them further by removing them from the details and 
debates over that condition that gives it meaning and practical force. 
For example, for Friedman the postmodern condition, or in this case 
the more specific postmodern manifestation of poststructuralism, has 
itself become a hegemonic "orthodoxy" that we should regard with 
suspicion due to its lack of commitment to social causes, yet which 
has forever changed notions of self, agency, and community. I 
hardly think that a postmodern hegemony is the kind of 
postmodernism with which practitioners would like to be associated. 
But they may want to be associated with Friedman’s post­
postmodernism. We must now, therefore, neither reject or accept
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postmodernism but rather work to understand how it has constituted 
our view of writing, the benefits and limitations of that view, and 
how our historical moment has changed that constitutive effect. We 
must be willing to update the "specific cultural field of meaning" in 
light of the situations in which we now find ourselves.
If so updated, we could use postmodernism to create a frame 
that would be attractive to practitioners and helpful for solving or at 
least enriching our understanding of composition's most vexing 
problems: student resistance, the introduction of politics into the
classroom, the recapturing of history, and perhaps most importantly, 
why composition practitioners resist a body of thought in which they 
may already be participants—at least when it comes to practice. For 
despite all the well known theorists in composition who have written 
volumes on the postmodern condition, little awareness of it. except 
perhaps as something hostile, has filtered down to the composition 
classroom, to the hallway discussions among teachers at conferences, 
or to the lives of our students. In this regard, I think Faigley’s view 
of composition’s relationship to postmodernism has some validity. 
Composition practitioners have, by and large, resisted the influence 
of postmodernism. However, they have resisted it not because of a 
modernist sensibility but because of the way postmodern theory was 
introduced into composition studies, the way postmodern theory is 
written, and the way postmodern theory problematizes the notion of 
agency. These "ways" have robbed composition of practioner input 
in discussions on postmodern theory. It is to these issues, therefore.
I would now like to turn.
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The A rrogance o f  Postm odern T heory
Henry Louis Gates Jr. once commented that while he did not 
"deny the importance, on the level of theory, of the [postmodern] 
project," such a project did not help him when he was "trying to get a 
taxi on the corner of 125th and Lenox Avenue" (Loose Canons  37- 
38). The project lacked what Gates called "practical performative 
force." I believe Gates' observation echoes the current relationship of 
composition's practitioners to postmodernism. Postmodernism has 
not persuaded them nor have its advocates worked very hard to do 
so. Postmodernism has remained a largely elitist and theoretical 
pursuit by tenured professors at large institutions. It has captured 
the minds and works of many of our best theorists, but an awareness 
of its potential usefulness has not penetrated into the hearts of our 
classrooms, teachers, or students. One reason for this lack of
penetration is the divisive and condescending way in which 
postmodern theory was introduced into composition studies.
As I've already written, in the early eighties the theories of 
Clifford Geertz, Thomas Kuhn, and Richard Rorty became widely 
influential in composition studies through the work of Bruffee, 
LeFevre, Bazerman, and others. These theorists used "postmodern" 
figures to help solidify the social turn of process theory, but, more 
importantly, they opened the way for more radical and critical 
applications of postmodern theory. One of the first and most 
influential of these applications was James Berlin’s "Rhetoric and 
Ideology in the Writing Class." In it Berlin criticizes Linda Flower's 
problem-solving rhetoric as "the rationalization of economic activity. 
The pursuit of self-evident and unquestioned goals in the composing
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process parallels the pursuit of self-evident and unquestioned profit- 
making goals in the market place."8 Then, as I've already discussed. 
Berlin criticizes Peter Elbow’s and Donald Murray's "expressionist" 
pedagogy as "inherently and debilitating divisive of political protest . 
. . . [and] easily co-opted by the very capitalist forces it opposes. 
After all, this rhetoric can be used to reinforce the entrepreneurial 
virtues capitalism values most: individualism, private initiative, the
confidence for risk taking, the right to be contentious with authority 
(especially the state)" (491). As can be imagined, Berlin's article 
caused quite a lot of controversy but also quite a lot of anger. 
Besides attacking beloved composition figures and practices, he 
privileged his own work as somehow not paralleling the capitalist 
structure—a claim I find rather dubious.9 Further, his charge that 
expressionist and cognitivist rhetoric supported the fragmenting and 
dehumanizing forces of capitalism did not sit well with a number of 
composition practitioners/theorists. For example, Maxine Hairston 
called his paralleling of expressionist and cognitive rhetoric with the 
forces of capitalism "a facile non-Iogical leap" ("Diversity" 25), and 
Donald Stewart countered charges against expressivism with charges 
that collaboration can lead to conformity and totalitarianism.
Unchecked, Stewart argued, collaboration leads to "the police state, 
the group mentality to the point at which it eliminates 'non-social' 
types as the Jews in Nazi Germany" ("Collaborative" 74).10
Whether Berlin was right or wrong, and I happen to think his
reading of Murray and Elbow is reductive,11 his argument set the
tone for how postmodern theory was to be used by many 
composition theorists. Further, it marked the way in which
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postmodern theory was to be seen by many composition teachers—as 
an unnecessarily hostile caricature of beloved composition 
practitioners and practices, as representing the interests and 
authority of the tenure-line, intelligentsia of composition over the 
interests and authority of the "workers in the trenches," and, perhaps 
most damaging, as having little to do with how the process classroom 
is run, how process writing is taught, and how process teachers relate 
to students. In short, postmodernism was seen or felt as the final 
colonization of composition by a newmly minted class of Ph.D.’s, 
scholars, and researchers, a process that had begun with the 
displacement of practioner authority in the 1960's.12
And Berlin wasn't the only one to use postmodern theory in 
such a divisive way. Some of the harshest criticism of process 
teachers came within a few years span of Berlin's article. For 
example, in "The Silenced Dialogue" (1988), Lisa Delpit accuses child 
centered, low-risk, process-oriented instructors of sustaining both 
classism and racism by keeping the rules and conventions of writing 
instruction implicit—thereby mystifying and at the same time 
privileging the middle class situatedness which those rules and 
conventions represent. In Textual Carnivals  (1991) Susan Miller 
argues that "teaching process for its own sake" promotes "as an 
article of faith that he or she [the student] is 'independent' and 'free' 
to choose within the controls the society establishes" (89). Miller 
believes that students are never so free, and to act as if they are 
places students in "an infantile and solipsistic relation to the results 
of writing" (100). Miller further accuses process teachers of making 
composition the replacement for literature studies as the dominant
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culture’s mechanism of ideological reproduction. Process theory. 
Miller believes, severs writing from the sites in which it is produced, 
understood, and critiqued. She writes:
It is tempting to infer that contemporary composition has gone 
literature one better in creating the sensitivity for its own sake that 
literary studies has required of students. It has, that is. removed a 
canon o f  ideologically  jo ined  w orks that instill e thnocen tr ic ,  
logocentric, or any other congruent set o f  values and has substituted 
for them an almost entirely formalistic and intransitive vision of 
writing. (97-98)
Once again process teachers are accused of masking preexisting 
conditions of power and authority to the detriment of the students.
Regardless of the worth of these arguments, and I am 
particularly persuaded by Delpit's, the way in which the arguments
were made seems unnecessary. For example, although LeFevre is 
critical of teaching invention as the act of an autonomous individual, 
she nevertheless recognizes the pragmatic reasons and good 
intentions for doing so. Under the more hostile applications of 
postmodern theory, this pragmatism becomes naivete and good will a 
mask that suppresses the benefits of conflict--the possibility of social 
t r a n s fo rm a t io n .13 The more hostile and condescending stance of
later theorists also goes a long way in explaining that while
composition studies coincides with the era of postmodernity, there is 
seemingly little in the short history o f  composition studies that
suggests a postmodern view of heterogeneity and difference as
liberating forces, and there are very few calls to celebrate the 
fragmentary and chaotic currents of change. (Faigley 14)
But I would argue that this lack of call to celebrate heterogeneity
resulted not solely from a modernist ethos but also from the way in
which these forces of heterogeneity were presented to or perceived
by practitioners as the hostile voice of the "reigning academic elite"14
(Christian "The Race" 227).
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The O paqueness o f  the T erm in istic  Screen
Second, postmodern theory is often badly written.15 It is
difficult to read, filled with jargon and torpid—all qualities which 
practitioners abhor. For example, Baudrillard's claim that "quotidian 
reality in its entirety . . . incorporates the simulatory dimension of 
hyperrealism" (S im u la t i o n s  147) is hardly the clear, open, and 
inviting prose of Donald Murray or Peter Elbow. While Murray, 
Elbow, and other early theorists write about issues and write about 
them in ways that resonate with instructors' classroom experiences 
and aesthetic values, postmodern theory, while it could also echo
those experiences, is written in such a way that a true connection 
cannot be made to it without considerable institutional support. As a 
fellow instructor once said to me while we were trying to decipher 
an especially difficult portion of Derrida's On Grammcitology .
"postmodern writing represents everything I don't want my
students' writing to be: long winded, jargony, dense, private, and
convoluted." My colleague's reaction was not an example of anti- 
intellectualism but of professionalism. We don't teach writing like 
that, so we doubt that it could have anything useful to say about 
what we do. And yet, Dewey and Bakhtin are also very difficult to 
read, and they are accepted and even loved by many in our 
community. I think, therefore, that while resistance to 
postmodernism on the grounds of jargon is legitimate, it masks a 
larger fear caused by inequities of power.16
Most instructors do not have the institutional training, support, 
or time necessary to unpack the density of postmodern theory. Yet
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mastery of or, at least, familiarity with postmodern discourse is one 
of the markers of professionalism in our field. Therefore, the 
difficulty yet influence of postmodern theory highlights and furthers 
practioners' feelings of m arginalization within the academy. 
Postmodern theory is seen by practitioners as a mechanism designed 
to exclude them from discussions on writing and decisions on 
pedagogy. It both mystifies our field's discourse and makes concrete 
practioners' positions as "outsiders." Its language does not open up 
topics for discussion but closes them down through discursive codes 
and rituals. Like Barbara Christian, practitioners see "the language it 
[poststructuralism] creates as one which mystifies rather than 
clarifies our condition, making it possible for a few people who know 
that particular language to control the critical scene" (229). Given 
the workload of our teachers, the way their knowledge and practices 
are treated by much of current theory, their innate respect for clear 
writing, and their learned suspicion of academics and academic 
discourse, it should be no surprise that practitioners resist 
postmodern theory. Resistance is a mechanism of survival.
The C risis o f  A gency
Finally, although I will analyze the postmodern impasse of 
agency more fully in the next chapter, the idea of the impasse in 
general is extremely troubling to most composition teachers. As 
Donald Jones writes,
In their critique o f  the autonomous individual of foundationalism, 
postmodernists have rejected the epistemological assumption that a 
knower directly perceives reality in thought then expresses these 
perceptions through language. Yet as these theorists have asserted 
the influence of language upon an individual's thinking, they have
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been unable to explain an individual's agency~the ability to create, 
assert, examine, and maintain/or modify a belief. (B e y o n d  vii)
This explanation is required if writing teachers are going to take
postmodernism seriously. After all, how do we teach writing,
process, invention, revision, resistance, collaboration, voice, audience,
and a host of other composition mainstays without a self with the
agency to alter behavior and be held accountable for action? The self
and its agency may be socially constructed, a site of often
contradictory and even conflicting discourses, but it seems a
necessary site if one is to write within our cultural structures. From
our economy, to our popular culture, to the rewards granted by the
academy, a strong sense of self and agency seems inescapable. Thus.
the postmodern critique of agency seems antithetical to the
conditions in which the teaching and doing of writing must exist.
Further, to embrace this critique would seem an act of 
professional suicide on the part of practitioners. The limited 
institutional authority they have rests mainly on their expertise as 
professional writers and teachers, as experts in the very areas of 
agency, intention, and authenticity that radical postmodernism
proclaims dead. No wonder the death of the author is a proclamation
the practitioners find incredulous and suspicious. As Barbara 
Christian argues, "Now I am being told. . .that authors are dead, 
irrelevant, mere vessels through which narratives ooze, that they do
not work nor have they the faintest idea what they are doing; rather, 
they produce texts as disembodied as the angels" (229-30). While 
Christian's portrayal of the death of the author is extreme, it 
accurately represents how practitioners feel about postmodern 
theory—it is a threat to their identity and authority. Without a
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notion of a writer who makes meaning, be that writer’s nature 
individual or social, they see no grounds upon which to base their 
authority in the classroom, their place in conference discussions, or 
their role in curricular decisions. To practitioners, the death of the 
author also .signals the death of the author as writing authority. Of 
course. I am not asking practitioners to embrace this critique. I am 
asking them to engage it to see if it can provide practical 
performative force for the classroom. Nevertheless, the notion of the 
impasse without the time and support to investigate, engage, and 
critique it is enough in itself to cause composition’s practitioners to 
resist postmodern theory.
If we then add to these practioner doubts the doubts that 
minority theorists, feminist theorists, conservative theorists, Marxist 
theorist, and a host of others have about postmodern theory, then 
why bother to engage it at all? First, because as Jameson argues "for 
good or ill, we cannot not use it" (P o s tm o d e r n is m  xxi). 
Postmodernism is where we currently find ourselves and so not 
understanding the theory robs us of an understanding of the present 
and ensures that those who do not understand it will not be able to 
defend themselves against those who do. Second, I also believe that 
postmodernism does have something to offer the teachers of writing. 
Namely, postm odernism  has the ability , in its love of 
incommensurability, fluidity, and heterogeneity, to support the 
pragmatic, experimental, and creative practices that practitioners 
have been doing all along. Third, it can provide new insights and 
new directions on old problems. Specifically, it can be used to create 
a notion of resistance that relies on the powers and skills of personal
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narrative—skills composition's practitioners know well: an anti­
dogmatism and love of incommensurability that critique the use of 
politics in the classroom in authoritarian or disrespectful ways; an 
experimental, pragmatic, and answerable ethics that maintains the 
possibility of our classrooms as places for social transformation: and 
finally, a view of history that makes it approachable by, relevant to. 
and dependent upon the personal and communal "texts" that a l l  
compositionists bring to the understanding and teaching of writing.
If the post postmodernism Friedman describes is to achieve the 
potential I believe it has for composition, then composition's teachers 
must see postmodernism as having practical performative force for 
the classroom and themselves as part of, perhaps experts in, that 
force. Why? Because the teachers in the classrooms are the heart of 
composition. They were there before we were a field, and they will 
still be there if composition as a distinct field disappears. The rift 
between theory and practice has never been greater in our field— 
which is ironic considering that much of the theory currently being 
advanced blurs distinctions between theory and practice. If 
postmodern theory is important, if it has something lasting to 
contribute to the teaching of writing, then it must bridge that gap by 
winning over the practitioners. Theories and theorists come and go, 
but the practitioners remain. If we, the lettered class of composition, 
want to add something permanent to the teaching of composition, 
then we must do it through the one constant in our ever changing 
field—the teacher in the classroom. To repeat Stephen North. 
"Literally anything can become part of lore," and "nothing can ever 
be dropped from it either" (24). Postmodernism, therefore, must
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enter that lore if it is to impact and remain part of composition 
teaching. We must dedicate ourselves to helping practitioners gain 
the institutional support necessary for making a connection to the 
postmodern condition—a condition of which they were the first 
members. I would now. therefore, like to begin helping to make that 
connection by turning to the question of resistance in the post­
postmodern era.
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CHAPTER ONE NOTES
1. Indeed, Schilb more than the others in this category sees the postmodern 
ethos of composition as more a potential than an actuality. He writes: "In
d e s c r ib in g  ways c o m p o s i t io n  m igh t ad d re s s  cu l tu ra l  s tu d ie s  and 
postmodernism, I am underscoring the potential o f  the field rather than it 
present sense of mission. We are far from realizing that potential, because of 
institu tional and ideological factors embedded in composition’s pas t” (177). 
Some o f  these ins titu tional and ideological factors include com position ’s 
invention as a field designed "purely to train students in the mechanics of
language,” a "belief that it exists only to serve the ’real’ disciplines, which are
bes t served  when com position focuses on students ' 'basic s k i l l s . ’” and.
borrowing the idea from Richard Ohmann’s English in Am erica , "the habit of 
f ram ing  social issues in a p rob lem -so lu tion  format that belies  the ir  
complexity" (177, 178).
2. I think this qualification is the most powerful moment in LeFevre’s work. 
She does not discredit the Platonic view of invention. She does not disparage 
the writing process model. She argues that the Platonic conceptions of 
invention is incomplete, and that this incompleteness is harming process
movement. LeFevre believes that "a Platonic view alone is inadequate, chiefly 
because it promotes an oversimplified view o f what an individual is and 
because it is not sufficiently com prehensive to account for what happens
when writers invent" (23). Moreover, she believes that it "leads us to favor
individualistic  approaches to research and to neglect studies o f  writers in
social contexts." (23) that it "depicts inventions as a closed, one-way system." 
(24) that it "abstracts writers from society.” (25) and that it "assumes and
promotes the concept of the atomistic self as inventor” (26).
3. It is not just the individual or the just the society that invents. Invention is 
the interaction of a individual/social being with the larger society in a
d i s t i n c t i v e  way. The word distinctive stresses the creativity of social
in v e n tio n —an aspect that many social construction  theories down play.
L eFevre’s social invention "neither denies an individual the possibility  of 
c rea ting  something original nor frees her from personal responsibility  for 
what she writes” (2).
4. At this point in her career Bizzell’s work echoes that of David Bartholomae 
whose poststructural doubting o f  individual authority runs throughout his
work. See especially, inventing the University," "A Study of Error." And 
"Facts, Artifact, and Counterfacts.’’
5. I should note that Trimbur is also critical of the "post-process” and "post- 
cognitive” theory of theorists like James Berlin and Patricia Bizzell. He sees 
them as having "walled out" too o f  much of the complexity o f  writing process 
theories. See Trimbur’s "Taking the Social Turn: Teaching W riting Post- 
Process" pages 108-10.
6. Though Vitanza does not give enough credence to the conflicted and 
rhetorical nature of Berlin's consensus, he is, I believe, correct in arguing 
that Berlin still sees consensus as possible and beneficial and that ideology can 
be correct.
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7. See Donald Jones’ B eyond the Postm odern  Impasse o f  C ontem porary
C om position  pages 75-80 for a discussion of how Donald Murray’s and Peter 
Elbow’s process pedagogies predate, predict, and reflect many of the themes of 
p o s tm o d e rn is m .
8. Berlin might have considered the more post-fordian cognitive theory of 
Mike Rose in Writer's Block: The Cognitive Dimension. In it. Rose criticizes 
the hierarchical and goal oriented cognitive rhetoric of Flower and Hayes in 
favor of a more opportunistic cognitive rhetoric.
9. Capitalism also values competition, debate, team work, and innovation—all
characteristics implied in Berlin's critical democracy pedagogy.
10. See Mara Holt’s "Toward a Democratic Rhetoric: Self and Society in 
Collaborative Theory and Practice” for a reply to Stewart.
1 1. See Donald Jones pages 6-17.
12. See Robert J. Connors' "Overwork/Underpay: Labor and the Status of
Composition Teachers since 1880” and "Rhetoric in the Modern University: 
The Creation o f  an U nderclass ,” Susan M iller's "The Fem inization of 
Composition" and Textual Carnivals: The Politics o f  Composition, and Stephen
M. North’s The Making o f  Knowledge in Composition: Portrait o f  an Emerging
Field.
13. See Susan Jarratt's "Feminism and Composition: The Case for Conflict."
14. Not all incorporations of postmodern thought into composition have been 
hostile, however. For example. Edward White argued as early as 1984 that 
teachers would embrace "poststructuralism as if it were and old friend” (184). 
White believed this because "once we strip away the jargon." poststructuralism 
"has an almost eerily familiar so u n d ”—the sound of writing as an ever 
spreading process to be endlessly revised (190). I agree with White and can 
only conclude, therefore, that the ja rgon  wasn’t strip and the connection 
wasn't made to practioner knowledge for ideological reasons. The neo-Marxist 
agenda that the critical pedagogues wanted to advance through postmodernism 
was more important than either the postmodernism or the goals, careers, and 
values of those who were teaching in the classroom.
15. I must admit that I exclude Foucault from the charge of bad writing. 
Though Foucault can be difficult, he can also be quite eloquent and moving. 
Moreover, Foucault's density is often designed to protect him from erroneous 
interpretations, from being held accountable for rhe interpretations readers 
make o f  work.
16. O f course, compositionists also have open ideological conflicts with 
postmodernism. For example, in "Collaborative Learning and Composition: 
Boon or Bane,” Donald Stewart criticizes Richard Rorty’s "abnormal discourse" 
as in no way capable of explaining exceptional creativity. He writes: "The 
person who has learned the conversation o f  mankind, we are told, learns how 
to challenge the status quo, to sniff out the stale and no longer viable. How? 
This is a completely unsatisfactory explanation o f  Mozart’s ability to transcend 
the influence of Haydn, of Beethoven's to transcend Mozart, of Brahm’s to 
transcend Beethoven" (67). Thus. Stewart not only privileges the unified
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individual’s consciousness but the ideology and cultural tastes o f  "high" 
culture. It is this appeal to high culture that many theorists such as James 
Berlin find questionable at best and supportive of an oppressive status quo at 
w orst.
4 9
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CHAPTER H
CRYING THE TEARS OF M Y ANCESTORS: 
REFIGURING THE SUBJECT OF RESISTANCE
Resistance is Futile, —the Borg.
Physical Pain has no voice, but when it at last finds a voice, it begins
to tell a story.
—Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain
In the end. all figures of otherness boil down to just one: that of the
Object. In the end, all that is left is the inexorability of the Object, 
the ir redeem ab il i ty  o f  the O bject. —Jean B audrillard  T h e
Transparency o f  Evil
Look at the co lo r  o f  your skin—that is your uniform. —white
supremacist Robert Shelton
The most famous catch phrase of "Star Trek: the Next
Generation"—the Borg's Ominous "Resistance is Futile"—supplies an 
apt popular culture understanding of the postmodern impasse. The 
now common argument is that in the postmodern critique of 
Enlightenment and Modernist conceptions of self, language, and 
agency, the ability to resist has become difficult to explain (Berlin 
"Poststructuralism" 18, Rhetorics  57-68; Faigley xii, 3, 226-7; Harvey 
291-302; Howard 349; Jones 11-13; Miller 10-23; Smith 50; 
Spellmeyer 724; Szkudlarek 42-57; Yagelski 203-05). The argument, 
roughly, goes like this: the self (or the subject as some prefer1 ) is an
effect rather than a cause of discourse. To paraphrase Lester Faigley. 
postmodernism "rejects the primacy of consciousness." Instead of 
seeing consciousness as prior to or distanced from language, 
postmodernists see "consciousness as originating in language." This 
reversal of self and language necessitates that human action does not
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arise out of a unified and removed consciousness "but rather from a 
momentary identity," a temporary and shifting site of multiple and 
even conflicting discourses (9). Resistance, therefore, reflects the 
fragmentary condition of life rather than defies it; resistance 
participates in and multiplies this fragmentation rather than 
overcomes it, because resistance, due to the selFs relationship to 
language, is itself an example and product of fracture rather than a 
cure for it.
This view of resistance's relationship to the fragmented world 
is very different from the modernist view. For while modernists 
such as Dostoevski. Rousseau, and Joyce also see the world as 
fragmented, they believe that the self's distance from the world 
enables it to critique the social conditions in which it is forced to live. 
The distance allowes for actions and thoughts not composed of or by 
those fragmentary conditions. Our subjectivity, therefore, could be 
our refuge and our salvation. As Faigley explains,
the world [of modernist writers) is no less fragmented and transitory 
than in descriptions o f  the postmodern condition, but the individual 
is granted the possib ili ty  o f  being able to critique that social 
formation from a distanced viewpoint and to d iscover a potential 
course for human emancipation. (16)
The postmodern critique, however, removes that distance by
changing the selfs/subject's relationship to language, leading to an
impasse from which agency and effective socio-political action are
difficult to explain.
But I don't want to focus too much on this well worn argument. 
Instead, I would like to question the insurmountability and/or 
importance of this impasse as it relates to writing and understanding 
resistance. I would suggest that having a theory of subjectivity and
5 1
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language that adequately explains how it is possible that we resist is 
less important than empirical evidence that we do. Resistance is the 
ability to challenge, critique, support, modify, and change structures 
of belief and power in documentable ways, ways that make us 
happier with who we are and how we live. It is not only a 
potentiality to be justified through a discursively substantiated 
subjectivity. It is an empirically documentable action, a series of 
practices performable, understandable, and teachable by, against, 
and from a contextual, material, and historical object status—the 
worth a culture assigns to material and corporal traits. Specifically, 
resistance is a form of critique, but it also larger than that. Whereas 
the postmodern critique is often seen as futile in that it shows the 
conditions of oppression but offers no way to change those 
conditions, post postmodern resistance alters the constitutive effects 
of oppression by rewriting the cultural stereotypes that enable or 
justify that oppression. It re figures the worth of the object status 
that a person carries by rewriting its perceived value. In short, post 
postmodern resistance attempts to transform the derogatory images 
of being that the dominant culture produces and that the 
marginalized assimilate as part of their identity. Such resistance 
does not require a distanced and unified subjectivity but rather the 
study and performance of actions through historical consciousness.
As I wrote in the introduction, while resistance may no longer 
emanate from a distanced self and may no longer be leveled against 
easily discernible and monolithic power structures, it can still exist, 
individually and collectively, in the multiple and fractured things we 
do: write a book, protest clear cutting, raise a child. It is a theory of
5 2
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resistance that has passed through the postmodern critique yet 
retains many of its insights. It is a theory that does not hold out 
hope for a unified self but examines actions to see how a multiple, 
fractured, and fluid self might be effectively manifested. However, 
in my analysis of documents to find traces of this resistance, I will 
focus on object status rather than subjectivity—not because a 
postmodern subjectivity is invalid but because the role that object 
status plays in the creation of that subjectivity and in the creation of 
the ability to resist is often ignored. Subjectivity is our recognized 
status as human beings within the power structures of society. It is 
the recognition that we feel, think, desire, hurt, and are human. 
Object status is the value, manifested in material attributes, that 
subjectivity is assigned. In other words, subjectivity is the threshold 
of our recognition and rights within a society, while object status is 
our horizon—the culturally determined value of our material body 
that constitutes what a society allows us to do and be.
The question of the impasse, while important, can focus too 
heavily on the epistemological possibility of authentic subjectivity 
instead o f  on understanding the pragm atic, material, and 
psychological activity of rewriting cultural stereotypes as a means of 
resistance. To question whether this activity and its effects are 
really evidence of true resistance or merely a discursive delusion can 
be profitable if that question is oriented toward helping us achieve 
greater freedom (see Foucault's "The Ethics" 282-85), but such a 
question can also be a mystification that removes writing from the 
very sites in which its resistance actually occurs and its effects can 
be understood. It suppresses the primacy and validity of our lived
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experience underneath theories for sanctifying the possibility of that 
experience (ironically, reducing written resistance to the very unified 
and distanced self postmodernism is critiquing).
Consequently, I will argue in this chapter that we do not have 
to have a unified and distanced self or even a fractured and fluid 
postmodern subjectivity to write, examine, understand, and teach
resistance.2 Where once marginalized groups needed to fight merely 
to be recognized as human beings, now they must fight over the 
value their human status is assigned. There has been a historical 
shift in what is needed to resist. Currently, marginalized groups, at 
least in the democratic countries of the world, suffer as much or 
more from the material effects of being labeled inferior objects and 
from the psychological effects of internalizing that inferior status as 
from a denial of subjectivity. What needs to be resisted now is not 
the denial of subjectivity but the cultural system of representing and 
valuing that subjectivity. For example, the struggle of African 
Americans to resist racism is no longer over basic human rights, but 
what bell hooks calls "the psychic impact of white supremacy"
(Killing Rage 119), the valuing of whiteness over color. Hooks 
reminds us that "racist white folks often treated lighter-skinned
black folks better than their darker counterparts and that this
pattern was mirrored in black social relations" (120). In other
words, African Americans have internalized, to the detriment of their 
social relations and psychological health, the "racist stereotypes that 
had always insisted black was ugly, monstrous, undesirable" (120). 
For example, hooks tells of a black mother in an interracial marriage 
who "was shocked when her four-year-old girl expressed the desire
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that her mom be white like herself and her dad." The little girl "had 
already learned to negate the blackness in herself" (129). Hooks tells 
of other little black girls who the media have taught to "prefer white 
images over black ones . . . white dolls better than black ones" (125) 
and of black children "psychological wounded in families and/or 
public school systems because they were not the right color" (122).
These children were not denied a subjectivity; they were not banned
from attending the school or from drinking at certain water
fountains. Instead, they faced a "color caste" system that assigned an 
inferior worth to the color of their skin, the texture of their hair, the 
sex of their bodies. As hooks writes, "To be born dark was to start 
life handicapped, with a serious disadvantage" (121).
To resist this internalized racism and white supremacy, hooks 
calls for "establishing a politics o f  representation which would both 
critique and integrate ideals of personal beauty and desirability 
informed by racist standards and put in place progressive standards, 
a system of valuation that would embrace a diversity of black looks" 
(119 my emphasis). This "politics of representation" or "system of 
valuation" is what I call the resistance of the object. It is the attempt 
to resist the material and psychological oppression inflicted by 
negative stereotypes. Having attained emancipation, the right to 
vote, the right to education, and all the other rights of a recognized 
humanity, the struggle for hooks is no longer for recognized 
subjectivity but over the worth that subjectivity is assigned—a worth
embodied in our object status.
To prove this claim of object status resistance, I will examine 
the internet writings of a lower caste, female, Indian immigrant
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named Malathi Raghavan. Malathi’s writings against upper caste 
bigotry will show that if we cannot resist as subjects, then we can 
resist as objects, or that if we can still resist as subjects, we can also 
resist as objects. Resistance, identity, and agency for Malathi are no 
longer matters of an authentic, unified, and distanced subjectivity or 
even of a postmodern multiplicity but of using writing to refigure a 
culturally constituted and discriminatory object status. Malathi uses 
writing to challenge the beliefs that dark brown skin, lower caste 
features, and female genitalia are signs of inferiority.
In making this argument, I am aware of the negative 
connotations being an object carries, the belief that objects cannot act 
but are acted upon. More importantly, I am sympathetic to the 
question many feminist, African-Americanist. and non-Western 
theorists ask, namely, why is subjectivity disappearing at the very 
moment so many groups that have been denied its benefits are 
attaining the power to occupy its space? However, my project and 
the critique of the "disappearance" of subjectivity are not mutually 
exclusive. I am not claiming that subjectivity does not exist, nor am 
I claiming that resistance through one's subjectivity is impossible. 
What I am questioning is the fetishization of the self by both 
modernist "theory hope"3 and many postmodernist critiques. What I 
am questioning is the importance that subjectivity is given for 
resistance, and I wonder what other forms of resistance that 
importance subjugates. I am suspicious of why subjectivity is 
privileged as the only authentic site of resistance in our culture, 
especially when white corporate males have our culture's most 
privileged subjectivity.4 More important than the question of the
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disappearance of subjectivity is the question of why subjectivity is
irreplaceable. If modernist subjectivity dies, have we lost an
irreplaceable form of resistance? Possibly, but who is this we, who
does this we serve, and what other forms of resistance would the 
"death" of that we's subjectivity open up for those who have been 
defined as questionable subjects within its structure?
These questions do not preclude the work of groups to
transform subjectivity or find new ways to conceive of it; they
merely shift the focus of our attention. For if there is no innate self, 
no modernist notion of self, then what is subjectivity but the
internalization of our object status—the internalization of our
culturally determined worth? To refigure that status, therefore, 
would also transform subjectivity, would also be an act of resistance, 
a form of agency. I am simply putting forth a way of resistance that 
is not dependent on a modernist notion of self or a postmodernist 
critique of subject for its functioning. I am trying to break the 
hegemony of subjectivity and those it privileges by offering object 
status, especially for the marginalized, as an alternate and legitimate 
site of resistance. I am, in short, trying to place resistance with 
Friedman's post postmodern historical moment—a resistance that 
recognizes the deconstruction of the modernist self but maintains the 
need for some way to change the oppressive structures of society. 
As Malathi will teach us, resistance is not merely abstract or 
theoretical. It is not solely an epistemological question, nor the 
exclusive domain of the powerful and their discursive practices. 
Resistance is about blood and bones, scars and ruptures, stereotypes 
and taboos inflicted on docile bodies labeled inferior but that now
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refuse to remain either docile or inferior. It is about the pain caused 
from internalizing one’s own features, ancestry, race, or gender as 
inferior. Resistance is not only a question of discourse but of a lived 
body manifested within a political representation. It is a matter of 
object status.
I would now, therefore, like to turn to an examination of the 
writing Malathi did on the internet, comment on that writing, and 
then give her a space to comment on my comments. I will end the 
chapter by exploring object based resistance through the work of 
Jean Baudrillard. Baudriliard's work is not necessarily the best or 
only theoretical lens through which to focus on resistance, but it 
stresses our status as objects more than other posmodern theories — 
a status and a potential that, as I have argued, are neglected in most 
theories of resistance.
A Short B iography
I first met Malathi Raghavan while we were graduate students 
at the University of New Hampshire. She was the R.A. (resident 
assistant) on the floor of the graduate dorm in which I lived. Over 
the course of a few semesters, I got to know Malathi quite well.
Besides my incessant questions on where the floor mop was, where 
the trash bags were, and why I couldn't have a dog, Malathi, despite 
her fluency in English, often wanted my opinion on what she was 
writing for the India Discussion Digest. The India Discussion Digest or
IDD is an internet discussion group, an "OPEN and FREE forum for
discussion of issues related to India and the Indian community"
(Ramamurthy I). These issues range from politics, to arts and
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entertainment, to immigration, to general interest. Though open to 
all, the IDD is dominated by well-educated, English using, upper- 
caste, middle-class Indians. And though stating that "No personal 
attacks and insults will be allowed on the Digest," and that "Attacks 
on a com m unity , I in g u is t ic / re l ig io u s /e th n ic /g e n d e r /s e x u a l-  
orientation groups or nationalities will not be perm itted"
(Ramamurthy I), the writing on the IDD can be quite vicious. 
Malathi. a member of a lower caste, knew, therefore, that her writing 
was more than an expression of her ideas. It was a test and 
demonstration of her worth. Consequently, she spent hours, 
sometimes days, on her writing. She wrote draft after draft, did
outside research, and agonized over how it would be received. Not 
surprisingly, considering the upper caste dominance of the IDD, it 
was not often received well. It was under these circumstances that I 
got to learn a little about Malathi and the Indian caste system.
Malathi was born in the south Indian city of Madras to a 
middle class but lower caste family. However, Malathi’s home life 
was anything but typical for an Indian family~at least not publicly 
typical. She was the first child of a civil engineer named Raghavan 
and a h o m e m a k e r- tu rn e d -c o tta g e - in d u s t ry  o w n er  nam ed 
Manimegalai. Malathi's sister Manessa was born some nineteen
years after her, making Malathi more of a second mother than a big 
sister. When Malathi was a child, her parents did not get along. Her 
father was some thirteen years older than her mother when he 
proposed (Manimegalai was only eighteen). Thinking that marriage
would allow her to escape the restrictions placed on Indian women, 
especially in that era. Malathi's mother accepted the proposal. It was
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a mistake. Manimegalai soon found she had simply exchanged one 
prison for another. The house was filled with mental abuse, power 
struggles, and an unwanted child. So, Malathi's mother did the 
unthinkable in Indian society. With a thirteen year old daughter, no 
job, and no support from either her family or her society, she left her 
husband. The shame of this separation, once it was publicly known, 
severely scarred Malathi's sense of worth. She particularly
remembers a day when her father came to her school and
complained about his wife to her teachers. It was. in a word,
humiliating. Eventually, Malathi’s mother and father reconciled. She 
started a small cottage industry—a dress shop—as an outlet for her 
creativity, and he provided the financial support for that shop. But 
Malathi never forgot the stares, the unkind remarks, the feeling of 
being of less value than other children. It was an time that, in her 
own words, "opened my eyes to the terrible public and private
injustices of India." The dowry burnings, the spousal abuse, the 
exploitation of children, and, most importantly, the hierarchy of caste
were all made visible to her once veiled eyes. It was an awakening
that she carried throughout the rest of education—the knowledge of 
what it feels like to "be an outsider within one's own culture."
Though Malathi was a Hindu, she attended Vidyodaya Girls 
Christian school for grades one through ten, and, though an ethnic 
Tamil, she attended Adarsh Vidyalaya Punjabi school for grades 
eleven and twelve. While in school, Malathi was a voracious reader. 
She read anything and everything she could get her hands on but
was especially drawn to books on atheism, ecology, feminism, and 
Marxism. She even had a poem read at an international women's
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conference in the Philippines when she was seventeen. After 
finishing high school, Malathi scored extremely high on her college 
entrance exams and got into Anna University where she studied 
production engineering. But she soon grew bored with engineering 
and, against her parents wishes, decided to pursue her first love— 
animals. Malathi applied for and received a scholarship from the 
Ministry of Higher Education to study veterinary medicine in the 
U.S.S.R. Having never been out of the country and speaking no 
Russian, Malathi traveled to Kiev where she not only earned her 
degree but became fluent in the Russian language. Indeed, Malathi is 
fluent in three languages (Tamil, Russian, and English) and has a 
reading or speaking ability in four more (Hindi, French, Spanish, and 
Ukrainian). During her time in Kiev, Malathi experienced the 
aftermath of Chernobyl, Gorbachev’s Perestroika, the fall of the 
Berlin wall, and the coming to power of Yeltsin.
After finishing her degree, Malathi felt the "call of America" 
and decided to apply to Environmental Studies programs in the U.S. 
Once here she majored in Environmental Education at the University 
of New Hampshire. Having seen the horrors of Chernobyl first hand, 
she felt her veterinary training "was too technical, too removed from 
the environment." She needed some "context to round off" her 
"content in animal welfare." She excelled in the program—receiving 
scholarships, summer research funding, and a teaching assistantship. 
In September of 1996, she won an internship with the United 
Nation's Division of Sustainable Development. Currently, she is 
enrolled in the Academic Review program at Purdue's School of 
Veterinary Medicine. She hopes to pass the American Veterinary
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Board Exam by early next year. Obviously, Malathi's education—both 
formal and informal—has been a rich mixture of intellectual, 
religious, ethnic, and cultural influences. Equally obvious, she is an 
incredibly accomplished, intelligent, and goal oriented young woman. 
Yet because of her lower caste status, Malathi is, in the eyes of some 
Indians, inherently inferior. Her apparent success can be explained
away as either an aberration or as the result of preferential 
trea tm ent.
Understanding the intricacies of the caste system could take a 
lifetime for a non-Indian. The system is thousands of years old and 
has a history so complex it could easily fill a library of books. It is a 
little like combining the issues of race, class, and gender and then 
justifying that creation through religious doctrine. I make no claim, 
therefore, to be an expert on the caste system. The little I know 
about the history and current status of the caste system I learned 
from Malathi, and she is quite forthright in admitting that her view 
is based on her experience. However, while Malathi's perspective is 
just that, a perspective, it is a legitimate perspective. After all, it is 
based on lived experience.
According to Malathi, the caste system has four major divisions: 
the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, The Vyaishyas, and the Sudra. Each 
caste has a place and a role in society with predetermined privileges 
and restrictions. The Brahmins are the highest caste. They, at least 
the males, were the culture's priests and intellectuals. While allowed 
education and religious authority, they were denied material wealth. 
The Kshatriya are the warrior caste. Though not as high as the 
Brahmins, the warriors were and are also considered upper caste
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people and have been and are treated as such. They were the rulers 
of India. If they were denied anything, it was only the higher 
religious status of the Brahmins. The Vyaishyas were the peasants, 
farmers, and merchants of India. Allowed to prosper monetarily, at 
least to a degree, they were denied education (this, of course, is no 
longer the case). Finally, the Sudra were the lowest caste. They 
were and are the sweepers, cleaners, laborers, and morticians of 
India. The Sudra, especially those who handled the dead, were often 
labeled as untouchable, the very bottom of the social and economic 
hierarchy. What they supposedly received from the system was an 
occupation, a skill, a trade that could be handed down from 
generation to generation, and a potential for rebirth into a higher 
caste if they did their work well.
Malathi and her family are mainly Vyaishyas. Her ancestors 
were farmers, weavers, petty landowners, and traders. These 
occupations were not simply something Malathi's ancestors did; they 
were something Malathi’s ancestors were. Their "occupations" 
reflected their soul’s closeness to god, how they would be seen and 
treated by others, and the limits of what they could hope to be. 
Acceptance of this status was the only path to spiritual, social, and 
psychological harmony. To reject one’s caste was literally 
unthinkable. Without a caste status one had no place within Indian 
society.
Though the untouchable caste was officially outlawed, that 
caste and the larger caste system are still alive in the minds and 
hearts of many in India. The current status of caste oppression is 
similar to that of black oppression. Though slavery in the United
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States has been outlawed since Emancipation and discrimination 
since the Civil Rights Act, the fight against institutional racism and 
white supremacy continues. The lingering prejudice of the caste 
system, however, does not mean that all upper caste Indians are pro­
caste or that current lower caste people live under the same
conditions that their ancestors did. For example, Malathi maintains
that she has never been denied a subjectivity. She has always been 
treated, at least legally, as a human being. Indeed, in many ways
India has more honestly tried to deal with the atrocities of its past
than the United States has. Before and after independence there 
were attempts to reform the caste system. For example, in the spirit 
of the democracy that swept the country after Independence and 
through the leadership of Gandhi, a series of caste reforms were 
enacted: the untouchable caste was outlawed, discrimination based
on caste at temples, schools, and by the government was outlawed, 
and a system of reservations was set up. The reservation system 
was and is a government program in which those who come from a 
caste that has suffered discrimination are given preferential 
treatment for government jobs and school admissions. Each year a 
certain percentage of spaces are set aside in both the government 
and the schools for people from the backward castes, scheduled 
castes, and scheduled tribes (often abbreviated as BC, SC, and ST). 
For example, Malathi's ancestry "qualifies" her as a backward caste 
person in the state of Tamil Nadu. The stigma of this "qualification" 
represents the social marker of "inferiority" that Malathi has fought 
against her whole life. Malathi has never faced, as her ancestors did.
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the denial of her humanity. Instead, it is the value of her humanity 
that has been in question.
The system of reservations also partly helps explain the 
current diaspora of upper caste Indians in America. Many Brahmins 
consider the reservation system a form of reverse discrimination. To 
escape it. they have gone international, enrolling in schools and 
getting jobs in the U. S. and all over the world. Consequently, a large 
portion of the Indian population in the United States represents a 
very educated, economically successful, and politically powerful class 
of people. The upper caste domination of the IDD, therefore, is not all 
that surprising. The upper castes are, after all, the most literate and 
worldly members of India's caste system. The IDD is a place where 
that dispersed group can stay in contact with other Indians. Indian 
culture, and themselves.
This painfully brief description of the caste system does not 
come close to capturing its dizzying complexity. For example, each 
caste is itself divided into multiple mini-castes (not all Sudras are 
untouchables and not all Brahmins are at the top of the hierarchy). 
Moreover, there are millions of Indians whose religion—Islam, 
Buddhism, and Christianity—removes them from the caste system— 
though millions of these same people still participate in it. However.
I hope this brief description provides at least the basis for 
understanding the terms and issues under debate in the writing that 
I am now going to examine.
The following is the text of an exchange that took place 
between Malathi and two upper caste Indians on the IDD. The 
exchange is an argument over how Indians should view each other.
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the caste system, and the government's attempt to erase the harm 
caused by that system. It represents only a small fraction of the
voluminous writing Malathi did and does on the IDD and other 
internet sites.5 However, I believe it clearly shows how Malathi uses 
writing to refigure the value of her object status. In short, she writes 
not only to make an argument but to show that someone from her 
caste can make an argument. The very act of being able to write, in 
addition to its quality and content, refigures her value.
As much as possible, I have attempted to present each entrants 
writing exactly as it appeared on the IDD. Representation of the
Other is always ethically problematic but especially so in this case. I 
am. after all, dealing with considerable ethnic, gender, and cultural 
divides. Consequently, errors in spelling, grammar, and punctuation 
have not be altered, bracketed comments always represent my 
clarification of terms, and e-mail addresses, except for Malathi's
which is reprinted with her permission, have been eliminated to 
protect the privacy o f  the participants. I will present the
participants' writing first and my commentary second. I will then 
follow this section with Malathi's comments and a general discussion.
A Fire Burning in M y Heart
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 96 II: 08: 51 EST
From Raghu Gotur
Subject: Satire on Reservations
We all know (the 'forward' and 'reserved' nomenclatured citizens of 
India) that the reservations do not contribute in any way to the 
progress and development of the nation.
Imagine the following scenario:
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A BC/SC/ST [backward caste , scheduled caste, scheduled tribe] 
minimum pass marks MBBS [a medical degree] graduate becoming a
N eurosurgeon using a 'soph is tica ted ' com puterized  medical tool
designed and developed by a BC/SC/ST min. pass mark Computer 
Engineer working in a hospital constructed by a min pass mark 
BC/SC/ST Civil Engineer with a BC/SC/ST min. pass mark Nurse 
assisting the Surgeon! And the patient happens to be a forward class 
person who lost all the above said career positions with fairly high 
pass marks to min.pass mark BC/SC/STs (any other possible worse 
nightmare than this?)
Looks like we have a parallel 'reserved' govt, social system for a 
BC/SC/ST right from childhood to the highest position in the 
c o u n t r y .
How about this solution Let a BC/SC/ST go to a school run and
taught by BC/SC/ST teachers, work in a factory constructed by a
BC/SC/ST, go to a BC/SC/ST doctor for treatment, eat food prepared 
and processed by a BC/SC/ST and so on. Under these circumstances, 
do you think any BC/SC/ST would survive to raise the question of 
r e s e r v a t io n s ?
I am not sure if the following quote works as a good analogy: "Its
like giving a typewriter to a chimp and hoping that someday it will 
type out a Shakespeare's quotation."
R a g h  u
A key word in this entry is nomenclature--a system of naming. 
I would argue that is exactly what is at stake in this entry—the 
question of who gets to decide who is what, who gets to be what, and 
on what basis. In the first few lines there are a number of things 
which strike me as important in determining who wins this struggle. 
First, I’m confused about the subject line: "Satire on Reservation."
This entry is obviously not a satire and yet Gotur labels it as such. 
My feeling is that the satire he is referring to is the idea that the 
reservation system is a legitimate way of addressing the problems of 
India. He obviously does not think it is. Indeed, Gotur never asks 
who the reservation system might help. Second, the use of the 
pronoun "we" is interesting. "We" connotates a community, a
6 7
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plurality unified in an organic way (his use of the words "citizens" 
and "nation" strengthen this feeling of community). Yet even Gotur 
feels the tension of using such inclusive terms. Immediately after 
writing "we all know," he qualifies that "we" with a parenthetical 
digression: "the ’forward’ and 'reserved' nomenclatured citizens of
India." His use of quotation marks around the words "forward" and 
"reserved" denote a sense of these words being false in some sense. 
The "we" he writes of is both not yet achieved and already
predeterm ined .
If we ignore the ugliness of Gotur’s argument in the second 
paragraph, we might notice his interesting use of labels. First, there 
is the BC/SC/ST label repeated again and again. The backward 
classes, the scheduled classes, and the scheduled tribes, while 
actually representing separate people, are not worthy of distinction. 
This conflation can be seen in the very construction of the label 
BC/SC/ST. BC/SC/ST is one "word," one group of people, separated 
only by slashes. Any distinctions between them are not as important 
as what binds them together—inferiority  and preferential
government treatment. Set against this cultural marker—the
BC/SC/ST label—are markers of high social standing: the
Neurosurgeon, the Computer Engineer, the Civil Engineer, and the 
Nurse. Gotur believes that the BC/SC/ST cannot really occupy these 
social spaces. Lower caste people are only "min. pass" 
Neurosurgeons, Computer Engineers, Civil Engineers, Nurses, and
Surgeons. Their inferior natures do not make them fit for these 
socially prestigious roles.
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By the third paragraph a pattern comes into focus as to the reason 
why BC/SC/ST cannot be true professionals. Allowed out of their 
spiritually preordained station, the BC/SC/ST, like a virus, (even the 
lettering reminds me of AIDS or HIV) will destroy the nation (the 
first paragraph), the forward castes (the second paragraph), and 
themselves (the third paragraph). Thus, to contain them is not 
oppression but patriotism, self defense, common sense, and or even 
compassion. The BC/SC/ST label is repeated so often in the third 
paragraph that it becomes almost a chant, each repetition driving 
home the cultural worth of the people this label manifests. Further. 
Gotur's use of the word "solution" within the context of the 
paragraph's musings on the survivability of the lower castes echoes 
frighteningly with the tragedy of Nazi Germany. The final "you" of 
the paragraph, the "you" he is asking the question of, represents the 
higher caste. The lower caste are not consulted as to the potential of 
their survivability.
The final passage of the entry speaks for itself. The 
reservation system defies the natural and spiritual order of the 
universe. The BC/SC/STs are not. by definition and design, capable of 
being Neurosurgeons, Engineers, and the like—except through the 
"nightmare” of the reservation system. It is, as Gotur writes, like 
giving a chimp a typewriter. If this natural order was recognized, if 
the false forward and backward labels were abandoned for the true 
nomenclature of caste, then the greater "we" Gotur writes of could be 
a reality. In fact, it should be stressed that Gotur is not denying the 
BC/SC/ST a subjectivity; he is defining the kind of social status they 
are capable of having, the worth of BC/SC/ST object status. Gotur
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does not argue that BC/SC/ST are  chimps with typewriters; he argues 
that it is "like giving a typewriter to a chimp." The BC/SC/ST are 
human beings; they just aren't worth very much as human beings. 
The next entry appeared a little later that same day. It is also a 
"pro-caste" argument. Only this time it is in direct response to 
another netter who has mocked defenders of or apologists for the 
caste system.
*  *  *
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 12:55:13 -0500 
From: "Sukanya Chakrabarti"
Subject: Misconceptions about caste system
This is in response to Sendil Nathan's letter about the ’garbage in 
philosophy” allegedly caused by Hindu customs. Nathan seems to 
identify the caste system as the ultimate culprit. What he, and many 
others have failed to realize is that the caste system was developed to 
prevent oppression and enhance social productivity. Consider the 
capitalist system, where a minority of the population has both social 
prestige and power—this essentially enables this small minority to 
dominate society. The caste system, on the other hand, is based on a 
system of checks and balances—certain castes are accorded social 
prestige, but denied wealth, while other castes are traditionally  
allowed wealth, and a smaller share of social prestige. To wit: the
Brahmins were the most respected members o f  the caste system, but 
they lived in sheer poverty (this is supported by statistics) If they 
had been accorded both social prestige and power, they could have 
tyrannized society. Furtherm ore, the caste system encourages 
specialization, leading to great social productivity. Indians and 
W esterners  should reevaluate  the perpetuated  stereo types and
negative images o f  the caste system—for this is by far the greatest 
e v i l—our ignorance.
The subject line of the entry is again interesting, but this time 
easier to understand. Those who criticize the caste system are
ignorant of their history. The supposed oppression caused by 
casteism is "alleged," a "stereotype," a "negative image." Hence, the 
experience of caste oppression is actually the experience of one's own 
ignorance. Chakrabarti's use of the inclusive pronoun "our" at the
end of the entry is interesting as well. Like in Gotur's entry, our
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connotates a greater unity. This time, though, the unity seems more 
a collective and inclusive responsibility than a natural order. Read 
closely, however, it becomes apparent that this community is 
maintained by ignorance and not by responsibility. What ties these 
people together is what they do not know, and what keeps 
Chakrabarti out of this community of ignorance or at its top is that 
she does know. Chakrabarti's "authentic knowledge" allows her to 
dismiss as illusion the suffering caused by casteism. Her will to truth 
enables her to make such specious arguments as "the caste system 
was developed to prevent oppression  and enhance social 
productivity" and to embrace such half truths as "the caste system 
encourages specialization." Nowhere is the pain and suffering caused 
by this system of "checks and balances" acknowledged; no where is 
the fact that lower caste people never volunteered for their position 
admitted. Upon first reading the entry, I had half hoped it was some 
kind of Swiftian "Modest Proposal."
It is also interesting to see how Chakrabarti tries to bolster her
argument with the trappings of stronger arguments: the very real
exploitation of people in capitalist societies, the Western notion of
checks and balances, the parenthetical aside to statistics that "prove" 
the poverty of the Brahmins. These are, of course, half truths, 
rationalizations, deflections, and logical fallacies, but they reveal the 
lengths to which defenders of the caste system will go to defend it— 
for they are really defending themselves. Many in the upper castes 
can no longer see themselves, the lower castes, or the effects of
casteism. They need someone to teach them how to read. Malathi
7 1
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Raghavan wrote the following two responses in an attempt to do just 
that.
*  *  *
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 19:07:26 -0500 (EST)
From: Malathi Raghavan <mr@christa.unh.edu>
To: editor@INDNET.BGSU.EDU 
Subject: The prevailing caste talk. . .(I)
I have been an "active " listener, consciously listening and not just
waiting for my turn to talk. The recent comparison of the likes of
me to chimps :-) by Raghu has prompted me to voice my thoughts. 
However, I have nothing against chimps. I think Jane Goodall has a
much more rewarding and rich life than most of us do.
Sukanya's high regard for the caste system is scary. Can we justify 
social order and prosperity to those unique and troubled individuals 
who might have wished to choose their own way of life and not to 
take the burden thrust upon them in the name o f  conformity?
Conform or be cast(e) out? I am not just talking about rebellions for 
the sake o f  rebelling. I am talking about fundamental rights to
education, choice of livelihood, healthy living quarters, respect, 
gratitude for doing your dirty job for you etc. System levelled
different communities by keeping checks & balances? I don’t think 
so! You are only thinking about power and wealth. One community 
had power to make decisions, another controlled  econom y, yet 
another had social standing maybe. So maybe traders, courtiers, 
some warriors etc other than brahmins had it a little better. What
about all the people responsible for behind-the-scenes’ activities: 
subsistence farm ers, weavers, dhobi [laundry people] families, 
sweepers, jan ito rs ,  people who worked with leather, grave yard 
workers and so on. . . .
Also, you are comparing apples & oranges when you compare class 
system with caste system. A person from the lower end of the 
economic ladder can at least theoretically work their way out of it.
However, since the caste is a "birthright" how does one even dream 
of shedding the stigma, or the privilege, as the case maybe? And 
don’t you turn it around and tell me that I consider it a burden
because o f  MY "inferiority  complex"! (Can’t rem em ber netter’s
name) Personally, I consider myself priveleged because I am a third 
generation school goer and a second generation university degree
holder. If I had been born a few centuries ago, or in a remote 
village today, I wouldn't have had the opportunity to arm myself
with similar markers of "social standing". Boy, am I glad that I can
atleast chalk out my own life, fight my own battles and owe it all to
the fact that somewhere along the line someone in my ancestry 
changed for the better. Not yet perfect but we'll all get there
som eday.
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On a lighter tone, how many o f  us have heard the cliches "the 
nouveau riche”, "breeding shows” etc? Bottom line being that "the 
nouveau riche may have made the money but fail to see the fine line 
that separates us from them”, (hint hint) to be continued...............
Ciao.
M a la th i .
Malathi begins her response with a very interesting subject 
line. "The prevailing caste talk part. . .(I)" is a reference not only to 
the upper caste's dominance of the IDD but to their privileged 
position in Indian society. It also reveals the Brahmins attempt to 
make their view of caste ecumenical. The subject line is, in other 
words, a tweaking of the upper caste's discursive hegemony. This 
tweaking is important. The upper castes are rarely challenged on the 
IDD by anyone except other upper caste people. Malathi is letting 
them know that the space is not as safe6 as they think, that she is not 
going to let what they write pass in silence.
She starts the actual response with an interesting description of 
what her participation or role on the IDD has been to this point. 
Malathi has been "an 'active' listener, consciously listening an not just 
waiting my turn to talk." Malathi knows that many lower caste men 
and women read the IDD but rarely contribute to it. The IDD is seen 
by them as hostile territory. She consciously attempts, therefore, to 
write not only for herself but for others. Her refiguring of listening 
from passive acquiescence to active resistance grants dignity to 
herself and those she embodies. She is letting the upper caste know 
that the lower caste are present and judging.
Her next line—the one which refers to being compared to a 
chimp—has three very important aspects. First, Malathi uses the
7 3
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phrase "likes of me." I find in this phrase a level of solidarity. 
Malathi conceives of herself as a we. This solidarity points to a very 
important aspect of resisting as an object—it is communal. Gotur 
never specifically refers to Malathi or anyone else in his analogy. 
What he refers to is an entire class or caste of people. Consequently, 
by using the phrase "likes of me," Malathi accepts this categorization 
but refigures its worth. Her resistance is a group effort inspired by a 
"we" consciousness. She is insulted not just as an individual but as a 
cast(e) of people stretching back into India’s antiquity. I argued 
earlier that resistance as an object necessitates a historical 
perspective and strategy. I think here is some proof. Malathi is not 
refiguring a single, ahistorical subjectivity but a larger group marker 
that she and others have inherited and must live within. And if 
Malathi is successful in changing how she is viewed, then others, 
including those of the past, are successfully refigured as well.7
Second, Malathi softens the bite of her response with her use of 
the symbol :-). I believe this reflects her own fear of being labeled 
as shrill or unfeminine. Besides the barrier of caste, Malathi must 
deal with what Teresa de Lauretis calls "the technologies of gender." 
the ways in which gender functions in Indian society through 
movies, books, fashion, marriage ads, religion, and elsewhere to 
constitute "concrete individuals as men and women" (6). One of the 
biggest rules of female behavior in India is decorum or even 
passivity—especially toward elderly males. To defy this rule leaves 
one vulnerable to charges of being unfeminine, and that is a very 
bad thing for a woman to be in Indian society. For example, when 
Malathi found out that one of the people with whom she had been
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openly arguing was a 60 year old Brahmin male, she literally shook. 
It was only the relative anonymity of the internet that allowed her 
to withstand charges of being shrill, unfeminine, and masculine. Her 
use of the symbol :-) reflects her unease at being forceful—an 
unease, evidently, that Chakrabarti's upper caste status dilutes.
Third, she ends the first paragraph with a playful reference to 
Jane Goodall. This reference is more than just mere name dropping— 
though it is that as well. Malathi wants people to know that she has 
read Jane Goodall, that she can read Jane Goodall, and that she can 
use Jane Goodall to advance an argument. She is very cleverly 
turning the tables on Gotur’s chimp argument. She is not like a 
chimp: she is like the people who study them (perhaps a veiled 
reference to Gotur considering that Malathi first identifies herself as 
an active observer of Brahmin behavior on the IDD). Hence, Malathi's 
alienation by Gotur, referring to her people as chimps, provided 
Malathi with the agency to resist: "Raghu has prompted me to voice
my thoughts." She is, in effect, raising the ante of knowledge 
required to enter this debate. After all, her use of Goodall's name 
assumes that the reader knows who Goodall is.
In the second paragraph Malathi consciously brings in those 
people left out of Chakrabarti's apology for the caste system. Those 
who were not allowed to "vote" on their place in the system or on the 
"gift" of greater specialization. Her contrasting of the pronoun "them" 
with the pronoun "you" is effective at highlighting the difference 
between those who have suffered and those who have benefited 
from this system of checks and balances. "Them" are noble and 
hardworking yet oppressed. "You" represents those who force others
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to do their dirty work for them. These "dirty jobs" sound like Cornell 
West’s "reality that one cannot not know.”8 Yet Chakrabarti is able to 
deny that reality—until Malathi reveals the denial. The upper caste 
believers in caste are self-deceived and maintain the "justice" of 
their system through self serving caricatures of those it destroys. 
The silence of the lower caste, silence that is often taken as assent or 
contentment, is, in reality, another sign of their oppression—"conform 
or be cast(e) out." In short, Malathi is teaching Brahmins how to 
read caste. She is refiguring the nomenclature by which Brahmins 
decide who is noble and who is inferior.
She continues this project in the next paragraph by revealing 
Chakrabarti's faulty logic: "you are comparing apples and oranges."
She also puns on the word "birthright"—revealing it as the wonderful 
thing it is for the upper caste and the horrible curse it is for the 
lower caste. She then displays an understanding of her audience's 
situatedness by predicting and refuting a potential counterargument: 
"And don't you turn it around and tell me that I consider it a burden
because of MY 'inferiority complex'!" Malathi knows that lower caste
people who criticize the caste system are often dismissed as suffering 
an inferiority complex (and at least partial acknowledgement that 
lower caste people have internalized their culturally inferior status). 
She deflects this attack by listing her family's accomplishments, by 
arming herself with her own "markers of 'social standing.’" She is a 
third generation school goer and a second generation degree holder. 
She is not like a chimp with a type writer who got lucky. Her
ancestry is not something that marks her as inferior but something
of which she is proud. She rewrites the cultural interpretation of her
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ancestry, her birthright, and her people, cleansing them of the taint 
they carry within the caste system. Through these acts and through 
tieing her personal family history to a larger social history, Malathi 
once again displays an understanding of historical consciousness. 
The words "we'll get there some day" should be read in the broadest 
possible terms. They display an understanding of where Malathi
comes from, where she is, and where she hopes to go. Finally. I
would stress that Malathi’s resistance of cultural stereotypes is based 
on object status and not subjectivity. She specifically states that she 
already has subjective agency--"Boy, am I glad that I can at least 
chalk out [an interesting reference to writing] my own life, fight my 
own battles"—what she is suffering from is an object status that
configures her as inferior.
In the final paragraph Malathi will once again turn the tables
on the upper caste by showing them how the lower caste sees them— 
a perspective which the Brahmins are rarely subjected to. It is not
the lower castes but the nouveau riche Brahmins of India who have 
forgotten or malformed Indian history. Obsessed with material 
goods, skin color, technology, and genetics, the lower castes cannot 
help but laugh at the Brahmins. Indeed, Malathi's pun, "on a lighter 
tone," tweaks the upper caste's obsession with skin color and caste
status as it relates to marriage.9 It is a deliciously funny little bit of
writing. However, Malathi has not yet developed the confidence to
write these critiques openly. She uses quotation marks, parenthesis, 
and phrases such as "hint hint" to soften the critique. She still feels 
uncomfortable about expressing her opinion among these worldly 
Brahmins. Indeed. Malathi ends with the word Ciao. This ending is
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not, I think, insignificant. It shows that this young, brown, lower 
caste woman is as cosmopolitan as the Brahmins. Two days later the 
second half of Malathi's response comes out.
*  *  *
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 1996 11:16:40 -0500 (EST)
From: Malathi Raghavan <mr@christa.unh.edu>
To: India-D Editor <editor@indnet.bgsu.edu>
Subject: Re: The prevailing caste talk...(II)
I am quoting here from the book "Philosophies of India" by Heinrich
Zimmer, Bollinger Series/Princeton. Chapter "Caste and the Four
Life Stages" p. 152-153.
..."One is not free to choose: one belongs to a species-a family, guild 
and craft, a group, a denomination. And since this circumstance not 
only determines to the last detail the regulations for one’s public and 
private conduct, but also represents (according to this all-inclusive 
and pervasive, unyielding pattern o f  integration) the real ideal of 
one's present natural character, one's concern as a judging  and 
acting entity must be only to meet every life problem in a manner 
benefi t ing  the role one plays. Whereupon the two aspects of a 
temporal even t- the  subjective and the objective-wili be joined 
exactly, and the individual eliminated as a third, intrusive factor"....
The reason I preferred to quote rather than recreate in my own
words the gist o f  this passage is to convey the reserved, observer- 
narrator style o f  the author. I know I will never assume his abstract 
tone. My imagination runs wild. There is a fire burning in my 
heart. I ask m yself’What if there is a trapped soul of my ancestor in 
there somewhere?" "What if she never let anyone hear her cries of 
anguish and fear and sadness?" "What if she consoled herself of her 
lowly status only by watching those weaker, sadder and lower than 
her?" Highly probable. My rebellion genes are a hand-me-down, 
aren’t they?
 "The supreme virtue is to become assimilated-whole heartedly and
without residue-to the timeless, immemorial, absolutely impersonal 
mask of the classic role into which one has been brought by birth 
(jati). The individual is thus compelled to become anonymous. And 
this is regarded, furthermore, as a process not of self-dissolution but 
of self-d iscovery’’....
What if  my own path of self-discovery takes me to another abode, 
one that the power structure thinks is premature. What if  I had 
been that exception to Mazlow's principle and didn't wait to find the 
road of excess that (supposedly) leads to the palace of wisdom? What 
if my own humble path turned out to be shortest, surest, and swiftest 
way to that palace of wisdom? —Adios folks. Malathi.
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I find this entry very moving. In fact, I still can't read it 
without becoming emotional. Malathi is meticulous, perhaps even a 
little neurotic, about not making mistakes that could be used against 
her. Notice, for example, that she not only quotes Zimmer but gives 
the name of the book, the name of the chapter, the name of the 
publisher, and the page number. Such formality is not the norm on 
the IDD, but she understands the stakes of the exchange. She 
understands that the question of her ability to quote and to quote 
honestly and correctly from reputable sources is not something she
can take for granted. She is showing the upper caste that she is not
afraid of them looking these quotations up: in fact, she is challenging
them to do so. She also understands the ethos to be gained by
quoting not only a source on caste but such an "objective" and 
respected source as Heinrich Zimmer. Malathi will use the Master’s 
own tools against him—but she will not become like him. The upper 
caste cannot argue that Zimmer's summary is biased against caste. 
Indeed, it may be a little flattering. Thus, the citation not only helps 
her argument but shows that she is fair, well read, and well read in 
areas that many IDD members are not. Malathi is constantly aware 
that her credibility is under the microscope, and she uses this
knowledge, her superior knowledge of books, and her fairness to try 
and refigure what the upper caste see, can see, and how they can see.
The next paragraph is has layers of complexity. Her building of 
credibility or ethos by admitting that she is not and cannot be distant 
in her view of caste; her attempt to persuade through the moving 
and beautiful passages on her ancestry; her refiguring of her 
ancestors from happy, accepting, "coolies" into tragic figures whose
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potential was stunted and spirit turned mean; her revealing of the 
insidious nature of casteism—that it maintains its hold on those 
lower in the hierarchy by providing them with someone even lower 
than they; her line about rebellious genes which mocks the upper 
caste obsession with "spiritual eugenics" all contribute to making the 
writing very persuasive and educative. Far from being a mark of her 
inferiority, Malathi's "genes" are a sign of her ancestors' denied 
potential and of her responsibility to fight the battles they could not. 
to topple the system that robbed them of themselves. Supposedly 
good or neutral terms such as "a species," "a family," "guild and craft." 
"integration," "real ideal." and "natural character" now all sound 
ridiculous, even evil, after Malathi teaches us to read them as those 
ruled by them read them. In fact, when we read the next citation, it
loses its descriptive distance. "Virtue" becomes a will to power. The
words "timeless," "immemorial," and "absolutely impersonal mask" 
are revealed for the historic, subjective, and oppressive privilegings 
they are.
Malathi uses her status as an alienated mirror of the upper
castes to change what is reflected. She shows that Indians have been 
brought to their status in society not through a spiritually
determined birth but through a carefully constructed power system 
of defined and definers. "The individual is" not "compelled to 
become anonymous," words that now seems horrific, but condemned 
or consecrated to live publicly an object status that punishes some 
and privileges others. Caste, in Malathi's writing, becomes, for the 
lower castes, not a process of self-discovery but a system of self- 
annihilation. Through her use of personal experience, pathos, and
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ethos Malathi has once again taught the Brahmins how to see 
Zimmer's "neutral" passage. They learn to read the passage not for 
what it says but for what it does—for the damage these supposedly 
neutral, beautiful, and timeless ideas do to those who had no say in 
constructing them. Malathi has become a teacher, and so her object
status must change. She is not like a chimp with a typewriter. She is 
like a teacher with her students.
The most important part of Malathi’s last paragraph, besides 
the reference to Mazlow [sic], is the audacious claim Malathi makes. 
She is beginning to grow in confidence as a writer. Malathi begins 
the paragraph with a series of questions designed to open up other 
possibilities for viewing these ideas. She then discredits the "road to 
excess" as costing too much for those not allowed to travel it, and the 
"supposed" place of wisdom as not seeming all that wise to those it 
brutalizes. Then she asks: "What if my own humble path turned out
to be the shortest, surest, and swiftest way to the palace of wisdom?" 
There are three important qualities to this question: first, it is a
question and so continues to build Malathi’s credibility as learned yet 
nondomineering; second, as a question, it puts Malathi in the role of 
the teacher; third, and perhaps most important, Malathi does not ask 
whether her humble path is the shortest, surest, and swiftest way to 
wisdom for her but whether it is the fastest, surest, and swiftest way 
for everyone. There is no second "me" in the sentence. In effect, 
what Malathi is asking is: what if the way to knowledge, truth,
justice, and wisdom is through a lower caste, brown-skinned, 
woman? If that is is true, then how will the upper caste attain 
salvation? They can see neither her nor themselves. Malathi has lost
8 1
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her timidness. She has rewritten her cultural worth. The upper 
castes must come to Malathi. to the lower castes, to learn. After all. 
she has shown that she not only understands the "accepted" or 
traditional view of caste, but that she sees the flaws of that view. 
She understands and can see more than the upper caste can 
understand and see. Predictably, many upper caste Indians find this 
new relationship to the lower castes threatening.
* * *
Date: Sat. 30 Mar 1996 16:46:08 -0500 
From: "Sukanya Chakrabarti”
Subject: Caste system: Guarding ourselves against the truth
It must be convenient to live in a shroud of ignorance. Such a life 
inevitably produces the kind o f  mentality that can allow one to make 
flippant remarks about the flying habits o f  ostriches in reference to 
a serious social issue, or grossly misinterpret a clear argument. But 
that is the toll that indoctrination has on an impressionable mind.
The American media has become highly adept at the art o f
brainwashing: it specializes in propagating stereotypes that bolster
the American image at the expense of the truth. The targets are
usually ideas that threaten traditional ideas, i.e., in America, we are 
all equals, there ain't no class distinctions, and certainly not the 
kind of oppression that one experiences in other cultures—namely, 
the kind of oppression that is due to the caste system in India.
I have already put forward arguments that demonstrate that the 
caste system was designed to prevent the oppression that results
when social prestige and power are concentrated in one sector of the 
population, as in the capitalist system. The gratuitous assertion was 
made that my remarks imply that I would support slavery. Slavery is 
immoral; the caste system was formulated to ensure that the moral 
rights and interests of the majority of the population would not be 
subordinated to the interests of the minority. (Consider corporate 
interests in the U.S. If you are unfamiliar with this line of criticism, 
read up on Noam Chompsky.) An analysis of the State of India today 
must necessarily be more complex—social institutions that were once 
powerful have been replaced by new influences. It is ludicrous that 
one could think that my arguments would imply that the American 
economy has flourished due to the influence of Christianity. My 
arguments were offered in the context on ancient India. If these 
remarks are taken out of context, one will obviously end with with 
laughable statements. There is no simplistic analysis of the present
A m erican  eco n o m y —g lo b a l iz a t io n  and in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n  have 
widespread effects that cannot be easily understood.
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Finally, we must seriously consider such questions as: Can there
ever be a classless society? Given the history of opppresion. shall we 
not try to find a solution that minimizes oppression? (for oppression 
exists in all forms of society) Shall we not try to create a system of 
checks and balances that accords power to one class, and balances
this by depriving it of wealth? Are not social equality and social 
mobility mutually exclusive? (If we were all equals, why would we 
climb up the social ladder?) Ask yourself how much o f  what you
have been told by the media is true. It will not be easy to find the 
truth—for it is well-guarded. The victors have the privilege of
writing history. But we have a responsibility to know the truth of 
our culture.
In this entry Chakrabarti is responding to both Malathi and an
entry by a non-upper caste, non-Hindu Indian named Sendil Nathan. 
Nathan accused Chakrabarti of willful ignorance inspired by religious 
dogmatism. Thus, Chakrabarti begins her response by writing of a 
"shroud of ignorance"—an allusion to Christianity-- and by 
disparaging the "kind of mentality" such a shroud produces. Those 
who knock the caste system are brainwashed, indoctrinated, and 
impressionable. They are traitors to their culture and traditions,
lower caste dupes incapable of understanding the complexity of her 
argument, not really Indians but pawns of the American media. 
We've seen these argument From Chakrabarti before. Her first 
paragraph is merely an attempt to once again control cultural images.
In the second paragraph we again have dazzling mental 
gymnastics, a displacement of argument, and this time—perhaps in 
direct response to Malathi—the parenthetical name drop of Noam
Chomsky. The fact that the name dropping is done as an aside is
more interesting than the actual name dropped (although it is ironic
that she relies on a American theorist to advance her argument given 
her charge that those who oppose her are brainwashed by the 
American media). The off handedness of the remark implies that
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this reference is just the merest fraction of what Chakrabarti knows. 
She includes it merely for the benefit of the less informed.
In the last paragraph Chakrabarti simply ignores Malathi’s 
implicit argument that India is far from having achieved a 
Habermasian public square—which would be necessary for 
Chakrabarti's "we” to mean anything. Also, I think the last line—"we 
have a responsibility to know the truth of our culture"—corresponds 
interestingly with the subject line: "Guarding ourselves against the
truth." I would argue that is exactly what Chakrabarti is doing. She 
never asks whose culture, whose truth is being guarded. She 
portrays others as ignorant to guard herself against the truth of 
lower caste oppression. It is a defense that Malathi will soon 
penetra te .
* * *
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 1996 21:14:42 -0500 (EST)
From: Malathi Raghavan < mr@kepler.unh.edu>
To: India-D Editor <editor@INDNET.BGSU.EDU>
Subject: Noam Chomsky & Caste
N am e-d ropp ing  can be e ffec tive  w hen the nam e d ro p p e r
understands the political beliefs of the name that she is dropping.
Using Noam Chomsky's name to defend the caste system is like using
G andhi’s name to defend bloodshed. If Chomsky, a dedicated
"anarchist and libe r ta r ian -soc ia l is t” knew that his hum anitarian  
arguments against A m erican /co lon ia lis t/cap ita lis t explo ita tion  were 
being used to defend the caste system he'd probably throw up or at 
least cry out "the emperor" has no clothes". That someone should use 
Chomsky, a w orld-renow ned human-rights defender, scholar, and 
cham pion o f  the oppressed  to defend a backward, oppressive, 
disgusting concept such as caste is ironic in the least and tragically 
sad at worst.
M a la th i
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Subject: Re: Noam Chomsky & Caste
Well said, indeed!
My favorite response by Malathi—sharp, eloquent, confident, 
carnivalesque. As I’ve already written, Malathi rarely got praise 
openly on the IDD. However, she did often receive private emails 
like this one following her Chomsky entry. These responses were 
usually from women and almost always from lower caste people. 
Reinforcing Malathi’s awareness that she wrote not only for herself, 
but for those who felt they could not write openly on the IDD.
In her Chomsky entry, Malathi catches Chakrabarti as she says- 
-without any clothes on (Chakrabarti's name means emperor). It is a 
carnivalesque moment in which the ruling class's superiority is 
destroyed by Bakhtinian laughter. Not only does Malathi also know 
Chomsky, she knows him better than Chakrabarti does. She can 
quote him correctly. Malathi is not a dupe of the American media. 
In fact, she understands its hegemonic impulse better than 
Chakrabarti. After all, she understands Chomsky's critique of that 
hegemony. Malathi has in this one entry shown the corrupt nature 
of upper caste knowledge and refigured her own cultural value. It 
was not Chakrabarti's corrupt use of knowledge which revealed her; 
it was Malathi’s writing. If Malathi is like a chimp with a typewriter, 
then what does that make someone who is outsmarted by a chimp? 
If Malathi is like a chimp, then how can she understand Chomsky 
and the emperor does not? The last line of the entry especially 
refigures class status for the members of the IDD. If they do not 
want to look "backward, oppressive, disgusting," then they need the
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information Malathi has. But to get that knowledge, they must
change how they see her.
I would now like to turn over this chapter over to Malathi. I 
do this because of the political and ethical issues involved in my
attempt to represent her and the debate among the Indians. As John 
Ernest argues,
We cannot escape the labyrinth o f  cultural diversity and social 
practice to reach the common ground o f  clarity and understanding, 
nor should we want to try. We can only acknowledge that it is. a 
labyrinth, that inevitably we all stand at different points within the 
labyrinth, and that the academy has developed a way of giving its
section of the labyrinth the appearance o f  independence and order.
Much as I might like to. I cannot build a bridge that will take me 
where my students live: I cannot understand them simply by
learning more about their backgrounds. But I can take what I learn 
to understand more fully where I live, and the terms of my life 
there. The best way to build bridges between cultures, it seems to me.
is not to start from the other shore, but to explore the geography and
shifting sands of the shore upon which one stands—to examine and 
reveal the assumptions, beliefs, and limitations of the culture one 
knows best. The acknowledgement of distance, joined with the desire 
to reach across that distance, is usually a more effective and 
respectful approach to human understanding than is the pretension 
of closeness and empathy. ("100 Friends” 23)
In my reading of Malathi's writing I have tried to remember that I
cannot ultimately know her. and that to pretend that I can is a form
of appropriation. My interpretation of her writing is the
interpretation of a text and, as Ernest implies, of myself. I would
like, therefore, to give her a space where she can critique what I
have written. Malathi, after reading the chapter wrote the following
response.
M ala th i's  C ritiq u e
Before I write anything, let me be clear about this: my
immediate nuclear family and I do not face overt caste
8 6
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discrimination. My father considers himself an atheist, and my 
mother, in addition to being an agnostic, possesses a "westernized" 
mind with respect to culture and tastes. This "colonization" of her 
mind has had the salutary effect of breaking the hold caste prejudice 
has over many in my extended family. Also my mother, I believe, is 
fairer and prettier than most of her cousins—a very important trait 
for an Indian woman. Also, my immediate family speaks and 
understands English (while most of my extended family do not), and 
we are more middle class, economically, than my extended family. 
All these things contribute to making me look  (and sometimes feel) 
more inherently confident than my cousins, and this confidence buys 
me relative immunity to the kinds of discrimination and ridicule 
they face everyday.
But this is not to say that there have been or are no effects of 
internalized casteism on both  my nuclear and extended families. 
From birth we are taught through the Hindu religion, the images in 
our televisions, in our movies, and in our literature that fairer is 
more beautiful, that dark is beastial and low, that caste reflects the 
worth of the soul, and that acceptance of hierarchy is a virtue. 
Moreover, as a woman I face the added oppression of the gendered 
image: domesticity, meekness, purity. It is not that long ago that a
wife, to prove her love for her husband, threw herself, or was helped 
to , onto his funeral pyre—a practice that is not unheard of today and 
that helps to justify the dowry burning that still continue. So to use 
Lance’s terms: one of the object traits assigned to women in India
seems to be that of kindling. My mother, sister, cousins, and I all 
suffer from this image of the female. However, the psychological and
8 7
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material effects of caste based prejudice—which I think Lance is 
right in looking at as internalized negative stereotypes—are much 
worse for the poor in Endian than for the wealthy—a fact Lance 
might have mentioned more. For as in all other things, no money 
makes matters worse.
As to what I wrote on the EDD, E am reading my own internet 
writings after a long time, and it amazes me how quickly my anger, 
emotions, and passions are once again aroused by reading Gotur’s 
and C hakrabarti 's  writing. The way that they present the caste 
system, a very complicated and painful topic for many Indians, in 
such a simplistic, cold, "logical." "factual" manner infuriates me.
Indeed, my own relationship to caste is very complicated. Though 
physically 1 look like a lower class person, E have, to my
embarrassment, learned to mask that appearance by the way I dress, 
walk, talk, think, and dream. E have learned, as Lance writes, to 
internalize the inferiority that others assign my body and
reexternalize that sense of inferiority through the cosmetic—or what 
1 think Lance would call object traits. As an aside, E also have 
another mask that hides my caste status: my name. 'Malathi' is
neutral to caste status. But 'Raghavan' is definitely an upper-caste 
name in the south. Et is the name of Lord Rama, who is generally not 
the family-God of non-brahmins in the south. 'Raghavan' is actually 
my father's first name. En the Tamil culture, in order to meet the 
last name requirement put forth by the British, the first name of 
husband/father became the wife's or child’s last name due to the 
absence of family names. The other option would have been to use 
the caste name—but every 'non-upper' caste individual knows better
8 8
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than to voluntarily expose their ’inferior' caste status. However. 
'Raghavan' is not the name given my father by his parents. It is the 
name that he selected for himself after he completed his B.E. degree 
at around the age 20. His parents had actually given him the name 
'Pichandi', which, when translated, means 'one who asks for charity’: 
not a very flattering identity (usually names with such meanings are 
used only by the lower-castes). Therefore, I can quite understand 
that my father wanted to change his name. To uses Lance's ideas it 
seems that he wrote himself a new identity through the act of 
renaming himself. Why he chose the name ’Raghavan’ is intriguing 
to me. but I can only speculate because this is a topic that cannot be 
touched in my home.
To return to the topic of my relationship to caste, I have often 
been, due to my outward cosmetics and middle class status, mistook 
as coming from "Brahmin stock" and, consciously, have never tried to 
set this straight—except for the moment I "declared" myself on the 
internet. Even then, wrapped in the anonymity of cyber space, it 
took everything I had to do it. I have many times endured the 
unpleasant experience of 'eavesdropping' on conversations, the likes 
of which would not have been meant for my ears if the 
conversationalists had known the truth about my caste status. I 
have, in other words, more often than not, been living a lie.
I think, therefore, that what Lance wrote is very true—if a 
little flattering of my arguments. Line by line his analysis of the 
writing revealed both motive and purpose. It amazes and frightens 
me about how transparent I must have been. I was resting the 
stereotypes that Indian society imposed on me, that caused me to
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want to live a lie. I wanted my writing to prove that I am relatively 
better read, a better writer, sharper, more logical, more critical than 
the brahmins—mainly because they do not believe it could be so. I 
was writing, as Lance says, not only to make an argument but to 
show that I can make arguments, arguments more persuasive than
those put forth by the apologists for caste. I wanted to show them
that I wasn't like a chimp with a typewriter, that my dark brown
skin, my gender, and my ancestry weren't something I should be
ashamed of but proud of. It is a sense of pride that is not easy to 
achieve or maintain. Every message, every image, every form of 
story in Indian society portrays, even stresses, the exact opposite. 
Brown skinned and lower caste women are to be beaten, worked into 
an early grave, set on fire, screwed in dirty hotel rooms because the 
fair skinned brahmin girls don’t fool around before marriage andw  &
certainly not anywhere but in their own beautiful homes. Yeah 
right! All of these things make up the oppression of imagery that I 
was trying to fight against.
However, there is one thing that I wish to state: I am afraid
that Lance gives me too much praise. I would like to think that my 
writing indeed is the reason that Chakrabarti remained silent from
then on. But even I will not assume that she or anyone else who
believes in the "genius of the caste system" underwent a radical
change only because of my input. I am afraid that it is not so easy. 
Social leaders have been begging, cajoling, arguing, fighting for so 
many years calling for a change in the way we see the caste system, 
yet so many things remain undone. How can my insignificant writing 
on the internet, read by a "polished." "educated," and "self-righteous"
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audience, be any more powerful than the work of major social
refo rm ers?
Still, I also know that there are a lot of non-upper caste people 
who are intimidated from voicing their reactions on the IDD. There is 
something in our culture that prevents lower class people from
talking about their lower-caste origin. I know because I suffer from 
this myself, and I received a lot of their personal thank yous. Still, I 
felt very agitated that I didn’t receive any open support on the
digest itself. Where does one draw the confidence to resist as an 
object when all the signs of a society degrade that status? So, I 
wonder if I need to feel supported to continue writing. Of course, 
Lance does write that resistance as an object is inherently communal. 
I think that is a very good point. The other reason I think that the 
writing I did was important even if it didn't "shut up" or persuade 
the brahmins was for my own mental health. I write to purge
myself of this 'sense of inferiority' that I have been carrying around 
inside myself. I feel so much more mature and 'cured' now that I 
have opened out to the world about my origins. I feel less tortured 
and rid of all my baggage. But, I wouldn’t be so sure and confident 
about the "silencing effect" that all this had on the upper-caste 
netters. Still, [ am sure that "resisting as an object"—as Lance calls 
it—did a great deal for my own and other lower caste peoples' sense 
of identity.
R esponse to a R esp onse
At first, I was not going to respond to what Malathi wrote at 
all. I was going to give her as much space as possible, but I feel
9  I
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compelled to comment, if quickly, on what she wrote. There are a 
number of things that strike me as interesting in Malathi’s critique. 
First. I think she's right—I did over estimate the effect that her
writing had on the Brahmins [it’s interesting to me that Malathi 
never capitalizes this word], probably because as a non-Indian I do 
not have the same intimacy with these issues. It seems to me. from 
my position in the labyrinth, that those supporting caste have little 
credibility. Yet, I would stress that Malathi did receive many private 
e-mails for what she wrote from other lower caste Indians, and that
Chakrabarti did stop writing on the IDD. Further, Malathi writes not 
only to create space for her subjectivity or to turn herself from 
object to subject but to redefine the value and image of her object 
status—and the material and psychological effects this valuing 
mandates. She tries to teach members of the IDD. through her 
intelligence, pathos, ethos, logos, and autobiography to desire 
brownness, lower caste status, femininity as attributes that they 
need to have or at least understand in order to be just, fair, 
intelligent, beautiful. I think she did achieve some success in these 
areas. Perhaps, therefore, the effect of her refiguring of object status 
was greater than Malathi thinks.
Second, it strikes me how that even in her response to what I 
wrote Malathi felt it necessary to continue to refine her object status. 
She goes to great pains to make sure that I understand that she has 
not suffered the discrimination that other lower caste people have, 
and that she is not a typical lower caste person. She feels, in other
words, a need to both embrace and distance herself from a lower
caste status to ensure authenticity. It's not that Malathi is
9 2
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embarrassed by her lower caste status but by her ability to "pass"
for an upper caste person. She knows that others are much worse off 
than she is. She feels some sense of having betrayed them when she
"passed" as a Brahmin. Her fight, therefore, is to represent the lower
caste people on the IDD, and herself through them, who have not yet 
developed the economic and social level necessary to write as she 
does. She wants to be their voice, but she recognizes the danger of 
appropriation.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, in Malathi's original 
entries and in her response to my interpretation, I was struck by the 
way personal narrative, family experience, was used to resist 
political oppression. I think this is the way to tie what Malathi did 
and my notions about resistance through object status to the writing 
classroom. Through our student's personal narratives they have the
power to refigure oppressive stereotypes—for themselves and, at 
least potential, for those who impose them. The students can use 
personal narrative, puns, ethos, logos, pathos, cited authority, and a 
host of other techniques that Malathi uses to change the value of 
their object status. Here is the students' means to resist in the post 
postmodern world, especially marginalized students. To use words, 
rhetoric, writing to compose the fragmented discourses of their 
being, into an object that seduces, teaches, and transforms the 
greater community. The post postmodern student would not seek 
the existential agency of the subject but the existential agency of the 
resisting object. This is not to say that personal narrative is not 
without risk when tied to the political, but that personal narrative 
has always already been tied to the politic, to the politics of
9 3
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representation. Finally, I am struck with how what Malathi wrote 
echoes with the work of Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard believes that 
we are objects every bit as much as we are subjects, and that this 
object status has profound implications for how we interact with
each other. Therefore, I would like to end this chapter with an 
examination of his theory—a theory that inspired my initial interest
in object status as a site of resistance.
The Suprem acy o f the O bject or "M irror M irror on the Wall"
Jean Baudrillard, with his disdain for historical consciousness, 
political agency, and social progress, might seem a strange lens 
through which to interpret acts of resistance. Indeed, many 
important theorists in composition, rhetoric, and elsewhere have 
criticized Baudrillard's work as nihilistic, dangerously skeptical, 
socially crippling, and oblivious to anything non-discursive. For 
example, Lester Faigley, while admiring the irony and challenge of 
Baudrillard's insights, believes that "At a time when widespread 
misery has become part of the daily landscape even in affluent 
centers of the West, few committed to activism will find his 
[Baudrillard's] nihilistic answer—'to play with the pieces' of what's
left—acceptable (211). James Berlin, who also enjoys Baudrillard's 
uncompromising attacks on hypocrisy, nevertheless maintains that 
Baudrillard's work represents the kind of extreme epistemological 
skepticism that leads to a "passive acquiescence to things as they 
are" (Rhetor ic  57). Douglas Kellner, one of Baudrillard's harshest 
critics, warns that Baudrillard "has fantasized himself into a 
repetitive metaphysical orbit with no apparent exit, and that, unless
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a dramatic reversal appears, his work will become ever more bizarre, 
trivial, reactionary and pataphysical" (Jean Baudrillard 217). Finally, 
Cornel West, whose work is representative of the pragmatism that is 
becoming more influential in composition, argues that
Baudrillard seems to be articulating a sense o f  what it is to be a 
French, middle-class intellectual, or perhaps what it is to be middle 
class generally . . . .  [but] there is a reality that one cannot not know.
The ragged edges o f  the Real, o f  N e c e s s ity , not being able to eat, not 
having shelter, not having health care, all this is something one 
cannot not know. The black condition acknowledges that. (277)
To West's criticism I might add the potential imperialistic impulse in
Baudrillard's work. When he writes that "It is the Object that is
exciting, because the Object is my vanishing point," and that "The
Other is what allows me not to repeat myself for ever," he risks
endorsing, even through his irony, the colonization or consumption of
the other for one's own identity ("The Object" 173, 174).10
For these critics and others, Baudrillard’s work leaves little or 
no room for the impact of the non-discursive on our lives—especially 
the lives of the oppressed and the poor. Even Baudrillard's simulacra 
or images are ultimately a form of discursive practice and 
understanding. His lucid postmodernism, they feel, denies the 
possibility of a self and community capable of effective democratic 
politics—at least as these are traditionally understood. The hungry, 
the homeless, those without health care cannot simply float from one 
signifying orgy to another. There is too high a price to pay for not 
paying attention to the reality of hunger, cold, and physical threat. 
Thus for these critics, Baudrillard's work reflects the situatedness of 
the privileged and is, therefore, useful to a limited and exclusive 
segment of society.11 While agreeing with these critiques to some
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extent, I wonder if perhaps they are missing a powerful strategy for 
resisting social inequities, especially for the marginalized, within 
Baudrillard’s work—a strategy he himself neglects due to his love of 
irony, skepticism, and strategic caricature.
In Fatal Strategies Baudrillard argues that "We have always
lived off the splendor of the subject and the poverty of the object. It 
is the subject that makes history, it's the subject that totalizes the 
world . . . .  In our philosophy of desire, the subject retains absolute 
privilege, since it is the subject that desires" (111). In other words, 
as long as the necessity of the subject reigns, then the violence of 
history, the privileging of the powerful, the subordination of the 
weak remains justified and justifiable by desire. "But," Baudrillard 
continues, "everything is inverted if one passes on to the thought of 
seduction. There, it’s no longer the subject which desires, it's the
object which seduces. Everything comes from the object and
everything returns to it" (111). I find a powerful potential for
resistance and a plan for human emancipation, especially for the 
marginalized, within this idea of the seducing object, a power and 
plan enabled not by their distance from the fragmentation of the 
world but by their situated alienation within it.
Again and again in Baudrillard's work, he reminds us that "we 
are objects as much as subjects" (124). We are not only entities 
which think, desire, measure, judge, and feel; we are entities which 
are thought about, desired, measured, judged, and felt. And 
Baudrillard believes that "what we all want as objects . . .  is not to be 
hallucinated and exalted as a subject . . . , but rather to be taken 
profoundly as object" (124). We want to be seen and. more
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importantly, treated as beautiful, intelligent, valuable, cherished, 
important, and necessary. We want to be treated profoundly as 
objects because, as Baudrillard's quotes imply, there are material and 
psychological punishments for not being treated so and revolutionary 
possibilities if we are. Since object status is not limited to the non­
human in Baudrillard’s work, and since the marginalized carry a 
more explicit object status than those with privileged subjectivities,12 
the marginalized could possess this power of inversion as well. If the 
marginalized can recognize the condition and potentiality of their 
object status, then, potentially, everything must also come from them 
and to them. Included in this everything would be a culture’s 
structures of representation, limitation, and identity. "Can the 
subaltern speak?" Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak asks—wondering, in 
effect, if the marginalized can be heard by the privileged within 
structures of discourse determined by relations of power. My 
answer would be yes but perhaps more as seducing objects than as 
desiring subjects. As the latter, at least within the dominant 
structures of society, they are always counterfeit, suspect, 
predetermined, or, most condescendingly of all. tolerated. As the 
former they have access to and are a power themselves. Our object 
status has a cultural cash value, if you will, which privileges some 
and marginalizes others.
Consequently, our object status marks the clearest and most 
social manifestation of the narratives of limitation and definition 
which bring us into cultural and political being. These narratives 
construct us as black, brown, white, male, female, straight, gay, 
bisexual, etc. These definitions are evaluative and are tied to other
9 7
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fluid, numerous, and evaluative definitions that combine and
dissolve to constitute our identities. In Malathi's case the markers of
social status include color, gender, and ancestry. By identifying and
showing how and why these narratives came into being,
understanding how they construct the understanding and valuing of 
people. Malathi offeres the marginalized a chance to refigure these 
narratives and, through that refiguring, themselves.
Why do the marginalized especially possess the agency or
power to do this narrative "remapping''? Because of their status as
alienated objects within the culture. Baudrillard explains that "The
Object's power and sovereignty derive from the fact that it is
estranged from itself" ("The Object" 172). The object, unlike the
subject, does not "live off the illusion of its own desire: it gets along
quite well without it" (Faigley 213). But
for us [the privileged subjectivities of Western culture] the exact
opposite is true. Civilization's first gesture is to hold up a mirror to
the Object, but the Object is only seemingly reflected therein; in fact
it is the Object itself which is the mirror, and it is here that the 
subject is taken in by the illusion o f  himself. (Baudrillard "The 
Object" 173).
The idea that the object, and by extension the marginalized person as 
object, is used as a "mirror" in which the subject sees himself or 
herself opens up a path of resistance. If the marginalized can
understand their role as mirror, how their object status came into
being, and the dependency of the subject on that mirror to maintain 
its illusions, then they can influence what the privileged see, can see. 
and want to see. For example, if a white male looks into the mirror 
of blackness and sees back at least that he is white, that he is not 
simply the norm, then blackness has refigured how the white male
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must view his existence and being. As bell hooks argues. "As 
fantastic as it may seem, racist white people find it easy to imagine 
that black people cannot see them if within their desire they do not 
want to be seen by the dark Other" (Killing Rage 35). By seeking to 
gain control of what the mirror of subjectification reflects, the 
marginalized have a chance to refigure the norms of society that 
keep them oppressed. Further, if the mirror can reflect the beauty, 
the uniqueness, the incommensurability of blackness, then the 
hierarchy on which white supremacy is founded becomes 
questionable as the only or best way of being. The object becomes 
what Baudrillard calls a strange attractor: "The Object is what theory
can be for reality: not a reflection but a challenge and a strange
attractor" ("The Object" 173). In short, the object offers and could 
control, through awareness and action, the possibility of new forms 
of subjectivity. Hence, the marginalized, because of their alienation, 
have a perspective on society that the privileged, because of their 
place at the top of society, cannot get anywhere else. And the 
privileged subject needs this perspective because he or she "know[s] 
the subject too well: the subject knows himself [herself] too well" 
("The Object" 173).
Resistance, under an extended Baudrillardian lens, does not 
require, therefore, a unified and distanced perspective, a place 
outside of the flow of codes, to function. Instead, it requires an 
understanding of alienated position within the flow of codes and the 
means to restructure that flow—a means that comes from the 
alienation itself and an understanding that comes from the empirical 
examination of the "documents" that create, sustain, and resist that
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alienation. Resistance becomes a form of educative practice. The 
marginalized become teachers instead of docile bodies, literally and 
figuratively using the power provided by their alienated object 
status to resist how they and others are seen, defined, and consumed 
as objects. They seek to control not only the means of their own 
object status's production and consumption but the means of 
producing the privileged subject's identity, becoming an object which 
seduces rather than a subject which desires.
This metamorphosis from subject to object is different than 
fighting to have one's subjectivity recognized—to be tolerated, if you 
will. Such a fight, even if successful, leaves the one who is granted 
the recognition in a subjugated position and the one who grants the 
recognition in a dominant position. ’’While I think your 
homosexuality is disgusting. I will tolerate it as long as you remain 
within predetermined bounds of behavior." As the homosexual 
community so insightfully argues: "tolerance equals death."
Supposed "angry, white males" are not angry because they must 
grant subjectivity and tolerance to others, nor are they threatened 
by others' calls for subjectivity and tolerance. As long as subjectivity 
reigns and "angry, white males" have control of the institutions 
which grant it and dispense tolerance, they are still in the dominant 
position.1 3
The angry white males are angry because others have begun to 
question the value of the white, male, corporate object status. 
Perhaps, rich, white, straight, males are not the only or best standard 
by which things should be judged. Perhaps the qualities of other 
communities are more seductive, more beneficial, more sexually
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attractive, kinder to the environment, kinder to other cultures. After 
all, William Bennetts' belief that America is losing the cultural war is 
not based on a fear of having to tolerate "deviants," but on the fear 
that "deviants" are demanding to be seen and are being seen as 
legitimate, perhaps even better, alternatives to traditional norms. 
The angry white males sense the shift in cultural power contained in 
images of beauty, intelligence, justice, and strength that do not 
reflect back, and so reaffirm, their own faces. The mirror has
changed what it reflects. While still in control of the culture's 
dominant economic and social mechanisms, they have at least begun 
to feel what it is like to have an object status that is not desired by 
all cultural institutions—institutions that have attained the power to 
make that undesirability felt. This is why the arguments of such
theorists as Dinesh D'Souza are so attractive to the conservative right. 
As an Asian immigrant, D'Souza's work puts a new face on old
arguments that help keep minorities within frames that the white 
power structure finds more comfortable. For example, D'Souza does 
not argue that African Americans are genetically inferior in the area
of intelligence and so responsible for their own oppression (although
he spends page after page giving "careful" and "thoughtful" 
consideration to such arguments), but because past oppression  has 
forced them to create an inferior culture. He writes:
I argue that the main problem faced by blacks is neither deficient IQ 
[notice D'Souza doesn’t say that blacks don't have inferior IQs only 
that such inferiority isn’t their main problem], as suggested in the 
The Bell Curve, nor racial discrimination, as alleged by Jesse Jackson 
and other Civil rights activists. Rather, the book [his book] contends 
that African Americans have developed a culture that was an 
adaptation to historical oppression but is, in several important 
respect, dysfunctional today. (The End xiii)
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Under this argument, whites do not have to examine their own
practices nor their role in the history of oppression in this country 
because 1) oppression is in the past, and because 2) it's the "blacks” 
own fault.14 Hence, calls for tolerance or for a common humanity can 
be tolerated because they ultimately legitimate the preexisting social 
order. As bell hooks explains, white supremacists "have a deep
emotional investment in the myth of 'sameness,' even as their actions 
reflect the primacy of whiteness as a sign for informing who they are 
and how they think" (Killing Rage 35).
However, refiguring object status disrupts that order to its very 
core. It works to intervene in and alter those racist stereotypes that 
keep the other under the control of the white image. Suddenly, the 
marginalized do not seek tolerance or even acceptance but 
appreciation. Black becomes beautiful, positive, generative and not 
merely the opposite or lack of white. Homosexuality becomes
something not to be tolerated but to be celebrated. When the 
marginalized look into the eyes of the privileged, they do not want to 
see condescending tolerance but empowering desire—a desire, if the 
marginalized person understands his or her situatedness, that does 
not control the object but the one gazing. This seductive power 
constructs the marginalized student as a "pearl of great price." Of
course, this refiguring power also represents the threat of the 
marginalized, the challenge of which Baudrillard wrote.
Importantly, this seductive power is different from that which 
is assigned to the traditional image of the seductive woman, a woman 
whose power over men is so great that she must remained masked, 
veiled, or kept out of sight. In that situation the woman does not
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control her object status but is controlled by it. The male has 
assigned the attributes that are desirable and uses them to control 
the female. Within Baudrillard's frame, or at least my construction of 
it. it is the woman who seizes control of the mirror of reflection. It is 
the woman who decides what the desirable traits are and through
the refiguring power of her rhetoric, her argumentation, uses them to 
refigure the desire of the subject. Like Madonna in a MTV video, 
sexuality is used to confront, control, and retrain the male's gaze.
And while the capitalist overtones of object resistance may seem 
distasteful, and while having a student whose "sense of self is set out 
exclusively in how she believes she is perceived by others" (Faigley 
216) may seem the most profound cynicism or inauthenticity, I am 
not arguing that the student's sense of self is or should be set out 
exclusively by how others see him or her. I am arguing that 
understanding one's object status opens up paths of resistance that 
are not immobilized in the postmodern impasse.
Granted, this resistance is not easy to do. Though w hat  the 
narratives are that constitute object status is always known, if 
sometimes only implicitly, the arbitrary and ideological why  of how 
narratives are is often invisible. For example, the supposed 
perversity of homosexuality or the supposed end of racism in 
America are presented as "facts" and so beyond argument rather
than ideological constructs to be debated. If these explanations do 
need to be argued for, then the proof of their validity is presented as 
common sense, patriotism, legal precedent, or economic necessity. 
However, if the ideology, the vested interest, the bias of these
supposedly self-evident facts can be exposed through the refiguring
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mirror of an aware object, then the invisibility becomes visible. If 
the marginalized person as object does not remain passive, docile, 
and cooperative but instead embraces what Baudrillard calls its 
inexorability and irredeemability, then resistance is possible. And 
while Baudrillard is right in that we cannot trace the historical, 
material, and contextual conditions of these narratives in a 
progressive or rational way; that we cannot escape the constitutive 
an arbitrary role of language; Foucault is right in that there is still a 
pattern. We can trace the genealogy of how these narratives came to 
be even if that genealogy is not rational or progressive. If the 
pattern can be traced and the inconsistency, irrationality, and chance 
which created it can be revealed, then it looses the power to seem 
natural, logical, common sensical, or preordained.
Thus, Baudrillard’s work forces us to consider our being as 
more than our subjectivity, to see subjectivity as only one way of 
being in the world. Subjectivity for Baudrillard is at best 
uninteresting, at worst a Western instrument for imposing terror 
upon the world, and in either case ineffectual as a site of resistance. 
And despite the disdain, the suspicion, and the potential cynicism of 
using object status as a site for resistance, Malathi Raghavan's 
writing shows that resisting from a sense of how one is seen by 
others does not have to be inauthentic but can be moving, powerful, 
and effective. Of course, resistance can also be dangerous, especially 
within the classroom. How are we to deal with students who wish to 
resist our power and authority in the classroom? Conversely, if we 
want our classrooms to be places for social progresses, then how can 
we encourage our students to see their place within the dominant
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social order and to resist that order? Should the political be allowed 
into the classroom or is the question itself politically naive? It is to 
these questions I would now like to turn.
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CHAPTER TWO NOTES
1. Postmodernists use the word subject instead of self because the former 
stresses consciousness originating in language rather than preceding it. See 
Sean Burke’s The Death and Return o f  the Author page 106 for a discussion of 
the problems inherent in the postmodernist's use of the word subject.
2. See Paul Smith 39; Susan Jarratt 70; Stuart Hall 12-38; Teresa Ebert 887-889; 
and Donald Jones 46-69 for attempts to refigure subjectivity, postmodern and 
otherwise, in ways that get around the impasse.
3. "Theory hope" is Stanley Fish's anti-foundationalist argument against 
trying to create a metatheory that can resolve the inherent contradiction
between theory and practice. Fish writes that "practice has nothing to do with 
theory, at least in the sense of being enabled and justified by theory. That
leaves me and you only a few worn and familiar bromides: practice makes
perfect, you learn to write by writing, you must build on what you already 
know; but anti-foundationalism tells us that these bromides are enough, tells
us that as situated beings our practice can make perfect, and that we already
know what we think” (D o i n g  355). Trying to impose a theory to "justify”
practice only ensures that we will blind ourselves to the complexity of the
situation and subjugate those things that do not fit into or under the theory.
4. ’ Indeed. I wonder why subjectivity is the only site from which legitimate
resistance can originate. I wonder whether subjectivity, as it existed in
modernist theory and exists in much postmodern critique, is a Western white, 
male, corporate construct. I Find it more than a little ironic that the ability to 
explain resistance and agency has disappeared because those who have always 
had it no longer believe in it; that there is a crises of subjectivity because the 
dominance of the white, male, theoretical view has been exploded—often by
other white males. But what o f  the marginalized groups that have, can, and do 
resist with and without this concept of subjectivity? Why is the idea of these
groups being able to resist outside of the frame of subjectivity not taken, by
evidence of the crisis, seriously? I agree with Teresa de Lauretis. She is
reluctant to apply any critical category to women "Because women have been
a colonized population for so long, I fear that any critical category we may
find applicable today is likely to be derived from or imbued with male
ideologies . . . .  1 am not suggesting that we ought to clean the slate of history 
and start anew, because I am enough of a historical materialist and semiotican 
that I cannot conceive o f  a totally new world rising out of, and in no way
connected with, the past or the present . . . .  What I am suggesting is that 
theory is dialectically built on. checked against, modified by, transformed
along with, practice—that is to say, with what women do, invent, perform,
produce concretely and not ’for all time’ but within specific historical and
cultural conditions" ("Gramsci" 84).
5. See Sawnet (South Asian Women’s Network) and Sasialit (South Asian 
L i te ra tu re ) .
6. By defining the IDD as a safe place I do not mean to suggest that it is not a 
place of confrontation and disagreement. It is. But it is also a place, perhaps 
due to its relative anonymity, in which the upper caste feels empowered to
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write on certain issues and in certain ways that they would never discuss in
open society.
7. I hope to show in the Baudrillard section of the chapter, that while
Baudrillard has little interest in historical perspective, object status can 
provide the sense o f  "historical depth" or "historical consciousness" that 
Frederic Jameson believes  is so lacking in the postm odern condition
("Regarding" 4).
8. See the Baudrillard section of this chapter.
9. Indians often run marriage ads stressing the fairness of their complexion
in order to attract a mate.
10. To be fair to Baudrillard, I should mention that he often writes of the
colonization or consumption of other. In "The Melodrama o f  Difference" 
Baudrillard argues that "We are engaged in an orgy of discovery, exploration,
and ’invention’ of the Other. . . . Otherness, like everything else, has fallen
under the law of the market, the law of supply and demand. It has become a 
rare item—hence its immensely high value on the psychological stock
exchange, on the structural stock exchange" (124). However. Baudrillard is
not criticizing this orgy so much as describing it. Still, there is a kind of 
ironic disdain rather than an ironic detachment in sentences such as "Our
sources of otherness are indeed running out; we have exhausted the Other as 
raw material" (125).
11. Baudrillard is not unaware of this criticism. He simply rejects its 
credibility. In A m e r i c a  Baudrillard argues that the poor do not figure into his 
explanation of America because the poor do not exist in America. He writes:
Reagan has never had the faintest inkling of the poor and their existence, nor 
the slightest contact with them. He knows only the self-evidence of wealth . . .
The have-nots will be condem ned to oblivion, to abandonm ent, to 
disappearance pure and simple. This is "must exist” logic: "poor people must
exit.” The ultimatum issued in the name of wealth and efficiency wipes them
off the map. And rightly so, since they show such bad taste as to deviate from 
the general consensus" ( I I I ) .  Again, while this passage does not quite count
as a criticism of how the poor are treated, its ironic insights could be used by 
those who would level such criticisms.
12. By arguing that the marginalized have a more explicit object status than
the privileged, I do not meant to suggest that the privileged do not also have an
objectivity. But the privileged do not often have to be aware of how they are
figured as objects. Their privileged status protects them from the pain of
internalizing "unattractive” attributes. In essence, the powerful have turned 
their objective traits into a subjective status which, if unchallenged, can
isolate them from the view of others.
13. By claiming this I am not denying other important institutions for
reaffirming identity—the black church, the National Organization o f  Women, 
student organizations, etc. But these institutions do not tolerate their members 
so much as embrace them. When I speak of institutions of tolerance and
identity. I am speaking of the governmental, legal, and social institutions still 
dominated by white, corporate, males.
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14. For example. D'Souza argues that "drugs and black-on-black crime kill 
more blacks in a year than all the lynchings in U.S. history. Racism is hardly 
the most serious problem facing African Americans in the United States today. 
Their main challenge is a civilizational breakdown that stretches across class 
lines but is especially concentrated in the black underclass" (The End  527).
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CHAPTER HI
POLITICS IN THE WRITING CLASSROOMS OF POSTMODERNITY
Truly speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can
receive from another soul. --Ralph Waldo Emerson "an address
delivered before the Senior class in Divinity College, Cambridge,
Sunday evening, 15 July, 1838”
[N]o book is genuinely free from political bias. The opinion that art 
should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.
—George Orwell "Why I Write," Collected Essays vol. I
Louise Wetherbee Phelps begins Composition as a Human
Science with the provocative claim "that composition awoke in the 
initial moment of its disciplinary project to find itself already
situated, prereflectively, within a specific cultural field of meaning— 
that of postmodern thought, with its characteristic preoccupations 
and world vision" (3). By this claim she means that composition, as a 
field of meaningful practices, is embedded within and indebted to 
the larger "sociocultural matrix" of postmodernity. It draws identity
and purpose through an in terdependent, co rrela tive , and 
transactional relationship with the postmodern condition, a condition 
"marked by themes of loss, illusion, instability, marginality, 
decentering, and finitude" (5). If, as I have suggested, we add to 
Phelps' argument Friedman's argument that the current nature of
this condition has changed so that we once again desire notions of
agency and advocacy along with the instability, then we are in what 
I have called a post postmodern condition.
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If my appropriation and extension of Phelps' argument is valid, 
then this post postmodern situatedness should be reflected in our 
pedagogy on the role of politics in the writing classroom. In other 
words, we would, on one hand, be preoccupied with indeterminacy, 
juxtaposition, openendedness, fracture, and rupture; reflect an 
inherent distrust of the notions of progress, universal explanation, 
and hegemony; embrace a politics of play that eats away at its own 
and others' author/ity; and. generally, favor questions over answers, 
displacements over resolutions, multiple finite narratives over grand 
narratives. On the other hand, we would also seek to demarginalize 
marginalized voices, marginalize dominant voices, present the 
unpresented, and reclaim postmodernized concepts of self, agency, 
history, and advocacy. In short, we would try to make explicit what 
Lyotard calls the "justice of multiplicity and the multiplicity of 
justice" within a historical moment that maintains the need for 
values {Just Gaming 100).
And sometimes our political pedagogy does reflect this almost 
schizophrenic attempt to both critique the current social condition 
and refuse to participate in the authoritarian practices which 
constitute it. For example, while I have distanced myself from Victor 
Vitanza's work because it is too radical for our current historical 
moment, his attempt to embrace radical postmodernism a n d 
maintain Lyotard's vision of just society is laudatory. Vitanza’s 
"Postmodern" or "Anti-body Rhetoric" of critical subversions "is . . . 
not concerned either with attempting to resolve rhetorical, 
interpretive differences or with even accounting for them. Instead, 
it identifies, detonates, and exploits the difference" ("Critical" 42).
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For Vitanza, the "struggle against author/ity" is not to either deny 
the political dimension of pedagogy or to move students to a critical 
and supposedly ethically superior or liberated social consciousness, 
but "to enhance our abilities to tolerate the incommensurabilities 
that make up what cultural critics are calling 'post-modern 
knowledge' (49).
This state of tolerance, this ability to drift is not, however, 
mere nihilism, an example of the dubious philosophy that anything 
goes. The goal of this play of contradictory voices is "to bring into 
realization what has been displaced—and that is the Sophistic idea of 
Kairos" which Vitanza defines as "many competing, contradictory 
v o i c e s "  (60 ).[ Vitanza's teacher seeks not the progress of a 
particular political agenda (a mask for the violence, subjugation, and 
privilege necessary to "make the world a better place"), but the 
paralogy—the rupture, paradox, and discontinuity—of multiplicity. 
The students’ different political situatedness is not seen as a problem 
but as a resource to be employed against the rise of a hegemonic 
discourse. The contradictive and multi-voiced classroom is a political 
end in itself and not a means to new world order.
Stephen M. Fishman and Lucille Parkinson McCarthy also offer 
what I would call a post postmodern or, at least, an non-foundational 
perspective on politics and pedagogy in the classroom. They present 
Dewey's pragmatism "as an effective alternative to radical or 
confrontational pedagogy . . . .  for teachers who find certain kinds of 
conflict unattractive but who seek student critique and change" 
("Teaching" 344).2 Importantly, this critique and change is not in the 
service of a previously determined political end but in the
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development of an intelligence capable of dealing with the "unstable, 
uncannily unstable" condition of the world (Dewey Experience and 
Nature  qtd. in Fishman 346). Dewey, they believe, "would oppose 
teachers who have static pedagogic ends, for example, particular 
political positions which they want students to adopt before leaving 
their classrooms. For Dewey, such educational objectives put too 
much emphasis on a relatively minor product of the educative 
experience" (347). Dewey's educational goals focus instead "on the 
development of certain habits and dispositions rather than on the 
acquisition of a fixed body of knowledge or belief' (346).
These habits and dispositions for dealing with the unstable
conditions of the world echo, using Vitanza's terministic screen. 
Lyotard’s idea of invention as paralogy. Both act as a means for 
tolerating the instability of the world. Dewey's "flexibility or 
'intelligence'—the ability to respond to novel situations, access . . .
cultural resources, reshape . . . plans, and take positive residue from .
. . experiences" (346-47)—could be used as the means for dealing 
with and acting within Vitanza's state of Kairos. Thus, like Vitanza, 
Fishman and McCarthy question the ethics and pedagogical 
effectiveness of confronting students to achieve a predetermined 
political end. Such predetermined ends can never be responsive 
enough to the ever changing experience of the world. A pedagogy 
inspired to realize those ends could never develop the intelligence or 
flexibility necessary to act and act ethically within such a condition— 
except perhaps to act through the violent imposition of theory.
However, unlike Vitanza, Fishman and McCarthy do not
privilege dissonance as an end in itself. They call not only for
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dissonance but cooperation: "For although Dewey recognizes the
importance of dissonance, he stresses that conflict must always occur 
within the context of appreciation for cooperative inquiry and the 
virtues which sustain it"3 (344). In other words, Fishman and 
McCarthy seek to create not simply a "'negative liberty,' the don't- 
tread-on-me-sorts of individual protections . . . .  [but also a ] 'positive 
liberty' . . . which encourages students to step out o f their private 
realms, find common projects, and, in conjunction with classmates, 
make their unique contributions to such projects" (347-48). 
Incommensurability is not ignored by Fishman and McCarthy but 
neither are chances for organic collaboration. And while Vitanza 
would also oppose an individualist inspired liberty, he would be 
suspicious of the social orientation of Dewey's pragmatism.
Finally, Judith Goleman’s Foucaudian and Bakhtinian inspired 
Working Theory  also reflects the attempt to foster a critical and 
political consciousness while maintaining an appreciation for 
indeterminacy. Goleman argues for a "counterhegemonic writing 
project" (106) in which both the teacher a n d  student work "the 
writing that has been working them" (107 my emphasis). The stress 
Goleman places on the situatedness of the teacher's politics and on 
the student and teacher as colleagues separates her work from many 
other radical pedagogues. Goleman argues that in order for students 
of composition to work the theories "that are working 
them . . . , they would j o i n  their teachers in redefining what 
intellectual inquiry involves and why" (6 my emphasis).
Students' subject positions are not the problem, that which 
must be reterritorialized. The authoritative discourses which help to
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construct those subjectivities are. The teacher does not present his 
or her own subjectivity as a superior consciousness so much as 
engage student subjectivity and be engaged by it. "The teacher." 
Goleman explains, "is not a master of situation, but a student of it" 
(9). The teacher is within the drama for change and not the source of 
that drama. The teacher and  the student become Foucault's specific 
intellectual trying to open up spaces in which language can be 
reterritorialized from authoritative to internally persuasive.
Goleman's project is not, however, naively or dangerously 
utopian. The teacher does not pretend to give up his or her authority 
or pretend to "leave his or her politics at the door." Goleman stresses 
that "Students who learn from us 'how to write' would learn that we 
cannot offer them technical procedures or interesting processes
alone, but in conjunction with the worldviews, subject positions and
regimes of truth that they are a part of" (6). But, this learning 'how 
to write' is a j o in t  project instead of an adversarial confrontation. 
Agency for Goleman's teacher and student comes from an
Althusserian "critical effectivity" achieved not through a universal 
theory of writing but through "a theory of the contextual" (4). In 
other words, the ability to act is reclaimed through a critical
understanding of the effects of specific actions in specific situations. 
There is an postmodern indeterminacy, however, as to the specificity 
of what these effects will be. Critical effectivity "cannot be learned 
all at once and once and for all. Rather, this knowledge is specific in 
its effects and thus must be learned over and over in it effects" (7). 
Therefore, Goleman's pedagogy is ultimately a neo-pragmatic 
process. And while this pedagogy places perhaps too much hope in
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the contextual for Vitanza's taste, Goleman, like Fishman. McCarthy, 
and Vitanza, sees education and critique as an ongoing and
indeterminate processes rather than as means to predetermined
political ends.
All of these theorists share what I would call a post 
postmodern ethos on the role of politics in the classroom.4 They each 
advance writing projects which are counter hegemonic not only in 
that they oppose the dominant discourse, a claim many radical 
pedagogues could make, but in that they are themselves
counterhegemonic in their practices. Unfortunately, the question of 
politics and pedagogy in our field is often presented instead as a 
false dilemma, a "choice” between two positions that, as Richard 
Levin argues, seem "to eliminate the possibility of any discursive
space outside the two warring poles" ("Silence" 173). The first
position is most eloquently and passionately put forth by Maxine
Hairston in her now infamous CCC's article: "Diversity, Ideology, and
Teaching Writing." In it, Hairston argues that the emphasis on
politics in the classroom is dangerous and ill advised. We, as 
composition teachers, are neither qualified nor justified to deal with 
questions of politics in the classroom. She writes:
I see a new model emerging for freshman writing programs, a model 
that disturbs me greatly. It’s a model that puts dogma before 
diversity, politics before craft, ideology before critical thinking, and 
the social goals of the teacher before the educational needs of the 
student. It's a regressive model that undermines the progress we’ve 
made in teaching writing, one that threatens to silence student
voices and je opard ize  the process-orien ted , low risk, student 
centered classroom we’ve worked so hard to establish as the norm.
It’s a model that doesn’t take freshman English seriously in its own 
right but conceives of it as a tool, something to be used. The new 
model envisions required writing courses as vehicles for social 
reform rather than student-centered workshops designed to build 
students’ confidence and competence as writers. It is a vision that
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echoes that old patronizing rationalization we’ve heard so many 
times before: students don't have anything to write about so we have 
to give them topics. Those topics used to be literary; now they're 
political. (180)
And in a "Comment and Response" section of College English, Hairston 
characterizes the articles written by radical pedagogues as
"dominated by name dropping, unreadable, fashionably radical
articles that I feel have little to do with the concerns of most college
English teachers," and the radical theorists themselves as "Iow-risk
Marxists who write very badly, are politically naive, and seem more 
concerned about converting their students from capitalism than in 
helping them to enjoy writing and reading" (694-95). For Hairston, 
we are very definitely to "leave our politics at the door." Writing, 
she believes, can and should be taught "for its own sake, as a
primary intellectual activity that is at the heart of a college
education" ("Diversity" 179).
The critique of Hairston's position is well known, and I will 
spend only a little time reviewing it. The critique is probably best
and most charitably made by Patricia Sullivan and Donna Qualley in 
their book Pedagogy in the Age o f  Politics. In it, Sullivan and Qualley 
argue that Hairston not only "endorses an agenda," picks a political
side, if you will, by "taking a stand against any curricular change that 
would insert the local and particular interests of culturally situated 
subjects . . . .  but that this stance is premised on an elisive reading of 
composition's history" (x-xi). Composition has never had the 
apolitical past Hairston imagines.5
To reveal the politics inherent in Hairston's article, Sullivan and 
Qualley point out that in Hairston's argument overtly political terms 
such as "dogma," "politics," "ideology," and "the social goals of the
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teacher" are pitted against supposedly apolitical terms such as 
"diversity," "craft," "critical thinking," and "the educational needs of 
the students." This pairing reflects less a flaw or slyness in 
Hairston's argument and more a nostalgia for "a prepoliticized time in 
composition's history when it was possible for us to teach writing 
untainted by the social values and institutional conditions in which 
our practices and theories are forged" (x). Or as John Trimbur argues 
in response to Hairston's scathing critique of him and other critical 
pedagogues, "the intellectual context of composition studies has 
changed over the past five or ten years as teachers, theorists, 
researchers, and program administrators have found useful some of 
the ideas and insights contained in contemporary critical theory . . . .  
the 'mainstream' Maxine refers to isn't quite there anymore" ("John 
Trimbur" 700). If it ever was. Indeed, I think the most 
disappointing aspect of Hairston's argument is her refusal to argue 
for the politics of her pedagogy—a student-centered, low-risk. 
personal narrative based, craft oriented, ideologically indeterminate 
classroom. Instead, she makes the dubious move, at least for our 
generation, of presenting her pedagogy as above politics.
The second position we are often offered for explaining the role 
of politics in the classroom is what has come to be known as the 
critical democracy or oppositional pedagogy. This pedagogy is 
associated with such diverse theorists as Alan France, Karen Fitts, 
Charles Paine, Laditka, C. H. Knoblauch, Patricia Bizzell, James Berlin, 
Ira Shor, Susan Miller, John Trimbur, Donald Morton, and Mas’ud 
Zavarzadeh to name but a few. They argue that it is impossible for 
us to leave our politics at the door, and that trying to do so is itself a
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political move that masks the teacher's inevitable political agenda
(making it more insidious and difficult for the student to openly
oppose) and privileges the status quo (patriarchal, classist, racist).
As Karen Fitts and Alan France put it, "we do not believe that writing 
can be separated from politics, that there are neutral topics that 
students can write about . . . .  [the] insistence that students write 
about ’their own ideas’ merely confirms the ideology of privatization" 
("Advocacy" 14). Instead, these theorists, in the name of professional
ethics and teaching for social reform, replace Hairston's "safe and 
cooperative classroom" with classrooms that favor directly 
challenging student subjectivities deemed sexists, classist, racist 
and/or homophobic (Bauer 389. Berlin 103, hooks 42, Jarratt 105-
106, Morton 79, Pratt 39, Sciachitano 300, Weiler 144-145). 
Consequently, many oppositional theorists call not only for openly 
political classrooms but aggressively partisan ones.
In "Relativism, Radical Pedagogy, and the Ideology of 
Paralysis," Charles Paine argues that
equality and democracy are not transcendent values that inevitably
emerge when one learns to seek the truth through critical thinking.
Rather, if those are the desired values, the teacher must recognize
that he or she must influence (perhaps manipulate is the more
accurate word) students’ values through charisma or power—he or
she must accept the role as manipulator. Therefore it is of course
reasonable to try to inculcate into our students the conviction that 
the dominant order is oppressive. (563-64)
In "Beyond Anti-Foundationalism to Rhetorical Authority: Problems
in Defining Cultural Literacy," Patricia Bizzell believes
that we must be forthright in avowing the ideologies that motivate 
our teaching and research. For instance, James Berlin might stop
trying to be value-neutral and anti-authoritarian in the classroom . .
. . Instead, he might openly state that this course aims to promote 
values of sexual equality and left-oriented labor relations and that 
this course will challenge students’ values insofar as they conflict
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with these aims. Berlin and his colleagues might openly exert their 
authority as teachers to persuade students to agree with their values 
instead o f  pretending that they are merely investigating the nature 
o f  sexism and capitalism and leaving the students to draw their own 
conclusions. (670)
And in "Creating Space for Difference in the Composition Class," Karen 
Hayes argues that by focusing on "diversity and dispute" instead of 
"politeness and common ground" teachers empower marginalized 
students to speak (300). In all these examples being critical is not an 
end in itself but a means to a particular and predetermined political 
end.
The criticism of critical pedagogy, besides that done by 
Hairston, has just begun. Mainly because it is relatively new, and its 
practioners have traditionally assumed the role of critic in the field. 
Before I turn to my criticism, however, I would like to strongly state 
that I regard the new studies in race, class, gender, ethnicity, and 
sexuality as having revitalized composition studies, as having 
brought to the forefront crucial pedagogical issues which were too 
often glossed over or ignored altogether. The current ruptures in 
theory and practice are not the result of "tenured radicals" (13) as 
Roger Kimball has argued but of shifts in the educational needs and 
social demographics of students. I agree with Gerald Graff that "As 
the democratization of culture has brought heretofore excluded 
groups into the educational citadel, with them have come the social 
conflicts that their exclusion once kept safely distant" (B e y o n d  8). 
Indeed, I think Hairston does not see that the impetus for critically 
based classrooms often comes as much from students as from 
teachers.
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I have problems with b o th  Hairston’s position and the 
oppositional or critical democracy position: Hairston's because her
pedagogy seems unreflective of her own political privileging, and 
critical pedagogy’s because it seems hegemonic and dictatorial. I 
haven't gone to all the trouble to oppose hegemonic discourses only 
to impose a new one—ideologically different to be sure but still
functionally and structurally authoritarian. Indeed, when teachers 
try to "exert their authority" on me persuasion has ended and 
coercion has begun. When teachers become my Socratic adversaries 
instead of my Elbowian advocates, my ability to "agree with their 
values" has been irreparably damaged.
Nevertheless, I too want my students to do more than play 
with the pieces of the deconstructed universe. I too hope that my
classroom is a site for progressive social change. I too hope to 
improve the lives of my students in material ways. And I too 
believe that politics can greatly enhance a writing classroom. 
Indeed, it has been my experience that students enjoy writing about 
politics given the support, respect, and constructive challenge that 
such investigation requires. For example, one student wrote the 
following in a mid-semester evaluation of a first year writing course 
I was teaching:
I think my favorite part o f  the class so far has been the discussions 
on political issues from our reader.!6 J I like how we're able to come
at things like aff irm ative  action and sexual harassm ent from
multiple sides. For example, one o f  the articles we read was from 
Rush [Limbaughj but others were totally against him. That way
everybody’s position is respected, but they still have their views
challenged. Like me for instance. I'm a hard line conservative. I
was always totally opposed to the idea of affirmative action, but some
of the things we read and some of the things other people said and
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you said in class really made me think. I’m not really sure where I 
stand anymore.
I do not, therefore, undertake this critique of the use of the political 
in the classroom lightly. I do it because I believe critical democracy
pedagogy may ultimately be damaging the very causes it is seeking
to aid and that I hold dear.
I would like to find a discursive place somewhere between the 
two options that we have been presented, a rupture where students’ 
political situatedness is respected but can be challenged; where we
keep the safe, student-centered, low-risk classrooms Hairston 
champions but invigorate them with explorations of the political: 
where the irreducibility of student difference is celebrated but the 
pain that privileged subjectivity causes is critiqued. The purpose of 
this chapter, therefore, is to more fully develop a critique of critical 
pedagogy. For critical democracy pedagogy is anything but that—it is 
not critical enough of its own assumptions, it is not based on
democratic practices, and it is not effective as a pedagogy for change.
A C ritica l View o f C ritica l D em ocracy Pedagogy
First, the argument that "everything is political"—the rallying 
cry for most critical pedagogy—conflates the term political with all 
other evaluative terms. While declaring that everything is political 
works well in revealing supposedly objective positions for the 
privileged subjectivities they inherently are, it does not help us 
decide the next and perhaps more important question: whose
politics should be privileged and why? If, as Laditka argues, "there 
simply is no value free pedagogy" ("Semiology" 363), then which
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values do we privilege and how does the idea that everything is 
political help us in making that decision? How is something political? 
How is politics different from religious, ethical, or moral frames? Is 
it? If everything is political, then does that mean all political views 
are equally valid? If not, on what non-political basis is this question 
decided? It seems that making everything political displaces the 
more important question and task of deciding which politics should 
be allowed in the writing classroom and in what ways.
Further, there is another unanswered question in using the 
argument that everything is political to justify an oppositional 
pedagogy. The goal of an "adversarial relation to the student," 
according to Morton and Zavarzadeh, is that such a relationship (if I 
can call it that) "helps reveal the student to himself by showing him 
how his ideas and positions are effects of larger discourses (of class, 
race, and gender, for example), rather than simple, natural 
manifestations of his consciousness or mind" ("Theory" 11-12). If we 
ignore the potentially condescending nature of such a statement (do 
Morton and Zavarzadeh reveal their own positions as effects of larger 
discourses?), we still have the question of why the revelation that 
ideas are the effects of discourse should cause a student to change 
his or her ideas or give up a privileged position. Perhaps the 
student is happy being in a privileged cultural position-irrespective 
of how he or she got there. What is politically intelligent about 
giving up advantage? Why shouldn't the student get defensive about 
having his or her subject position attacked when all subject positions 
are equally the product of discourse? In short, why should 
knowledge lead to a specific action?
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Thus, it seems that this kind of conflation could lead to the 
devaluing of intellectual engagement and the glorification of 
dogmatism. "Well," many students could argue, "it's just my opinion 
and all opinions are equal in that all are political." James Vopat 
feared that Ken Macrorie’s work could lead to "the sensational rush 
over the considered response" ("Uptaugh t  Rethrought" 42). I fear 
that critical pedagogy will lead to the uncritical privileging of 
political views in the name of all things being political. Bruffee’s 
Rortian inspired definition of knowledge as "socially justified belief" 
("Social Construction" 774) could become a rationalization for 
dogmatism and brutality.
For example, many students in my first year writing course 
agreed with Ward Churchill’s overall argument in "Crimes against 
H um an ity"7 but decided not to change their opinion on using Native 
American tribal names to name sports teams. One student found 
Churchill’s essay "extremely thoughtful" but maintained that 
"referencing a group of people as "Redskins," is simply factual 
"because the Native American/Indians [have] red color pigmentation 
in their skin as Asian people have a yellow pigmentation." Another 
student argued that while "Churchill makes some great points in his 
article . . . .  It leaves me in a very neutral position . . .  On one hand I 
can see how the Indians feel but on the other hand I don’t 
understand why they're making such a big deal about it." Another 
student wrote that while using Native American names "causes many 
controversies . . .  I feel that these franchises are not trying to . . . 
mock or degrade these Indian tribes. They are merely names. In 
fact, I feel as though the Indians should be proud of their tribes and
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respect that these teams are using the names to promote their clubs." 
Finally, another student wrote that "Before reading the article by 
Ward Churchill, I thought the controversy on the names of sports 
teams in professional and college sports was absurd. [ still feel this 
way because it is meant to be in good spirit not degrading to the 
Indians."
The changing of privileged beliefs requires more than 
confrontation. It requires a sustained pedagogical relationship. 
Adversarial pedagogies have left out the importance of persuasion, 
and their condescending attitude has destroyed the basis on which 
persuasion rests—respect. As Jay and Graff argue, "critique can 
succeed only by resorting to persuasion, and persuasion has no 
chance unless it is willing to respect the resistance of those not yet 
converted" ("A Critique" 208). While I was not able to persuade all 
of my students as to validity of Churchill's argument, the sustained 
respect and engagement I gave each student did have some effect. 
One of the above students wrote in the revision of her original 
response on Churchill that he showed her
just how much these names offended and hurt people . . . .  Churchill 
makes one wonder why it is that people are treated in such a cruel 
manner, and how we . . . can just back and let it happen. Although I 
suppose the media is part of the reason why people find this so 
funny. It's almost like propaganda to 'sell a product’ at the expense 
of other people . . . .  I know that I now will try to be more considerate 
of what I say and do.
While I'm not Pollyanna enough to believe that this student's change
in attitude had nothing to do with trying to please me, I must stress
that I never tried to force her to change her opinion. Like with the
other students. I merely stated my opinion and suggested further
reading she might do on the subject.
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Second, some critical pedagogues take the belief that one 
cannot "leave one's politics at the door" as license to impose their 
political views on students. They lack respect for opposing ideologies 
and cultural perspectives. For example, David Bleich argues that
"Religious views collaborate with the ideology of individualism and 
with sexism to censor the full capacity of what people can say and 
write" ("Literacy" 167). Morton and Zavarzadeh argue that teachers 
should treat student resistance as "another example of false 
consciousness to be demystified" ("Theory" 208). In quotes already 
discussed, Paine justifies manipulation, Bizzell the exertion of power. 
Hayes an adversarial relationship to deal with political views 
resistant to hers. Is the only legitimate role for resistance? Do 
teachers demystify their own authority? Their own consciousness? 
Might student resistant instead be a form a Bakhtin's Carnival—a 
moment when all that is seen as high and holy, all that is seen as 
above the student is brought down through mockery to a level where 
the student can—as Bakhtin puts it—finger it? Student resistance is 
often not taken seriously by many critical theorists except as a 
problem to be overcome. Student resistance, if too strongly against 
the teacher's ideology, is not seen as a legitimate political act. The 
teacher's political stance is authentic the student's stance is not.
For while Berlin stresses that "The lessons of postmodern 
difference remind us . . . that the individual must never be sacrificed 
to any group-enforced norm . . . .  [and that] the worth of the 
individual must never be compromised" (Rhetorics 101-102), and 
while France and Fitts say they "are committed to open democratic 
forum, free expression of conflicting arguments, and an empathetic
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classroom ("Advocacy" 14), and while Freire stresses that education 
must "start with the conviction that it cannot present its own 
program but must search for this program dialogically with the
people" {The Pedagogy 118), and while Ira Shor advocates a "critical 
literacy" that "invites teachers and students to problematize all 
subjects of study" ("Educating" 24), Shor, Berlin, France, Fitts and
other Freirean inspired teachers seem rather selective in the subjects 
that they problematize and the students who are problems. For 
example, all of the students and subjects that need to be 
problematized or which cause Berlin problems in Rhetoric, Poetics,
and Culture reflect only one political position: conservative.
Berlin describes a group of male students who "When pressed 
to active dialogue . . . may deny the o b v io u s  social and political 
conflicts they enact and witness daily. For example, the majority of 
male students I have encountered at Purdue have in our first 
discussions assured me that race and gender inequalities no longer 
exists in the United States and do not merit further discussions . . . .  
Any inequalities that do remain, they insist, are only apparent 
injustices, since they are the result of inherent and thus unavoidable 
features of human nature (women are weaker and more emotional 
than men, for example) or are the product of individual failure . . . .  
It is at this moment of denial  that the role of the teacher as problem 
poser is crucial, providing methods for questioning that locate the 
points of conflict and contradiction" (102 my emphasis). Again, if we 
ignore for a moment Berlin's somewhat condescending portrayal of 
these students' opposing arguments, his text contains a rather gaping 
contradiction. Berlin opposes the banking model of education in
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favor of teacher as problem poser, yet his language betrays his belief 
in an obviously correct pre-existing body of knowledge that he has 
and his students, suffering under their mystified consciousness, 
deny .8
When Berlin states that "the questions the teacher poses are 
designed to reveal the contradictions and conflicts inscribed in the
very language of the students' thought and utterances" (102-03), he 
must recognize that not only are the meaning and location of these
contradictions and conflicts and the way they are inscribed opened to 
vast ideological disagreement, but that the very idea that there are 
contradictions and conflicts and that the teacher is justified and 
qualified in naming them are themselves ideological premises to be 
argued. As Jay and Graff point out, "terms like 'cultural diversity’ 
and 'empowerment' should denote a set of problems to be explored 
and debated, not a new truth which teachers and students must 
uncritically accept," and, further, that "the definition of categories 
such as the disenfranchised and the dominant, oppressed and the 
oppressor, should be a product of the pedagogical process, not its 
unquestioned premise" ("A Critique" 207). Even the social inequities 
Berlin mentions are not obvious but the recognition of a situated 
experience that must be explored dialogically with students—
students who are not seen as in denial but in different situated 
frames. If not, then Berlin's critical agency is really only the moment 
when students with different ideologies agree with him. Despite his 
protestations to the contrary, Berlin's pedagogy must ultimately take
the correct knowledge from his head and place it in the heads of his 
students.
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Somehow all political positions are the result of situated
perspectives, yet the students' perspective, if different enough from
the teacher's, is seen as lacking, resistant, uncritical, or naive.
Students are once again conceived of as neophytes. No longer
developmentally or cognitively inferior, now students have lower
levels of consciousness or are pawns of the capitalists state. As Jay
and Graff argue, "Students who are not persuaded by radical politics
cannot, by definition, be expressing an authentic desire. It cannot be
their true selves speaking but only the internalized voice of the
oppressor" (203). Conversely, the teacher's perspective, which is
every bit as much a product of discourse as the students', becomes
inexplicably privileged in critical pedagogy—a privileging which is
often rationalized in the name of honesty or inescapable authority.
For example. Fitts and France are particularly sensitive to the charge
that they privilege their own subject positions. They write:
We risk presenting ourselves  as p riv ileged  subjects , somehow 
standing outside culture. How did our understanding o f  sexual 
difference seemingly escape the dominant culture that we oppose?
The short answer is—we suppose—that our own subjectivity results 
from the accidental confluence of social forces on our lives, which 
subverted to some degree  the dom inan t gender patterns  and 
demanded more egalitarian ones. Thus, the internal contradictions 
of our personal histories have situated us at the critical margin. And 
it is from this crit ica l margin that we engage our students. 
("Advocacy” 17)
Notice that France and Fitts do not actually explain why their 
position is more enlightened, only how it is that they might have 
come by that enlightenment. Fitts and France begin with the 
assum ption that their subject position is inherently  more 
equalitarian than those who disagree with them. Their position is 
privileged because it is superior, and their position is superior
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because it is privileged. Such circular logic, especially wheu it is used 
to justify an adversarial relationship with students, frightens me. It 
can lead to a dogmatism before which any denial of the legitimacy of 
the teacher's interpretive frame is itself evidence of that frame's 
legitimacy. There is no space in which the incommensurability of the 
student and the fallibility of the teacher can be recognized and even 
celebrated. Such circular logic blinds its users not only to their own 
situatedness but to that of their students—preventing the teacher 
from seriously listening to student objections.
In general, Berlin's seemingly common sense argument that
"the success of the kind of classroom he wants depends on the
teachers knowing their students" (R h e t o r i c s  104) could be
interpreted as license to define students in terms of lack, to attempt
to remake them, to, in a very Foucaudian sense, force students to
confess (in both a religious and legal sense) the truth of the teacher's
political discourse. In the case of theorists like Berlin, the confession
is not of a gross political agenda, clearly Berlin, Bizzell. Shor, and
others oppose that; it is the confession of more subtle and
unproblematized political premises located in the moment when
student resistance is seen as denial instead of difference. When
Mary Louise Pratt writes that
All the students in the class had the experience. . .of having their 
cultures discussed and objectified in ways that horrified them: all the 
s tu d e n t s  e x p e r i e n c e d  f a c e - t o - f a c e  the  ig n o r a n c e  a n d  
incomprehension, and occasionally the hostility of others . . . .  Along 
with the rage, incomprehension, and pain, there were exhilarating 
moments of wonder and revelation, mutual understanding, and new 
wisdom—the joys of the contact zone. ("Arts" 39)
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I cannot help but hear the words of Foucault from the first volume of
History o f  Sexuality—words that express the horrors of of the contact
zone. He writes:
The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject 
is also the subject of the statement: it is also a ritual that unfolds 
within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the 
presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the 
in te r lo c u to r  but the au thority  who requ ires  the confess ion , 
prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, 
punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is 
corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount 
in order  to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the 
express ion  a lone, independently  o f  its ex terna l consequences,  
produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it
exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his 
wrongs, liberates him. and promises him salvation. (61-62)
Placing this frame over the language that many critical theorists use
produces, for me at least, a very frightening echo. Through a
Foucaudian terministic screen, teachers become the authoritative
interlocuters demanding a confession as to the racism, sexism, and
inadequacy of the students' subject positions. Students become the
subjects who are exonerated, redeemed, purified, unburdened, and,
perhaps most chillingly, l i b e r a t e d  through confrontation and
forgiveness with the teacher's truth. Foucault’s words concerning "a
ritual in which truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistance
it has had to surmount in order to be formulated" seems to speak
directly to the critical theorists' justification of confrontation in the
name of the rhetorical invention it creates.
Students are being and student being is being "'put into
discourse,'" "a technology of power," a "will to know" over which they 
do not have the same control as the teacher. Critical pedagogy, to 
paraphrase Foucault's ideas on sexuality, "compels everyone to 
transform their" identity "into a perpetual discourse, to the manifold
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mechanisms which, in the areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and 
justice, incite, extract, distribute, and institutionalize" (33) the 
discourse of subjectivity.9 Of course, Foucaudians would argue that 
the subject is always an effect of discourse anyway. But this insight 
should be taken as a warning not a celebration. The more one's 
being is subjected to discourse, especially discourses in which one 
has less power, the more trapped in the games of power one 
becomes. To paraphrase Foucault's ideas on sexuality once again, 
student subjectivity is "driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a 
discursive existence" (32). Students are made knowable subjects: 
they are subjected to discourses of truth grounded in the teacher's 
superior power position. And while some would rightly argue that 
the privatization of student identities may support—at least 
implicitly—the exploitation of others, who is the teacher to decide 
which student subjectivity is exploitative and which is not? Do we 
really want to grant such power to a teacher? To claim that teachers 
unavoidably have such power anyway is to concede that there are no 
ethical differences in the ways in which power is used—a proposition 
the critical theorists decry.
I suppose one could read Foucault's work as supporting the 
effectiveness of confrontation in the classroom—a place where the 
teacher is unalterably the "authority who requires the confession"— 
but such a reading takes Foucault's work as a license to abuse power 
instead of as a critique of those who hide their power behind notions 
of truth, objectivity, and scientism. It reads Foucault not as someone 
who problematizes the ethical use of power but as someone who 
gives joyful accent to repressive strategies. Further, such a reading
131
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
would run counter to the expressed desire of critical democracy 
pedagogy—to liberate students through critique.
Instead, a Foucaudian inspired teacher would focus on the 
process  of political change, change as a semester long project rather 
than the product o f an overwhelming confession. Change is not 
something we impose; it is something we strive to create and such 
creation requires openness to each unique classroom rather than 
adherence to a politics that can be applied to any classroom. Change 
is something that we test and try to learn from, something that 
involves the transformation not only of the students but of the 
teacher as well. Otherwise, the pedagogy of critical theorists 
becomes, if not in letter than in spirit, like the curriculum Mike Rose 
describes in Lives on the Boundary —"a curriculum that isn't 
designed to liberate . . . but to occupy" (28).10
Third, the power relationship of the teacher to the student is 
not theorized enough in some critical pedagogy. The "evangelical" 
tone that many critical theorists take sounds too close to 
proselytization. As Graff argues "There are those who justify turning 
their courses into conscious raising sessions on the grounds that all 
teaching is inevitably political anyway. This authoritarian behavior 
is indeed disturbing, and it has been making enemies out of potential 
friends of the reform movement" (B eyo n d  25). Yet, France's and 
Fritts' objective is to "awaken" their students to class consciousness. 
Mary Louise Pratt writes of the "exhilarating moments of w o n d e r  
and reve la t ion"  ("Arts" 39 my emphasis) in her class. Dale Bauer 
argues that "The feminist agenda offers a goal toward our student's 
co n vers io n s  to emancipatory critical action" ("The Other" 389 my
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emphasis). Would we allow such practices in the classroom if they 
actually were used in the service of religious conversion?
We must always remember that as teachers we have two votes
in a classroom, that we are representatives of powerful institutions
(sometimes governmental institutions). The classroom is not a free
space, a Habermasian public square where equals come to debate
claims. Students are often frightened, intimidated, or feel attacked
by our authority. Indeed, Hairston warns us "That novice writers
can virtually freeze in the writing classroom when they see it as an
extremely high-risk situation" ("Diversity" 189). Listen to this
famous passage from Bartholomae and Petrosky's Facts, Artifacts and
Counterfacts .  But as you read, consider the weight of intimidation
that would be added to this project if the teacher assumed an
adversarial relationship with the student:
In the course, and in this book, we are presenting reading and 
writing as a struggle within and against the languages o f  academic 
life. A classroom performance represents a moment in which, by 
speaking or writing, a student must enter a closed community, with 
its secrets, codes and rituals. And this is, we argue, an historical as
well as a conceptual drama. The student has to appropriate or be
appropriated by a specialized discourse, and he has to do this as 
though he were easily and comfortably one with his audience, as 
though he were a member of the academy. And, of course, he is not.
He has to invent himself as a reader and he has to invent an act of 
reading by assembling a language to make a reader and a reading 
possible, finding some compromise between idiosyncrasy, a personal 
history, and the requirements o f  convention , the history of an 
institution. (8)
The struggle Bartholomae and Petrosky urge students to undertake
(and which I support) is already intimidating. Adding an adversarial
relationship to the performance would, as Hairston claims, freeze the 
students' ability to write. I am not arguing that the teacher can or 
should relinquish his or her authority, or that the teacher should be
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afraid of his or her authority. I am arguing that the teacher should 
use that authority to become the student's advocate instead of his or 
her adversary.
Of course, advocacy itself can be dangerous, especially when 
those who one is advocating for are from different racial, ethnic, 
gender, and class backgrounds. If not constantly open to revision
and listening, advocacy can become appropriation. We can come to 
believe that we are the students, that we can know them, that we 
can unproblematically represent them through a common humanity 
or a supposedly shared culture. As John Ernest argues concerning 
the attempt of teachers to "recognize the authority of the various 
cultures represented by our students." such attempts "too often . . . 
conceptualize, essentialize, and thereby appropriate the cultural 
background of the ir  students while susta in ing , however 
unintentionally, the mystical authority of academic modes of 
understanding" ("100 Friends" 13). Instead, we must advocate by 
beginning with ourselves. We must examine who we are as teachers, 
what we want, and how these often conflicting identities and desires 
threaten, harm, or help our students negotiate their own conflicting 
desires and multiple identities within the academy. In short,
advocacy is a process that begins with self critique rather than 
student evaluation. The evaluation must inevitably come but only 
after the self examination and only if that evaluation is opened 
ended rather than closed.
I know first hand the pain advocacy can cause for both the
student and the teacher. I once taught a sophomore level
introduction to critical analysis course in which I had a bright.
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intelligent, and talented writer. Indeed, Erin came into my class with 
tremendous ability, and it was because of this that I decided to push 
her. Firmly grounded in a Bartholomae mode at the time, I decided 
that what she needed as a writer was to challenge herself, to push 
her abilities beyond where she thought they could go. Consequently. 
I held back on her grades, asked for multiple rewrites, pushed her to 
push herself. And it worked. By the final paper, Erin made a 
tremendous jump in her writing ability—but there was a cost. 
Among my evaluations for the semester was the following:
1. What have you learned by taking this course?
"That my writing sucks. I learned how to rack my brain to support 
everything, every point that I made in an essay. I learned a lot more 
about literature obviously. I think that this class has made me a 
better writer, but it was an ego blow. I've never had less than an ’A’ 
on an English paper until this class. Welcome to college, right.”
2. Which features of this course, or of this particular section 
of the course, do you think are effective? What changes 
might be made to improve it?
"The reading assignments were good, conversation—discussion was 
beneficial & enjoyable. Conferences helped a lot.”
3. What are the particular strengths and weaknesses of this 
instructor's teaching? Please elaborate.
"Lance gave way too many pointers and when I got done w/a 
conference, my brain hurt. That's a good thing. Lance was a good
Prof.. but he’d never ever ever ever give me an A. I thought I
deserved A’s, and it frustrated me to no end when I was unsuccessful.
I thought he graded too hard & should have measured more on 
improvement and effort."
I knew it was Erin’s evaluation from the hand writing, the attitude, 
and the major. I think the first line. "That my writing sucks," and the 
line that I would "never ever ever ever give me an A" struck the
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deepest cord. Both were false. Erin was a very good writer, and she 
got an A on her final paper (although she did not know that when 
she wrote the evaluation). Her writing was filled with voice, insight, 
and academic rigor, but she was cruising in the course. So I pushed 
her, and it worked. Her writing improved. She learned how to 
"support everything, every point that I made in an essay," and that 
she could be "a better writer" than she was. Overall, I think it is
positive evaluation.
But somehow I missed her need to hear me say that she was a
good writer. My agenda on the needs of my student blinded me to
the other needs of my student, and her confidence as a writer
suffered. In my advocacy of Erin I had appropriated who she was 
and what she needed. I hadn't examined myself closely enough. 
Why was I so adamant on Bartholomae's approach? Was I convinced 
that the personal writing of first year English wasn't good enough for 
critical analysis? I'm not sure, but I shudder to think what would
have happened if I had pushed an adversarial relationship with 
Erin? Would I have shut her down completely, turned her off to 
writing forever? Is it right for a male instructor to p u s h  a female 
student? Her writing got better but at the price of her identity.
Luckily, my relationship with Erin was still a good one. I called
her and asked to meet. We talked about her work and the 
evaluation. She assured me everything was fine, that she enjoyed
the class, that I was a good teacher. But, I wasn't actually all that 
concerned with how she saw me. I was concerned with what my 
view of her had done to her confidence as a writer. Sure enough, 
after a few minutes, she said something that I will never forget: "I
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just wanted to feel like you were on my side once in awhile Lance." I 
thought it was obvious that I was, but in my appropriation of what 
that support should be I missed part of what it should have been. 
How much more do critical theorists miss in their adversarial 
pedagogies? They see their students as racist, sexist, classist, and 
homophobic. While I’m sure this view is partially true, does it also 
allow them to see their students as human beings, as intimidated by 
writing, as needing encouragement as well as critique? As John
Clifford argues, "students want to become writers . . . .  because they 
are convinced they have something to say, and more importantly,
somebody to say it to. They want an audience they can trust, one
that encourages them" ("The Subject" 46). In their rush to make the
classroom a place where the inequities of the world can be 
transformed, do critical theorists participate in the very brutality 
they abhor?
Fourth, I am sympathetic to or at least influenced by 
Baudrillard's argument that there is no space outside of the flow of 
culture from which to critique it. As Lester Faigley argues, 
"Baudrillard rejects the idea that we can somehow get outside the 
flow of codes, simulations, and images to discover any space for 
social critique" (213). While this interpretation of Baudrillard is a 
little simplistic, after all Baudrillard is ultimately rejecting the 
distinction between inside and outside, Baudrillard's theory does call 
into question the central claim of critical democracy pedagogy, that 
students can liberate themselves though a critique of how mass 
culture is produced, circulated, and consumed. If Baudrillard is right, 
then Henry Giroux's "language of possibility" (P o s tm o d ern ism  52)
137
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
becomes an impossibility, and Fitts' and France's attempt to 
"facilitate political demystification and social change" (Left Margin 
xi) becomes an exercise in a "will to truth." And while Zavarzadeh 
has argued that there is an "unsurpassable objectivity which is not 
open to rhetorical interpretation and constitutes the decided 
foundation of critique" and that "is the outside" that Marx called the 
"working day," I, as a rhetorician, question that any position is not 
open to rhetorical interpretation ("The Stupidity" 98). Moreover. 
Zavarzadeh ignores or chooses to deny the constitutive role of 
language in creating our conscious awareness and understanding of 
that working day.
As I wrote in the first chapter, Berlin, Morton, and other critical 
theorists haven't rejected the hegemonic terror of reason but merely 
shifted its locus of control, its foundational justification outward to 
the "social situation, context, paradigms, communities, or local nomoi 
as loci of deliberation or judgement"11 (Vitanza, "Three" 143). The 
"social-epistemic rhetoric" of Berlin and the "hidden curriculum" of 
Giroux are still based too deeply on the "game of knowledge"~no 
longer a game of individualist consumerism but now of socialist 
rationalism. Vitanza sees this shift in the location of reason as 
potentially "both dangerously utopian and blindly ideological" (143). 
and so do I.
Further, Baudrillard's work makes me suspicious of the claim 
that "The teacher can best facilitate the production of knowledge by 
adapting a confrontational stance toward the student" (Strickland 
293). Strickland believes, like most critical theorists, that the 
teacher's confrontational stance forces the student to invent
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rhetorical strategies to deal with that confrontation. If Baudrillard is 
right, then the student's supposed resistance and eventual 
acceptance of the teacher’s political view may be more an example of 
the student playing the capitalist game than of a true conversion.
Even if I grant that confrontation can create social critique. I’m 
still not sure it creates the intelligence to act on that critique. We 
might listen more closely to Dewey when he warns that "unless the 
activity lays hold on the emotions and desires, unless it offers an 
outlet for energy that means something to the individual himself, his 
mind will turn in aversion from it, even though externally he keeps 
at it" {How We Think 218). Dewey believes that the role of the 
teacher in taping into this energy should be as a "guide and director: 
he [the teacher] steers the boat, but the energy that propels it must 
come from those who are learning" (36), and I agree.
Fifth, I agree with Gregory Jay and Gerald Graff that much of 
critical pedagogy is based on an unexamined contradiction. In Jay 
and Graffs reading of Paulo Freire’s influential Pedagogy o f  the 
O p p r e s s e d  , they worry "that efforts by teachers to empower 
students often end up reinforcing the inequalities of the classroom," 
and that teachers "who directly promote progressive political 
doctrine . . . merely invert the traditional practice of handing 
knowledge down to passive students" ("A Critique" 202). For 
example, while "Freire does attack the Leninist model of education in 
which revolutionary leaders impose their teleological blueprint on 
students, merely inverting rather than breaking with the ’banking’ 
model of education,"12 (202) Jay and Graff point out that "the goal of 
teaching for Freire is still to move the student toward ’a critical
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perception of the world' and that this perception implies a correct
method of approaching reality" (203). Such an implication throws 
into doubt Freire’s claim that liberation education "starts with the 
conviction that it cannot present its own program but must search
for this program dialogically with the people" (118). While Freire 
argues that he is merely giving the will of the people back to them in 
amplified form, he "clearly presumes he knows in advance what the 
'authentic will of the people' is or should be" (203). Hence, how
dialogic can Freire's program be?
More troubling, what does Freire do with those who go through 
the Freirean dialogue and reject his view of reality? As Jay and Graff 
ask.
Suppose a student ends up deciding that he or she is n o t  oppressed or 
not oppressed in the way or for the reasons Freire supposes? What if, 
after a Freirean dialogue, the student embraces capitalism or decides 
that, for him or her. authentic  liberation  means jo in ing  a 
corporation and making a lot of money? Freire can only account for 
such decisions as the result of the student having been brainwashed 
by the dominant culture. (203)
It is, in short, "a pedagogical premise" that begins by "condescending
to students" (203). Thus, critical democracy pedagogy does not break
with the banking model of education; it simply supplies a new
ideology to be "deposited." The roles which the student and teacher
must play and the proper outcome of that interaction are
predeterm ined .
Finally, I’m convinced that critical pedagogy may do more
harm than good to the political and social causes that they are
attempting to support. Besides risking alienating students or forcing 
them to play a game, critical pedagogy institutionalizes a form of 
practice that could turn on them. Theorists like Freire, France. Berlin.
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and Miller seem to assume that only critical pedagogy people will 
adopt their method of instruction, or that even to use the method 
requires a similar ideology. For example, when Knoblauch argues 
that we "denounce the world . . . and above all oppression and 
whatever arguments have been called upon to validate it" (181), I 
guess he assumes that what institutions, practices, laws, and systems 
are oppressive, in what ways, and how they are to be denounced are 
obvious. But what if  a teacher decided to denounce affirmative 
action, gay rights, or feminism?
Read again the passages I quoted from Paine, Bizzell, Morton 
and others but imagine that the person who would use these 
methods is a racists or a homophobe hoping to advance his or her 
political agenda. Do we really want to institutionalize a 
confrontational pedagogy considering the many people on the far 
right who might disagree with its radical message but agree with its 
methods? Critical pedagogues would do well to remember that they 
are a minority community—probably within the academy and 
certainly within the larger society. They must be careful what 
practices they institute for fear that those practices could be wrested 
from their ideological control. If the critical theorists are not careful, 
they will create a precedent, a power structure, that will not be 
dependent on their particular ideology to function. Foucault has 
pointed out that changing the world is more complicated than merely 
changing the ideologies which operate its machinery. As James 
Miller, paraphrasing Foucault, argues, "To seize and exercise a 
dictatorial kind of power might simply reproduce old patterns of 
subjectification under a new name" (The Passion 234). Revolutions
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that change only the ideology of a power structure and not the
structure itself change only who gets killed (which can often be 
important but loses the moral high ground).
Thus, it seems to me that much of critical pedagogy lacks the 
indeterminacy, the celebration of paradox, and the ability to live 
with incommensurability that I value so much in postmodern 
theory. Instead, the critical theorists seem to have aligned 
themselves with what de Man has criticized as the philosophical
attempt to suppress the creative aspect of language through the 
"grammatization of rhetoric" ( A l le g o r ie s , 15)—only now it isn’t a 
grammar which limits creativity but a methodology of restraint 
employed in the name of establishing an equal ground for freedom. 
I'm not suggesting that politics can and should be left at the 
classroom door. I am suggesting that there is a difference between 
recognizing the situatedness and political dimension of all pedagogy,
finding that troublesome and challenging, and using that as an excuse
to privilege the teacher's ideology.
Whether postmodernism can ultimately provide both a love for 
indeterminacy and a progressive pedagogy is questionable. Indeed, 
a progressive postmodern pedagogy is an oxymoron—but, then again, 
postmodernism does not shy away from oxymorons. Further, if we 
argue for the post postmodernism of Friedman, then the possibility 
of joining postmodernism to projects for social transformation 
increases. Yet there are serious questions as to whether such a 
postmodern project is possible. Do we need a self for a politics of 
difference? Can we live with the paradox of universalizing 
difference? Does postmodern politics deny us the possibility of self
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and community—elements that are crucial to any viable political 
theory? I don't know. But I agree with Phelps and Friedman that 
these questions must be answered within the sociocultural matrix 
that composition finds itself embedded, and that there is a discursive 
authenticity in the attempt. The question for our field in the post 
postmodern age is not whether our classrooms are political but in 
what way. It is, in the end, a question of ethics—an ethics of the 
political.
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CHAPTER THREE NOTES
1. See Kennedy's The Art o f Persuasion page 67 and Kinneavy’s "Translating 
Theory into Practice in Teaching Composition: A Historical View and a
Contemporary View" pages 71-72 in Connors, Ede, and Lunsford’s Essays on
Classical Rhetoric and Modern D iscourse  for a more detailed discussion of 
Kairos.
2. See Emig, Newkirk, Jones for a further exploration of Dewey's tacit tradition 
as an alternative to radical pedagogy.
3. See Dewey's How We Think: A Restatem ent o f the Relation o f  Reflective
Thinking to the Educative Process pages 270-271.
4. For other theorists who also try, to varying degrees, to construct a 
postmodern politics for the classroom see: Faigley, LaDuc, Jay and Graff, a n d -
H a rk in .
5. See Susan Miller’s Textual Carnivals: The Politics o f  Composition for the best
overview of this political past.
6. See Left Right and Center: Voices from  Across the Political Spectrum. Eds.
Robert Atwan and Jon Roberts. New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press.
7. See Left Right and Center: Voices from  Across the Political Spectrum  p ag es
425-34. In the essay Churchill tries to point out the injustice, cruelty, and
disrespect of using Native American tribal names to name U. S. sports teams—
especially since the U. S. commited a holocaust against Native Americans.
8. Berlin specifically opposes the banking model of education, "the model of 
teacher as giver of knowledge and student as passive receiver "{R h e to r ic s  102). 
Indeed, he blames that model for making students unwilling to participate in 
discussions on the differences among students organized around issues of 
class, race, age, and gender.
9. I am changing the subject of Foucault's writing from sexuality to identity in 
this passage. However, I believe Foucault's writings on sexuality could also 
apply to subjectivity or identity. The actual passage reads as follows: Sex was
driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a discursive existence. From the
s in g u la r  im perialism  that com pels  everyone to transfo rm  the ir  
sexuality into a perpetual discourse, to the manifold mechanisms which, in the 
areas of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice, incite, extract, distribute, 
and institutionalize the sexual discourse, an immense verbosity is what our 
civilization has required and organized" {The History 33).
10. Of course. Rose was writing of a curriculum that did not challenge—but the 
effect is the same.
11. Vitanza does see this shift—while inadequate—as an improvement over the 
Cartesian justification of reason. However, he still labels Berlin's reason as a 
will to power. Social-epestemic rhetoric, Vitanza believes, is too tied to the
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games o f  rationality and knowledge and the "dominant (political) modes of 
representation" ("Three" 143).
12. Though Freire is usually the theorist most quoted for this type of idea, 
Dewey has expressed similar ideas. See ’’The Child and the Curriculum" page 
209. D em ocracy and Education  pages 4-30, and "The Need for a Philosophy of 
Education" page 10.
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CHAPTER IV
A POSTMODERN ETHICS FOR THE POLITICAL CLASSROOM
I would more or less agree with the idea that in fact what interests 
me is much more morals than politics or, in any case, politics as an 
ethics. —Michel Foucault "Politics and Ethics: An Interview"
In "Teaching the Political Conflicts: A Rhetorical Schema,"
Donald Lazere argues that "little basis has been established within 
the discipline of composition delineating either a theoretical 
framework or ethical guidelines for dealing with political 
controversies in writing courses" (194). Consequently, his essay 
offers a rhetorical frame as a "model for incorporating critical 
thinking about politics in writing courses" (194). As I do, Lazere 
favors courses that "broaden the ideological scope of students' critical 
thinking, reading, and writing capacities," yet he fears "that such 
courses can all too easily be turned into an indoctrination to the 
instructor's particular ideology" (195). The goal of Lazere’s rhetorical 
frame, therefore, is to "empower" students "to make their own 
autonomous judgements on opposing ideological positions in general 
and on specific issues" (195).
While endorsing Lazere’s pro jec t,1 I find that his rhetorical 
frame leaves the more important job of constructing "ethical 
guidelines for dealing with political controversies in the writing 
classroom" undone.2 Lazere’s frame provides a technical basis for 
how to include politics in a writing classroom but not the basis on 
which to decide what politics and behaviors should  be allowed in the
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writing classroom. For example, when Lazere writes that, "Part of 
my theoretical intention here is to indicate ways in which partisan 
political positions . . . can be introduced within a rhetorical schema 
that is acceptable to teachers and students of any reasoned political 
persuasion," (195) he leaves out or leaves implicit just what 
constitutes a reasoned political persuasion. What criteria distinguish 
a reasonable political persuasion from an unreasonable one? What 
behaviors in the name of those persuasions do we allow in the 
classroom? Does the partisan politics of Klan ideology get equal space 
with Queer Theory? Where and on what basis do we draw the line?
The answer to such questions requires something more than a 
rhetorical schema. It requires an ethical one. After all, something 
can be rhetorically effective yet morally objectionable. Hitler's 
propaganda ministry was very effective, but few of us would 
consider it moral. To use politics in the classroom requires an ethics 
of the political, a system of moral principles or values that governs 
the conduct of the members of our profession in the arena of politics.
I do not claim that this ethics somehow escapes ideology. Nor do I 
present it as the utopian opposition to ideology.3 Instead, I accept 
"Althusser's notion of ideology as an interpretation that constitutes 
reality" (Bizzell, "Marxist" 55), but I maintain that to constitute 
reality is not to determine it. There is an indeterminacy, a looseness, 
in the word "constitutes" that should be filled by an ethics of 
experimentation, practice, an awareness of effect, and dialectic to 
prevent the calcification of ideologies. There is often a gap between 
how our ideologies say the world works and our experiences of how 
it does. As Patricia Bizzell argues, "if we were utterly convinced of
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the inevitability of ideology, we would not feel uneasy about seeing 
the world through ideological interpretations . . . any more than we 
feel embarrassed about needing to eat or drink" ("Marxist" 55). And 
while Bizzell overstates her argument (we often do feel embarrassed 
about the need to eat), many of us still desire a truth, beauty, or 
morality that is above ideology. We do feel the need to test our 
ideologies in practice, and "reality" is constantly surprising us. There 
is an experience of the world that exceeds the ability of our 
ideologies to contain it.
Thus, ethics is the reminder of our experience of our ideologies' 
limitation. It is the reminder of what is left over from what was 
prior to ideology—the echo of our first need to respond to the world 
rather than to understand it. Jeffery T. Nealon, using the theory of 
Emmanuel Levinas, explains ethics as "the primacy of an experience 
of sociality or otherness that comes before any philosophical 
understanding or reification of our respective subject positions" ("The 
Ethics" 131-32). I would argue that this experience of overflow, this 
urge to test ideologies, this need to respond to other is itself the 
possibility of the ethical. It allows our ideologies to resist 
calcification, to remain open and changeable. Ethics, therefore, is not 
above ideology so much as envelopes it, precedes it, informs it, or 
puts it to the test. In short, I am arguing for an ethics of the 
pragmatic, the experimental, the answerable. I do privilege this 
ethics of practice over an ideology of interpretation but through 
argument and not because it has superior access to reality. Without 
this ethics we have no way of controlling what politics and behaviors 
are allowed in the classroom save raw applications of power.
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The following is my attempt to construct a postmodern ethics 
for the introduction, operation, exclusion, and critique of politics in 
the writing classroom.4 It is different from the political in terms of 
its scope. The political is the encrusted beliefs one has on specific 
issues. The ethical is the larger methodology of value constraints in 
which many specific and even contradictory politics can exist. The 
political represents the cultural structures we support and that 
support us. It provides the foundation for self interested action, 
action that is often different from what we say, on cultural issues. It 
is through the political that we protect the self, but it is through the 
ethical that we make the self vulnerable. In constructing this ethics 
I will first examine and synthesize potentially useful ideas from four 
influential theorists of postmodernity: Michel Foucault, Gerald Graff,
Patricia Harkin, and Mikhail Bakhtin. I will then put this ethics to 
the test against examples of "offensive" student writing, writing that 
challenges deeply held beliefs.
I place the word offensive in quotation marks because it must
perform multiple functions in this chapter~not simply because I 
desire it to but because in the postmodern era all such evaluative 
terms are political and situated. From a postmodern perspective 
what is offensive is every bit as ideological as what is true, beautiful, 
and good. Offensive is used in different ways by different people for 
different reasons. To the right offensive becomes synonymous with 
over sensitivity, with political correctness gone wild. To the left 
offensive denotes an attack with words, an assault upon those in
weaker positions of power. To the center offensive can mean
anything from bad judgement to bad taste to low morals. Offensive
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is a word wrapped in situatedness and intent—both of which are
often only partly conscious. How are the words and intentions
framed and by whom? What is the intent of the person using the
offensive words—harm, mockery, destruction, resistance? How is that
intention perceived by those the words target—a bad joke, an
assault, a reflection of lower consciousness? A lesbian will perceive
an attack on gay rights differently than a straight male and a straight
male will aim an offensive remark differently depending on his
target. Thus, offensive is always relational. As Laura Kipnis argues
concerning the counter-hegemonic and class based degradation of
women's bodies in Hustler ,
The sense of both pleasure and danger that violation of pollution 
taboos can invoke is clearly dependent on the existence o f  symbolic 
codes, codes that are for the most part only sem i-conscious. 
Defilement can't be an isolated event, it can only engage our interest 
or provoke our anxiety to the extent that our ideas about such things 
are systematically ordered, and that this ordering matters deeply—in 
our culture, in our subjectivity. As Freud (1963) notes, 'Only jokes 
that have a purpose run the risk of meeting with people who do not 
want to listen to them.' ("(Male)" 379)
In essence, offensive words have an addressivity built into them.
They represent a Bakhtinian dialogism in which the offensive words
mean, are understood, "as a part of a greater whole—there is a
constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the
potential of conditioning others" (Holquist, "Glossary" 426). Being
offensive and being perceived as offensive are determinations based
on one's situatedness within structures of class, gender, and race.
Offensive writing is enacted as, within, and against structures of
morals and tastes that constitute the meaning and intention of that
writing, where one stands on that meaning and intention, and that
reveal one's own place within the structures of society.
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My schema, therefore, is not the only possible ethics or an 
ethics for all time. It too reflects my own situatedness in relation to 
offensive terms. Rather, it is designed to begin a discussion among 
those of us who are uncomfortable with oppositional pedagogy but 
still see a place for the political in the writing classroom, a place 
which requires ethical conduct. Of course, as Lazere argues, "any 
effort to construct such a schema is itself bound to be captive, in 
some measure, to the partisan biases it sets out to analyze" (196). 
My ethical guidelines will be no different. However, like Lazere I 
believe that "the only possible way to transcend these biases is 
refinement through dialectical exchanges with those of differing 
ideologies" (196).
F our A ltern a tiv es to O p p osition a l P ed agogy: F ir st, M ichel
F oucault and the Freedom  of the Ethical
The idea of positively associating Michel Foucault with 
questions of ethics might, at first, seem rather strange. After all, 
Foucault is more often associated with the central figures credited 
with creating a body of work—postmodernism—before which "no 
principled position can stand"5 (Faigley xii). The strangeness of the 
idea, however, results from focusing too heavily on Foucault's early 
work, where he is described by Paul Rabinow as "a philosopher or 
historian of power" (Foucault, "Politics" 375). In these works, where 
Foucault uses em pirical evidence to reveal the oppressive 
consequences of humanism's attempt to reform hospitals, asylums, 
and the penal system, the argument that Foucault is in favor of ethics 
does seem rather naive. It is in Foucault's later works, when he 
becomes what Rabinow calls a philosopher or historian "of the self or
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subject," that the argument for ethics becomes not only credible but 
central (375). Indeed, in "The Subject and Power" Foucault states
that "the goal of" his "work during the last twenty years has not been 
to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations 
of such analysis." Instead, jis "objective . . . has been to create a 
history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human
beings are made subjects" (208). It is in this attempt to create a 
history of the modes of subjectification that Foucault becomes
concerned with questions of the ethical.6 Consequently, there are 
three crucial idea on ethics that we can take from Foucault's later 
works: that "Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics" ("The
Ethics" 284), that "ethics is a practice" ("Politics" 377), and that
individuals who live under systems of constraint must "at least have 
the possibility of altering them" ("Sexual Choice" 148).
In "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom," Foucault argues that "Freedom is the ontological condition 
of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when 
it is informed by reflection" (284). In other words, ethics comes into 
being as freedom, or freedom is "a reality that is already ethical in 
itself" (284). However, to maintain freedom requires understanding 
what is necessary for its continued existence, and that is ethical or 
responsible behavior. Freedom does not mean that we can choose 
whatever we want nor does freedom exist in the absence of 
constraints. On the contrary, ethical freedom exists, precisely, as a 
system of constraints that enables choice.7 The ethical results from 
how a system of constraints is structured and operates.
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How, therefore, should a system of constraints be structured? 
Defining ethics as a tangible domain of choices amongst constraints 
necessitates that we structure "ethics as a practice" rather than as a 
theory. To be ethical we must act. "The 'best' theories," Foucault 
believes, "do not constitute a very effective protection against 
disastrous political choices; certain great themes such as 'humanism' 
can be used to any end whatever" ("Political" 374). Consequently, we 
must structure ethics instead as a conscious form of practice or 
experimentation. ”[W]hat is ethics," Foucault asks, "if not the . . . 
conscious . . . practice of freedom?" ("The Ethics" 284). For Foucault 
ethics is the freedom to test ideas, to see how they play out, to 
modify them as the situation changes, to open one's self and one's 
theory to critique. Hence, the theory that everything is political does 
not justify one's behavior. Instead, it is the exact opposite: theory is
made ethical by practice, by "a demanding, prudent, 'experimental' 
attitude. . .[in which] at every moment, step by step, one must 
confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, 
with what one is" ("Politics" 374). The a p p l ic a t io n  of ideas, for 
example the material-feminist ideology of many oppositional 
pedagogies, implies a finishedness, a correctness, a rightness to the 
idea. Foucault, on the other hand, insists "on all this 'practice,' . . . not 
. . . in order to 'apply' ideas, but in order to put them to the test and 
modify them" (374). Ethics is not, in other words, a encrusted 
attitude one holds, an abstraction that removes one from the world, 
or even a political outlook one applies. Ethics is the ability to open 
oneself to possibility.
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The questions Foucault is "trying to ask are not determined by 
a preestablished political outlook and do not tend toward the
realization of some definite political project" (375). Instead, Foucault 
is trying "to open up problems that are as concre te  and genera l  as 
possible, problems that approach politics from behind (376). The 
political is too limited as a frame for understanding systems of 
domination and for constructing practices of freedom. The political 
cannot explain the existence of its subject without reference to it. and 
so it cannot adequately provide the genealogical history necessary to
trace the constitution of knowledges. Without this genealogy it is 
impossible to locate the gaps in knowledges in which different ways 
of being are possible.
Finally and logically, therefore, Foucault believes that a system 
of restraints is ethical when those who are ruled by it have some
means of modifying it. He writes:
the important question . . .  is not whether a culture without 
restraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of
constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the 
liberty to transform the system. Obviously, constraints o f  any kind 
are going to be intolerable to certain segments o f  society. The 
necrophiliac finds it in tolerable that graves are not accessible to 
him. But a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the 
individuals who are affected by it don't have the means of modifying 
it. This can happen when such a system becomes intangible as a 
result of its being considered a moral or religious imperative, or a 
necessary consequence of medical science . . . .  restrictions have to 
be within the reach of those affected by them so that they at least 
have the possibility of altering them. ("Sexual Choice, Sexual Act" 
147-48)
Thus, those who argue that it is unethical for the teacher to keep his 
or her politics secret in the classroom because that makes it harder 
for students to confront those politics would be correct from a 
Foucaudian point of view. For a system of constraints to be ethical.
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the student must at least have the possibility of modifying the self 
that that system produces and the system itself. And to modify 
these the student must first be able to see the system's structures. 
But they are wrong in making those politics oppositional. In that 
move they are a pp ly in g  a theory, assuming its correctness, rather 
than testing it to study its effects. Consequently, instead of their 
classrooms leading to possibilities of greater freedom, they risk 
becoming places of further political domination. Oppositional 
pedagogy does not offer a means for the student to change the 
classroom's systems of constraint-only the skill to survive them.
Of course, one objection that composition theorists could raise 
to Foucault's ethics is whether it is ever truly possible for students to 
modify a classroom's systems of constraint. The classroom, they 
might argue, can never be a democracy and, therefore, attempts to 
portray it as such merely mystify both authority and power 
inequities (See Jarratt's "Feminism and Composition" 106-13). 
However, there is a difference between a classroom having to be a 
democracy and a classroom where choice is possible—just as there is 
a difference between being suspicious of the possibility of 
consensuality and supporting nonconsensuality. For while Foucault is 
suspicious of systems of constraint based on consensus, seeing the 
consensus as a mask for political domination and repression, he 
nevertheless maintains that the idea of consensus is pragmatically 
useful as "a critical idea to maintain at all times" ("Politics" 379). As 
Foucault argues, "perhaps one must not be for consensuality, but one 
must be against nonconsensuality" ("Politics" 379).
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So, what can we take from Foucault for the construction of our 
ethics? We can take the crucial ideas of ethics as a state of freedom, 
as an opened ended practice designed to test theories rather than 
apply predetermined political outlooks, as fluid, tangible, and 
responsive to the situation, as dependent on empiricism and 
experimentation, as non-coercion, and, most importantly, as a system 
of constraints in which those who are ruled by it have a means of 
altering it. In short, Foucault's ethics forces us to situate our theory 
in practice, in who we are, and in what we are doing. Teachers who 
try to pressure their students into accepting a predetermined 
political outlook do not provide the means to alter structures of 
domination but merely enact new ones, constructing the classroom 
not as a place to experiment but to regurgitate. Foucault teaches us 
that to ethically use politics in the classroom depends not on being 
honestly confrontational but honestly vulnerable, making ourselves, 
our theories, and our authority open to critique.
G erald G raff’s Ethics o f  T eaching the C onflicts
In many ways Gerald Graffs desire "to teach the conflicts 
themselves . . .  as a new kind of organizing principle to give the 
curriculum the clarity and focus that almost all sides now agree it 
lacks" (B eyond  12) seems the perfect model for furthering an ethics 
of the political. Graff clearly criticizes "those who justify turning 
their courses into consciousness raising sessions on the grounds that 
all teaching is inevitably political anyway," yet he maintains that 
there is a "crucial distinction between expressing  a political view in 
class and imposing  it forcibly on students and colleagues" (25, 149).8
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Further, Graffs solution to make the "disagreements themselves . . .
the point of connection" (119) seems especially friendly to
composition teachers in that it stresses the importance of students
having access to the process as well as the product of their
professors' intellectual debates. Graff writes:
students typically experience a great clash o f  values, philosophies, 
and pedagogical methods among their various professors, but they 
are denied a view of the interactions and interrelations that give 
each subject meaning. They are exposed to the results o f  their 
professors’ conflicts but not to the process of discussion and debate 
they need to see in order to become something more than passive 
spectators to their education. (12)
Graffs stressing of process and active learning not only echoes much
of composition pedagogy, it shifts the brunt of the conflict off the
students and onto the professors—people better able to defend
themselves. This shift, while not removing a productive tension, may
do a great deal to lessen the fears of theorists like Maxine Hairston
who believe that students can freeze when the stakes of performance
are too high (189).
Graffs are indeed important to the furthering of an ethics of 
the political for the writing classroom, but there is another aspect of 
Graffs theory that is equally important for ethics though not as often 
stressed. It is the crucial role that respect plays in making it possible 
to teach the conflicts, for there to be "a positive role for cultural 
conflict," for difference rather than consensus to be the "basis for 
coherence" (10, 58). Graff argues early on in Beyond the Culture 
W a rs  that "The first step in dealing productively with today's 
conflicts is to recognize their legitimacy" (5). In other words, the 
conflicts being debated are real. There are legitimate, intelligent, and 
moral people on different sides of the issues. When a teacher does
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not respect the conflict as authentic, he or she presents only one side 
of the debate or, at best, a caricature of it. But Graffs organizing 
principle necessitates that no one teacher’s (or student's) politics be 
presented as the only "correct," "enlightened,” or "true" position on a 
subject. Each position represents only one of many possibly 
legitimate positions, the ethical principle involved being that a 
legitimate position is willing to "create a common ground of 
discussion" and not that it must form or submit to an overarching 
consensus (194). We must "respect" others' "objections as arguments 
needing to be addressed rather than as mere mystifications" (169). 
The necessity for this respect only increases when one's goal is not 
simply to include politics in the classroom but to endorse a politics. 
As Jay and Graff argue, "persuasion has no chance unless it is willing 
to respect the resistance of those not yet converted" ("A Critique" 
208).
If an argument (or arguer) is not willing to grant this respect, if 
it is authoritarian, dismissive, hostile, or monologic, then, within 
Graffs frame, it loses the "right" to participate in the debate. Using 
the political in the classroom requires the humbleness, the courage, 
and the perspective to "risk entering a debate that . . . [one] would 
not necessarily be guaranteed to win" (Graff 169). Thus, rather than 
dismissing our colleagues or students as naive, ill informed, or 
bigoted, we should try to respect the legitimacy of their political 
s ituatedness--even  ones with which we strongly disagree. 
Conversely, we should expect like treatment in return. This 
reciprocal respect does not mean that all positions are equal, or that 
we must give up our passionately held beliefs; it merely means that
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our colleagues' and students' subject positions should not be reduced 
to examples of false consciousness. Instead, they should be treated 
as examples of a different consciousness, a different situatedness, 
that we sometimes agree with, sometimes object to, but always try, 
to the best of our ability, to respect—at least in terms of their 
ultimate incommensurability. If we give this respect to our
colleagues and students, then, according to Graff, we have the right to 
demand it in return.
Teaching the conflicts, constraints based on common ground
and not consensus, access to the process of debate and not merely 
the product, acknowledging the legitimacy of difference, building a 
coherence out of reciprocal respect for that difference, respect as the 
beginning of persuasion, and an awareness of the limitations of our
own situatedness are all crucial ideas that we can take from Graffs
work to further an ethics of the political. However, there is also a
limitation to Graff's solution. Besides its utopian nature, Graff's
solution misses the visceral way in which many of us hold our 
political beliefs. Lynn Worsham argues in "Emotion and Pedagogic 
Violence," that "the discourse of emotion is our primary education" 
(122), yet the idea of "teaching the conflicts" assumes a level of 
em otional distance or privileges a measure of intellectual
disinterestedness that many effective teachers do not have, would
not endorse, and, most importantly, do not feel.
A refusal to participate in Graffs conflict centered classroom is 
not necessarily an example of dogmatism or entrenchment. Instead, 
it could be a form of self defense, a refusal to be seriously involved 
in a classroom where painfully, perhaps threateningly, different
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ideological arguments are given equal space (in terms of time, 
resources, assessments, and lesson plans) with ones that a person 
holds dear. And while Graff is not asking us to deny our feelings, our 
passions, or our beliefs to participate in the debate, he is asking us to 
admit that the other side is at least worthy of debate. Thus, Graffs 
solution reveals a situatedness that allows him to intellectualize or 
make hypothetical the horror of patriarchy, the pain of 
discrimination, the limitations of class.9
This gap in Graffs solution is somewhat ironic given that he 
critiques John Searle’s argument to, when possible, "leave our politics 
at the classroom door" as ignoring "the fact that 'political 
commitments' are often expressed in the very choice of what to 
include or not include in a course" (147). As Graff reminds a 
conservative sociologist with whom he had been corresponding, "the 
mere act of teaching Marxism at all" conveys the "'view' that 
Marxism is a respectable body of thought or at least merits study" 
(146). In a similar vein, Graffs solution to the culture war asks 
passionately committed feminists, Marxists, and multiculturalists to 
convey the view that extreme conservative ideology on race, class, 
and gender is a "respectable body of thought or at at least merits 
study", and vice versa. Graff proudly states "that what gives the 
integration experiments" he has outlined "a hope of succeeding 
where their predecessors failed is that they do not set themselves 
against the dynamics of modern academic professionalism and 
American democracy but take these dynamics for granted as 
opportunities to be seized" (195). This "failure" to set himself against
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those structures of power is exactly the problem some theorists 
would have with Graffs solution.
However, let me make it clear that I am not one of these 
people. I find Graffs solution brilliantly pragmatic and ultimately 
ethical in its willingness to test ideologies in debate. But I am trying 
to show how the visceral way in which political beliefs are often held 
makes this ethics difficult to achieve. The playing field in which this 
debate will occur is not a level one. Different people will bring 
different histories, often painful histories, to that debate. True, we 
can and should make the inequality of the playing field and the pain 
of history part of the debate itself, but in order for Graffs solution to 
work it requires more than the opportunity and ability to argue. It 
requires an ethics of care for those, especially from marginalized 
positions, with whom we argue. It is not the same thing to ask a 
conservative, white male to share the ideological space of a classroom 
with a feminist, African-American female as it is to ask the feminist, 
African-American female to share the ideological space of a 
classroom with a conservative, white male. The feminist has much 
more to lose both professionally and psychologically. The ethics of 
our classrooms, therefore, must acknowledge this preexisting 
condition. Perhaps it could, at times, allow special considerations in 
terms of time, resources, and right of refusal to those from 
marginalized groups. This is, of course, an open question, and I do 
not intend this chapter to answer that question. However, I do 
intend the chapter to at least raise it. In any case, teaching the 
conflict is a reasonable solution, but we must work an ethics of care 
into that reasonableness.
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P atricia  H arkin and the E thical P otentia l o f Lore
The work of Patricia Harkin can help us untangle one of the 
most pressing problems for constructing an ethics of the political: 
how do we prevent these principles from themselves becoming 
authoritarian, arbitrary, and unresponsive to the changing dynamics 
of our classrooms? Foucault and Graff have already supplied part of 
the answer. The ethics must be experimental, pragmatic, modifiable, 
and tangible. It must enable choice, be formed by a coherence of 
difference rather than consensus, and be based on a respect not only 
for that difference but for the emotional depth with which many 
beliefs are held. But is such an ethics possible or is it hopelessly and 
dangerously utopian? Can a discipline, specifically composition, 
embrace an ethics that is pragmatic, experimental, conflicted, 
diverse, fluid, and playful? Yes according to Patricia Harkin, because 
composition is not a discipline but a post discipline, and as a post 
d isc ip lin e  it thrives on co n trad ic tio n , pragm atism , and 
experim enta tion .
A discipline, according to Harkin's reading of Stephen Toulmin,
is,
a traditional procedure for raising and answering questions in a 
regulated way. It is precisely the regularity of its procedures of 
inquiry that produces the facts. A discipline, therefore, is a function 
o f  its lexicon (the way it defines its terms), its representation 
techniques (or traditional ways o f  sharing that knowledge through 
lab reports, articles, books, conferences, presentations, maps, charts, 
d iagram s, etc.), and its application  procedures. (Harkin, "The 
Postdisciplinary" 130)
Composition, on the other hand, does not function, at least for its
practioners, in a disciplinary way. Its lexicon, representation
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techniques, and application procedures are based on what Stephen 
North calls lore. North defines lore as "the accumulated body of 
traditions, practices, and beliefs in terms of which Practioners 
understand how writing is done, learned and taught" {The Making 
22). Far from being regulated, lore's traditions, practices, and beliefs 
are unapologetically contradictory; "its procedures derive from 
disparate and unarticulated assumptions about writing" (Harkin 
126). Further, Lore's making knowledge is "driven . . .  by a 
pragmatic logic: It is concerned with what has worked, is working, or
might work in teaching, doing, or learning writing. Hence, its 
structure is primarily experiential" (North 23). Finally, lore is "anti- 
essentialist" in that it eclectically forages among theories to test their 
effectiveness in the classroom. It deals "with situations in which 
single causes cannot be stipulated, in which causes cannot be 
discriminated from effects" (Harkin 134). Thus, these "irregular, ad 
hoc procedures of lore" could be seen "as post disciplinary in their 
willingness to use, but refusal to be constrained by. existing 
institutional rules of knowledge production" (Harkin 130-31).
If Harkin is right, and I believe she is, then composition's post 
disciplinary ethos would prevent it from using an ethics in an 
authoritarian way. Indeed, just as composition embraces a way of 
making knowledge that is experimental, pragmatic, anti-essentialist. 
and contradictory, it could easily embrace an ethics that contains 
many of the same qualities. Harkin believes that composition's post 
disciplinarity allows it "to avoid the unfortunate aspects of 
disciplinarity, particularly its tendency to simplify to the point of 
occulting its ideological implications and making us think that its
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narrowness is normal" (134). In a similar way, this post
disciplinarity would allow composition to avoid using ethics as a 
narrow, abstract, and unchanging set of laws to be imposed from "on
high," especially if this post disciplinarity was itself part of the ethics.
Harkin’s objective for lore could be our objective for ethics: the
objective of trying "not to achieve a totalizing" ethics "but rather to 
see where" ideologies "intersect, where they contradict, where they 
form constellations, and, perhaps what is most important, where they 
form lacu n ae"10 (136). To paraphrase Harkin's ideas on lore, 
composition's post disciplinarity can allow it to embrace an ethics 
that will help us to "see ways of construing relations of relatedness to 
which our ideology has made us blind" (135).
M ikhail B ak h tin 's C arnival: O ffensive W ritin g  as a P olitical
Act in N eed o f  an Ethical Response
Finally, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin is important for the 
construction of a postmodern ethics. So far my ethics has centered 
mostly around the behavior of composition teachers. But what about 
the behavior of composition students? How should we deal with
students whose behavior is authoritarian, disrespectful, monologic, 
dismissive, or threatening? How should we see and deal with their 
writing? I think the of work Bakhtin can supply some answers.
We might see offensive student writing as a hybrid form of 
Bakhtin’s carnival. For Bakhtin the carnival was a time of 
"temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the 
established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, 
privileges, norms, and prohibitions" (R a b e la i s  10). During the 
carnival all that was placed above or beyond the physical body, all
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that was officially sanctioned as "high, spiritual, ideal, abstract" was
"degraded" or parodied into the lowest common denominator, the
obscene, the material (19-20). "The lower stratum of the body, the
life of the belly and the reproductive organs" (21) were particularly
important to this degradation because so much of humanity’s
commonality lies within its biological functioning. Degradation, by
constitution, relates "to acts of defecation and copulation, conception,
pregnancy, and birth" (21). Its power
is predicated on its opposition from and  to high d iscourses ,
themselves prophylactic against the debasements o f  the low (the 
lower classes, vernacular discourses, low culture, shit...) . . . .  The 
very highness of high culture is structured through the obsessive 
banishment of the low, and through the labor of suppressing the 
grotesque body (which is. in fact, simply the material body, gross as 
that can be) in favor of what Bakhtin refers to as ’the classical body’
. . . —a refined, orifice-less. laminated surface’’ (Kipnis, "(Male)''
376).
The weapons of the carnival were a "gay, triumphant and at
the same time mocking, deriding laughter" (Bakhtin, Rabelais  12), an
abusive, insulting "marketplace language" (16), and a "carnivalesque
speech" liberated "from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at
other times" (10). Laughter is the most important weapon of the
carnival because it draws the object
into a zone of crude contact where one can finger it familiarly on all
sides, turn it upside down, inside out. peer at it from above and below, 
break open its external shell, look at its center, doubt it, take it apart, 
d ismember it, lay it bare and expose it, examine it freely and 
experiment with it. (Bakhtin, D ia lo g ic  23)
In short, carnival is the resistance of the oppressed through crude
jokes, degrading portrayals, and mocking caricatures. It is often
violent and obscene, but it is also transformative and generative.
The carnival is like a great compost heap in which everything that is
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seen as above is degraded into its "organic" communality and from 
that mass the possibility of new patterns of existence grow.
I would argue that for many students we—English teachers— 
represent the high, the holy, and the official, especially those of us 
who hope to inspire a political consciousness about issues of race, 
class, and gender. I would further argue that, rightly or wrongly, 
many of our students feel oppressed or threatened by this attempt to 
broaden consciousness. For example, a student wrote the following 
in a column for the University of New Hampshire's student 
newspaper. It represents his take on the campus’ Diversity Support 
Coalition:
When I was a little boy, my mother would try to force me to eat my 
peas at dinner time. She always failed because I was a stubborn little 
turd who never saw the value of eating her stupid peas simply 
because sh e  said it was good for me . . .  . Now I’m in college and 
multicultural special interest groups are trying to spoon feed me 
cultural d iversity  like a gross baby formula that they claim is 
essential to my growth as a well-rounded human being. Well, I'm
gonna have to spit-up in their laps because I still don’t see the value
of swallowing what they  consider to be good for me.
The student feels pressured and infantilized by the coalition. As he
writes, the coalition is trying to "spoon feed" him "cultural diversity."
He resents this treatment. He sees it as authoritarian, imposed on
him from above, coercive, so he degrades it.
Thus, offensive writing, while sometimes a sign of immaturity, 
bad taste, or poor judgment, could also been seen as a political
attempt to resist our authority, to mock us, to realign the 
relationship's power structure, to bring us down to a level were we
can be poked at. It can be a political weapon aimed at that which is 
seen as oppressive. This is, of course, a rather unsettling thought. As 
Kipnis argues. "There is discomfort at the intended violation—at
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being assailed 'with the part of the body or the procedure in 
question' (380). For Kipnis there is a "further discomfort at being 
addresses as a subject of repression—as a subject with a history—and 
the rejection of porn can be seen as a defense erected against 
representations which mean to unsettle her in her subjectivity" 
(380). But I would add that there is a discomfort in being associated 
with repressive structures of power as well. English teachers usually 
do not wish to see themselves in the role of the authoritarian figure 
(neither do they want their authority so challenged), but I believe 
students often do see us so. Whether or not the Diversity Support 
Coalition was acting in an authoritarian way, this young man feels
that it was, and he resists that pressure with carnivalesque writing.
Of course, I am stretching Bakhtin’s theory somewhat to call 
this student’s writing carnivalesque. Though not apparent in this
example, O'Neill’s other writing is particularly misogynist, racist, 
homophobic, and xenophobic (I will examine his writing more closely 
in a later section). Bakhtin, on the other hand, stipulates that the 
carnival, while mocking, degrading, and even abusive, is a 
celebration that embraces all people, that degradation is "not only a 
destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating one" (R a b e la i s  
21). that the bodily element "is deeply positive . . . .  not . . .  a private, 
egotistic form, severed from the other spheres of life" (19). It could
reasonably be argued, therefore, that much offensive writing lacks
the utopian sensibility of carnival. And yet, the writing of Rabelais 
often depicts extremely violent and degrading acts against women as 
humorous, and Bakhtin sees him as one of the greatest of 
carnivalesque writers. Indeed, Bakhtin is ominously silent on the
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plight of women. He does not recognize that his carnival—as he 
conceptualizes it—cannot be fully used by women, and, in fact, that it 
uses women's bodies to achieve its ends. Given this and other blind 
spots in Bakhtin's theory of the carnival, it is difficult to determine 
when mocking, degrading, and abusive writing has gone too far. 
When has offensive writing stopped being an attempt to mock that 
which is seen as oppressive, an attempt to transform hierarchical 
power relations, and started being an attempt to use the power of 
the carnival as a weapon of oppression, an attempt to maintain 
inequities of power?
Further, Bakhtin does not see the potential strategic use of 
carnival like power and techniques by specific groups against specific 
structures of authority (instead of the mass of humanity using it 
against easily identifiable and monolithic power structures). Writing 
at a time and place and about times and places where official 
structures of power and authority were concentrated in theocracies, 
aristocracies, or state dictatorships and influenced by the sparse class 
categories of Marxism, Bakhtin could not imagine an official power 
structure dispersed by democracy, capitalism, and technology nor a 
populace stratified not only by economic class but by gender, race, 
ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and ideology.
Consequently, neither the structures of American power, the 
dynamics of our classrooms, nor the constitutions of the oppressed 
are categorically unified enough for Bakhtin's original concept of the 
carnival to be applied in a "pure" or unproblematized form. 
Categories still exist in very material ways, but they also overlap, 
intersect, explode—resulting in people who occupy multiple positions
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of privilege and oppression at the same time. For example, one may 
be born into a privileged class but an oppressed race, an oppressed 
class but a privileged gender, an oppressed gender but a privileged 
race. It is a condition that Patricia Bizzell, inspired by Fredric
Jameson, calls a "change in the history of totalities." She writes:
T h i s  vision of change may help us understand why we have
difficulty defining the social order in modern America and securely 
delineating  the boundaries o f  the working, m iddle, and upper 
classes. A co llege-educa ted  high school teacher  may make 
considerably less money than a plum ber who is a high school 
dropout; and both may be considerably less comfortable with left-
oriented political ideas than the psychologist with a graduate degree 
and an incoming totaling more than theirs combined. ("Marxist” 60)
In single, identifiable, monolithic structures of oppression it is easy
to tell who is the oppressor and who is the oppressed. But in post
fordian, multi-identity, heterogeneous, and technological America,
who uses the power of the carnival and against whom is determined
not by easily definable categories of oppressed and oppressor but by
much more complicated, layered, and specifically situated political
interests.
It is easy to see the mocking, deriding, degrading laughter of
the carnival as universal, joyful, and uniting when it is directed at 
the church, the state, the patriarchy, or the aristocracy (especially if
we are not members of those groups). It is not so easy when we are
members of the group being mocked, especially when that group, in 
certain areas of society, might not have all that much power. Yet, 
who is deemed "worthy” to be in the carnival and who must suffer
its attacks is, at least partially, an ideological question. Ironically, the 
"clean" use of the carnival was possible only when meta-narratives
and their supporting power structures made it so. In the age of
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finite narratives, fractured power structures, and shifting identities, 
the carnival is more complex, less utopian, and used by more people 
than we—teachers of a progressive bent—would like. English 
teachers may have to recognize that, under certain political lenses, 
they are the "oppressive" class which an "oppressed" group is 
resisting, resisting in ways they don’t like, and against things they 
hold dear. Today, disturbingly, almost any group can use the 
leveling power of the carnival but leave its universal good will and 
easily identifiable categories of oppressed and oppressor behind.
If this fractured and political take on offensive writing is how 
we should view it, then how should teachers deal with it? How do 
teachers connect with students who see their writing as resisting our 
"PC fascism," when we see it as supporting, albeit at times
unconsciously, larger oppressive structures? If what makes offensive 
writing offensive is ideological, then can we create an ethics broad 
enough to encompass those different ideologies yet tangible enough 
to put them to the test? I believe so. I think the answer to these
questions is once again ethical, an ethics of answerability.
In Art and Answerability, Bakhtin has a concept that he calls 
an excess of seeing or knowing. This is the idea that others can see 
parts of our spatial and temporal being that we cannot. Bakhtin
argues that
When I contemplate a whole human being who is situated outside 
and over against me, our concrete, actually experienced horizons do 
not coincide. For at each given moment, regardless of the position 
and the proximity to me o f  this o ther human being whom I am
contemplating, I shall always see and know something that he, from 
his place outside and over against me, cannot see himself: parts of
his body that are inaccessible to his own gaze (his head, his face and 
its expression), the world behind his back, and a whole series of 
objects and relations, which in any o f  our mutual relations are
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accessible to me but not to him. As we gaze at each other, two
different worlds are reflected in the pupils of our eyes. (22-23)
The other can sees parts of myself I cannot and can, therefore,
extend my understanding of myself and vice versa. Each person's
unique spatial and temporal position in the world gives him or her
an irreplaceable perspective. The self has a structural need for the
excess of seeing this unique perspective can provide (Nealon 140).
The other's excess of seeing gives the self the potential for growth.
change, and new ways of being. New ways of understanding
ourselves are literally reflected in the eyes of another.
The mutual dependency of self and other for an excess of
seeing ensures what Bakhtin calls the obligation of answerability, the 
responsibility of response. I and the other must
empathize or project myself into this other human being, see his
world axiology from within as he  sees this world: I must put myself 
in his place and then, after returning to my own place, 'fill in his 
horizon through that excess of seeing which opens out from this, my 
own, place outside him. I must enframe him, create a consummating
environment for him out o f  this excess of my own seeing, knowing,
desiring, and feeling. (Ar t  25)
The spatial, temporal, biological, psychological, and social parts of the
self cannot be interconnected without the extended view provided
by the other. This interconnectedness depends upon our realization
of an ethics to respond. "[W]hat," Bakhtin asks, "guarantees the inner
connection of the constituent elements of a person? Only the unity of
answerability" (I). We cannot turn away from the other without
turning away from the potential of ourselves. We must be
answerable to each other because it is in the ethics of response that
the self comes into being and has the potential for change.
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This ethics of response does not mean that I can become the 
other. Both physically and subjectively I cannot see the world 
ex a c t ly  as the other sees it and any attempt to do so would be 
im peria lis tic .11 But as Nealon argues, the Bakhtinian "self is never 
merely an appropriation machine, but always open--responding or 
answering—to the other" (133). Answerability represents a dialogic, 
intersubjective understanding of ethics. It is, as Zygmunt Bauman 
writes in Postmodern Ethics, "an ethics that recastes the Other as the 
crucial character in the process through which the moral self comes 
into its own" (84). This moral self is the obligation to response. 
"What the self is answerable to," Anne Dyson explains, "is the social 
environment; what the self is answerable for is the authorship of its
responses" (229). In short, the self, in Bakhtinian terms, exists in
relation to others; "the self is an act of grace, a gift of the other"
(Dyson 230).
If a student is willing to present his or her discourse in a
dialogic of answerability, even if ideologically offensive, then we 
must respond in kind. For even, perhaps especially, offensive 
writing can give us a view of ourselves as teachers that we cannot 
get anywhere else, a view that can be used to critique, modify, and 
extend who we are, what we do, and why we do it. And we can offer 
the same gift of self, growth, and change to our students. In the 
spirit of this ethics, then, I would now like to put it to the test. In 
the following pages then, I will present the writing of two students 
that I find extremely offensive. The difference between them is one 
writer's willingness to be answerable.
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T estin g  the E thics
Sitting in my office late one afternoon grading papers and
listening to the student produced sewage run through the pipes
crisscrossing my ceiling, a quiet yet determined knock sounded at
my door. It was Kerry Reilly, a fellow instructor in the writing
program. She was upset. It seems a student had given her a very
misogynistic paper, and she was torn about what to do with it. She
had already been to see the director of first year composition. The
director had first determined what the context of the writing was.
Was this the first example of such writing or was it part of a larger
pattern? Had Kerry attempted to engage the student over a period of
time? Did Kerry feel threatened? In short, the director had
emphasized the importance of the process of engagement for dealing
with offensive writing. Then the director told Kerry that she would
support whatever she needed to do—but Kerry wasn't certain what
that was. This wasn't, in fact, the first time that "Doug" had given
Kerry problems. He wasn't hostile but he was subtly inappropriate
and threatening, challenging Kerry's right to authority in small ways.
For instance, he commented on her new haircut in a one-on-one
conference (he liked her hair better long), asked about her dating
habits, wondered out loud how old she was. He also subtly
challenged the worth of Kerry's assignments. In a reflection essay on
how he felt his work was going, he wrote the following:
Surely, you would rather I tell you about the wedding plans and how 
the horses will fit in. Or maybe I should relate how my brother
wants to meet me in North Carolina at the end of the week. Maybe 
how I intend to retrieve the vessel into which I poured every spare 
ounce of love and energy for three years. All of this seems much 
more exciting and alive right now than reflecting on some "choice” 
past essays. Never the less, the direction I must go has been chosen
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for me and you will have to wait weeks or even months to find out 
about weddings and horses, brothers I haven’t spoken to in years,
and who or what was that vessel exactly.
The challenge is small but there nonetheless. Doug doesn't want to
waste his time on Kerry's meaningless assignments. He would rather
spend his time writing about things that should interest them both.
Nevertheless, Kerry had "chosen" (forced would be a more honest
word for how Doug feels) the direction in which Doug must go, and
Doug didn't like to be forced.
Doug was a large, muscular man, a few years older than most 
first-year students. He had been in the military before coming to 
college. With his military hair cut. imposing presence, and
opinionated manner, he was intimidating to Kerry. Among his 
expressed opinions were that homosexuals are abnormal, that a man 
should be proud of his homophobia, and that feminists are sexually
frustrated. Kerry feared what an outright confrontation might 
produce. And yet, there was an honesty about Doug, a willingness to 
enter into debate, to see debate as necessary that caused Kerry not to 
want to, in her words, "banish him from the class." For example, in 
another self evaluation of his work, he wrote:
I think that my contribution to discussion in class and in workshops 
is a necessary evil. Although, a couple of times I thought that if  the 
mob had a leader I might be lynched. Particularly when the class 
was discussing Adrienne Rich, five more minutes and I think they 
would have gotten a rope. Stirring up the class and taking the road 
less traveled was not and is not my goal. I just seem to end up on that 
road anyway often carving my own road alone, although I do believe 
my roads are justifiable. In conferences I would have to say that I 
am usually not holding up my half of the conversation. I think that 
maybe this gives you the wrong impression of how I am taking what 
you are saying. It's not that I do not agree, or am not willing to 
change, but I fear this is often how I come across . . . .  If you will 
bare [sicJ with me I think we are headed in the right direction now.
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The incorrect use of the word "bare" in the last time is ironically
appropriate. It is symptomatic of the situation. Doug is not only 
asking Kerry to bear with him but to bare herself to him as he will to 
her. He is asking Kerry as a female instructor to enter into a 
relationship that may be threatening to her. Yet, he is willing to 
make this relationship answerable. He realizes that others dislike his
opinions, but he maintains that his opinions are "justifiable." In
other words, he understands that opinions are just that. and. 
therefore, that they must be argued for. His actions are driven by
more than simple rebellion. He doesn't stir up the class to cause 
trouble, but to remain authentic to his individualist ideology. He is 
aware, to some degree, of his own subjective biases.
Further, his self mockery about being lynched displays at least 
some measure of perspective on the subjective, socially constructed 
nature of perception. He understands that what he finds legitimate 
others find offensive. Indeed, in the same evaluation he writes that 
"in responding to an essay we have preconceived notions, usually 
rooted in our own path, that fill in some of the blanks." The we in
this quote is important. It shows at least some connection to the
class and a perspective on interpretation being "rooted" in individual 
or cultural experience. This "we" also echoes with the final "we" of 
the evaluation. He tells Kerry that he knows that he is not "holding 
up" his "half of the conversation" in conference, but that "if you will 
bare with me I think we are headed in the right direction now." This 
"we" shows that Doug does see himself in a relationship of mutual
obligation or answerability with Kerry, one that he feels he is
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currently not respecting, and that is an important insight for dealing 
with him.
Kerry also felt that Doug was an important, if disruptive, part 
of the class's community. One young woman wrote in her class 
evaluation to Kerry that,
My favorite part of the class is when we have the open discussions. I 
get to learn about other people’s outlook on the story. It helps me to 
think about other ways that I can look at something. ["Doug"] drives 
me nuts because he contradicts everything everyone says, but I also 
liked to put myself in his shoes and look at things in the way he does 
(to some extent).
Thus. Doug does seem to provide an important Bakhtinian excess of 
seeing for the class. He opens up new ways for the class members to 
see the subject and themselves. He also seems to be an integral part 
of initiating the debates that allow Kerry to "teach the conflicts." Yet. 
the writing Kerry hands me to read makes me wonder exactly what
the effect and worth of that opening up is. The paper, or at least
parts of it, reads as follows:
Jim the Binge and I
Jim and I started out the evening without planning to binge. We
went down to the worst part of town, where I knew the owner of this
run down hole in the wall bar/strip joint. Her name was Kimberly, 
she was pregnant, she was bisexual, and she was more than just a 
little less than impressed with the shape and weight of her body at 
the time. I hesitate to describe her feelings towards me as a crush as 
she is all of thirty two years old, but that would seem to be the most 
accurate way to describe them . . . .  I’d taken her out a couple of 
times, I wasn’t trying to get anywhere with her but I was getting 
there none the less. So Jim and I headed out for the night and the 
first landing was at Kim’s bar. Jim and I shot a few games o f  stick 
and drank a few beers when another younger lady who I was good 
friends with and who new Kim very well pulled me aside to have a 
few words. I can’t recall the exact wording but it went something to 
the effect of ’’If you don’t have protection with you, you should slip 
out and go get some. I think Kim’s going to ask you to spend the 
night with her." Knowing how close the two of them were that was 
more than a suggestion. Meanwhile I still haven’t figured out what 
if anything I feel for this girl. I consult Jim, who is the greater 
womanizer, and his advice of course is to take what I can get and if I
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don’t feel anything for her run like hell when I’m done. He also 
suggests that I give him a lift up to the Fantasy Club so that in the
event I stay with Kim he can catch a ride home and in the event I
don't I can join him . . . .  Thirty minutes or so of contemplation later 
I am back at Kim's no further along than I was to start out with. A 
couple of hours and three or four beers later I am still undecided but 
leaning towards the realistic side of the house, that is to say, I don't 
have any real feelings for Kim at all, and I know her just a little too 
well to steal the candy and run. Being the honorable individual in 
an honorable mood, when asked to adjourn to her place, I told the 
truth and I felt like shit. Both because I had hurt her feelings and 
once again I was going home alone. Next stop the Fantasy Club.
I dropped in on Jim intending to polish off another beer and 
offer him a ride to the "Big House” if he wanted it. Leave it to Jim to 
give good advice, "Let's kill some Pain, Jessica, come here you
sweethart. My friend and I need a couple o f  shots and a fresh
pitcher." So much for going home. Jim is a connesier of strip joints, 
his second ex-wife was a stripper, and there is no place he would
rather spend his time or his money and we just got paid. My 
tolerance is high right now so it’s going to cost us a bit to get
trashed. However drinking is not the only attraction and both Jim 
and I are tipping the girls rather heavily when compared with our 
normal tipping styles. Usually we make them work alot harder for a 
dollar and we never tip more than a dollar at a time, to easy to run 
out of money that way and ruin the evening. We both know we will 
be going home alone this evening however Jim is still trying to turn 
his luck around. One of the girls is selling "shooters" usually a mixed 
drink of only hard alcohol served in a test tube in the size o f  a
double. Depending on how good you are, that is to say how good
looking, how smooth your style, how much money she thinks she 
can milk you for and so on will define the finer points of how you 
will receive your drink. On this particular night Jim is ranking well 
up the scale when he calls her over. She get's down on her knees 
and kneeling between Jim’s legs, with some extra show and flourish 
deep throats Jims test tube. While Jim is looking down at her she 
pulls his mouth to hers and kisses him while standing up. Jim being 
seated in a chair the effect is to empty the tube when she is once 
again standing above him. And to Jim's credit he did better than I 
and did not spill a drop. O f course some of the other patrons have 
observed this display and are now calling the young lady to their 
tab les .
It was shortly after this display that Jim looked at me and in a 
completely somber voice said, "Isn't it amazing, that is that money 
has such power.” That was when he pulled old George out of his 
pocket to be forever associated with this moment. He spoke as a
gentleman making a completely scientific observation. "You see this 
doller, it has real power, with this doller, one doller now, I have the 
power to make that girl over there, the one thats crawling all over 
that guy like a hot rock, come over here and crawl all over me. And 
this single doller gives me the power to do that with any girl in the 
room.” This is no news flash for me, but at that moment for some 
reason the thought just clicked. It really is amazing the power that 
money holds over people and truth be told there are few who for the 
right price would not do nearly anything that you asked of them.
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Now make no mistake these particular youngladys were not selling 
themselves short, on a good night these girls will walk away at over 
a hundred dollers an hour. Thats alot of power.
The essay is strikes me as very misogynistic. He writes happily of
"girls." women reduced to vessels, of taking "the candy" and running,
and of a multiple of other horrid things. Further, the context of this
particular classroom is important. Would Doug have written this
essay to me or another male instructor? I don't think so. His
challenge to Kerry’s authority is deeply rooted in Kerry being a
female in a position of power over him. The sexual content of the
essay is a way to let Kerry know that Doug has the power to make
her feel uncomfortable, to assert the male privilege that he has in
other areas of life. If ever there was an essay that could cause a
visceral reaction, it is this one. Can we find a way to respect or at
least understand Doug's subjectivity? Can Kerry? Can we make a
connection? Do we want to? Still, there are ways into this essay,
ways that can be found in what has been written, ways to begin a
critique that are internally  persuasive rather than sim ply
confrontational (a strategy that would not work with Doug anyway).
For example, there is a certain morality or code of ethics in this 
and other essays. In this essay, Doug writes that he does not sleep 
with Kim because he doesn't "have any real feelings for Kim," and he 
"knows her just a little to well to steal the candy and run." Though it 
is wrapped in a crude misogyny, there is ethics at play here. 
Sexuality is not merely a physical act, and he does not want to use 
someone he knows. He feels some sense of obligation to people with 
whom he has a relationship. He decides, against Jim's advice, not to 
treat Kim as disposable. It would be a dishonorable action, and he. in
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his own words, is an "honorable individual." While hardly the high 
water mark of moral behavior, it does give us a place to start that is 
internally persuasive to Doug, that recognizes his subjectivity and is 
based on a morality he wrote rather than one we imposed. It allows 
us to begin a discussion in which we can historicize why Doug has the 
attitudes about women that he does. We could ask him why he is 
able to humanize Kim but could participate in the dehumanization of 
the "girls" at the strip bar? How can he justify "stealing the candy" 
with them so to speak but not with Kim? Is it only because he knows 
her? How logical or reasonable a basis is that for an honor code? And 
logic or reasonableness is of great importance to Doug. His essays 
and conversations are peppered with remarks as to the 
unreasonableness or ill-logic of others. By turning his own ill-logic 
against him, we, once again, have an opening for critique that could 
be internally persuasive, respectful of difference, and based on 
evidence derived from the student's own writing.
In other papers, Doug also betrays a sense of morality we could 
use to make a connection and form a critique. For example, In an 
essay called "Of Morality, Honesty, and Things that Cannot be 
Forgiven," Doug writes that
My buddy Jim believes that if a married woman is out on the town 
looking, her husband is not taking care of business at home and she 
is therefore fair game . . . .  I have found myself hard pressed to 
consider the wives fair game morally . . . .  I do not believe in divorce 
. . . .  It used to be alot easier for me to say [that], way back when, 
before my first relationship with a married woman . . . .  Truth be
told, of all the shameful things I have done in my life I put the . . .
[affair] right at the top. Biblically speaking there is only one thing 
that is grounds for divorce and that is adultery. The woman whom I 
am seeing now is in the pursuit of divorce, and she is justified
biblically. Yet she is still technically married and that has been the
thorn in my side and the inspiration behind some extensive
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research into the subject. Combined with some serious soul
searching as of late.
The religious imagery of this passage is important. Religion
obviously forms the grounds for a rather extensive code of moral
behavior. Doug finds adultery biblically wrong. Therefore, to have 
committed it is a "thorn in" his "side." This pain forces him into
serious contemplation, "serious soul searching," of his actions. Could 
we not use this sense of religious morality, this willingness for self 
examination, to critique Doug's behavior at the strip bar in a way 
that be internally persuasive to him? Is it moral for him to treat the 
woman in the bar the way he does? It would not be difficult to find 
examples of religious based essays condemning the sexual
exploitation of women, to give these essays to Doug, and ask him to 
respond. Is it possible that such an assignment might provide an 
excess of seeing that would rupture Doug's ethical blind spots? I
believe so. Later in same essay Doug writes that he accepts "full
responsibility for the weaknesses of my own flesh and mind. Sadly, 
they have so often been my downfall. . . .Having searched my soul 
and passed judgement on what I found, I set about to correct that
which was not." I would argue that Doug has a strong sense of what 
is right and what is wrong, that he can be made to feel guilt, and that 
this guilt or response causes him to attempt to change his behavior.
Doug ends his essay on morality with an important question: 
"where do you draw the line and what are you willing to forgive?" 
This question reflects the openness and responsibility that are 
required for entrance into ethical debate. Doug is concerned, deeply 
I think, with moral behavior. Indeed, in a conversation with me, he 
stressed how he always stops to help women in need of car repairs
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while other so called "sensitive" people drive right past.12 H is
behavior at the strip bar, therefore, represents a contradiction in his 
ethics that a teacher could rightfully ask him to explain. Perhaps 
trying to explain that contradiction could help change where Doug 
currently draws the line on what he is willing to accept.
There is another potential path for critique in the last
paragraph of the "Jim the Binge and I" essay. Indeed, part of me 
wants to argue that the first part of the story is designed to highlight 
the immorality of the last paragraph; that the narrator of the story 
comes to an insight or cannot be trusted and, therefore, cannot be
assigned to Doug. But I'm afraid I'm not that optimistic. Instead. I 
think we will have to settle for the connections to Marxist. 
Foucaudian, and feminist criticism that we can make in the final
paragraph. We can point out the interconnection of money, power,
and the exploitation of women in the paragraph. Jim's speech on this 
nexus is ripe for dialogue. Of course, Jim's argument and its impact 
on Doug are hardly Marxist, Foucaudian, or feminist in character. For 
though Doug sees the connection among money, power, and sexual
servitude, he feels no necessity to critique it. He writes that the
connection between money and power "is no news flash for me, but 
at that moment for some reason the thought just clicked." This click 
shows at least the beginnings of an insight that might make further 
Marxist, Foucauldian, or feminist critiques of that connection also 
click. Then again, it might not, but it is a place to begin, to put 
pressure, to make a connection. In any event, it is a strategy that 
has a much greater chance of working with this student than
oppositional pedagogy does.
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Doug was quite aware and proud of his military background, 
and he was convinced that the "left wing liberals" of the English 
department would not and could not understand it or him. In an 
essay called "A Momentary Expansion of Time," Doug writes that "My 
platoon was just about as tight as they come, and this may not really 
mean anything to you, or more precisely you don't know what 1 
mean." And in a personal note to Kerry, Doug argued, concerning his 
service in the Gulf War, that "I don't think anyone who has never 
had such an experience can truly understand." Doug's military 
background is every bit as much a culture to him, a unique and 
separate way of understanding the world, as racial, ethnic, or 
religious cultures are to someone else, and he was upset that people 
in the English department did not, could not, and would not "respect 
it." According to Doug, strip joints, affairs, competition, confrontation, 
violence, and strong opinions were the way of military life. They 
constituted what was important to him, his personal experiences, 
what he wanted to write about, the way he rendered meaning from 
experience. He didn't expect the English department to validate his 
experience, but he was angry, nonetheless, that it didn't. However, 
he was also grateful that Kerry, while setting firm boundaries for his 
behavior, had not tried to shut him down, to make him write what he 
called "pet the puppy papers." I believe oppositional pedagogy 
would have gotten just that from him—no critique, no self reflection, 
no growth, only "the playing of the game." True, Doug would not 
have been intimidated by an oppositional pedagogy. He would have 
pushed back, but eventually he would have, as he told me, "gone 
along to get along."
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Kerry, on the other hand, was able to make at least some kind 
of connection with Doug, cause some kind of self reflection in him. 
and, so achieve a measure of answerability. While in an early 
personal note to Kerry Doug claimed to be "a person mostly devoid of 
feelings," in another essay he confided what it was like to be in the 
military: "When you get back to base and the demons come to visit
you at night in your rack you cry your tears and deal with the 
ghosts, but in the field you shut your emotions off." I think it is an 
insight into and for this man that came only from Kerry's ethical 
engagement of his offensive writing.
But what do we do with a student with whom we cannot make 
a connection, when the visceral reaction to the student's writing 
overwhelms our desire and ability to form a relationship, when the 
empirical evidence before us shows that the student does not want a 
relationship of answerability? The writing of Bryan O'Neill raises just 
those questions. I include his writing, therefore, to show that any 
ethical system must have limits, ways of saying no to certain 
behaviors or ideologies. As open, fluid, experimental, answerable, 
and respectful as my ethics tries to be, those very principles also 
necessitate a standard of both inclusion and  exclusion. Still, I believe 
some kind of controlled engagement with writing that we would 
condemn as unethical can give us a better perspective on who we 
are, what we believe, and how the effect of what we do is perceived 
by certain others. For example, while the writings of Adolf Hitler 
would occupy no ethical space in my classroom, they could occupy a 
kind of negative space, a means for starting debates or historicizing 
arguments. Perhaps we can use writing that we cannot engage
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ethically to, at least, inform our ethics, to make them concrete and 
lived. I will first present O'Neill's writing and then comment on how 
we might understand it and its impact.
The 666th L evel o f  Evil
The 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 school years were a highly 
conflicted, painful, divisive, yet unifying time at the University of 
New Hampshire, a time when four important events occurred. The 
first of these was the suspension of Professor Don Silva on charges of 
sexual harassment of students in his basic writing course (eventually 
the matter was settled in court but not before the University was 
forced into the media spotlight). The second was a "stinger rush" at 
Zeta Chi (ZX) fraternity. The members of ZX held a party in which it 
was alleged that alcohol had been served to minors, and that the 
brothers had hired strippers to perform oral sex while party 
members threw money. The third incident was a SHARPP [Sexual 
Harassment and Rape Prevention Program] sponsored "Mock Rape 
Trail." The trail was a dramatization of a date rape in which both 
sides of the incident presented their views on what happened. 
Football players who had been required to attend the presentation 
made lewd and derogatory comments throughout. They were 
subsequently sentenced to attended presentations on rape culture 
sensitivity.
Finally, and thankfully positively, Jared Sexton was elected the 
first African American student body president in the University's 
history. Mr. Sexton was not only a vocal supporter of diversity on 
campus, he was instrumental in encouraging the creation of many
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University supported student organizations. Among these were the:
BSU (Black Student Union), AASO (African American Student 
Organization), Alliance (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered, and 
Their Allies), ARC (Against Rape Culture), ADELA (The Latin
American Student Organization), Hillel (The Jewish Student
Organization), DSC (Diversity Support Coalition), WRC (Women’s 
Resource Center) CED (Coalition to End Discrimination), ASO (The 
Asian Student Organization), Queer Campus, and People for People— 
not to mention a series of events and programs such as Sexual 
Awareness Week, Blues Jeans IF You're Gay Day, Take Back the Night, 
and Safe Zones. These groups made demands on both the
University's resources and culture. The school newspaper was 
flooded with demands for more diversity, sensitivity, and resistance, 
letters against these very demands, and letters either for or against 
Silva and Zeta Chi. In short, it was a traumatic and dynamic time for 
the UNH community.
Into this emotionally and politically charged situation walked 
Bryan O'Neill and his student newspaper column: "Hi Mom! I'm in 
Jail: A Rating Scale of All Things Evil from 1 to 666." In it O'Neill
listed and ranked a series of people, places, and things on a scale of 
evil from I to 666. O'Neill's column led to a storm of controversy 
that culminated in calls for his removal from the paper and article 
length letters from students and professors either condemning or 
supporting him (or at least his right to free speech). The following is 
a sketch of his writing and the controversy it caused from September 
1994 to May of 1995.
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O'Neill's first contributions to The New Hampshire (T N H ) were 
in the form of cartoons:
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Though the cartoons dealt specifically with the Silva and Zeta Chi
controversies, they caused surprisingly little stir. After the cartoons,
however, the first of O'Neill's columns appeared. The following is a
sample of his first entries:
D iv e r s i t y :  Some people seem to think that the best way to diversify
our fair campus is to enhance the enrollment of minorities. True.
But I think the whole process would go much faster if we just killed 
off a whole bunch o f  white guys. Sure, it may sound extreme, but 
then again. I'm pretty hard-pressed to think of any gender or race 
related issues on this campus that haven't already been beaten like a 
stinky mashed potato. (345)
Sm ith  Hall: Oh goody! Let's make one really nice dorm where we
shove all the diverse foreign students and make them feel at home!
Oh yeah! Let's even leave a few spaces open for a few white students
so that they can experience many different cultures in the confines 
of their own room. Pbbbttt! Why don't we just shove Satan in there 
so that we can make the place completely evil. (665)
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The ZX trail: Give me a break. If the university decided that they
were going to nail every whore that walked through the doors of a 
fraternity part...ahhh...never mind. (98)
Special interests groups: Well. now. We must be a very diverse
campus because we’ve finally got at least one student committee per 
nationality, race, and sexual orientation on our fair campus. I'm so 
happy I could <§>#$%&* die. Ha. I'm just kidding, of course. I really 
think it all sucks. I’m a white heterosexual male, and I’m feeling sort 
o f  left out. There’s no group out there for me. I was thinking of
starting up a little group for lonesome little white guys like myself,
and calling it "Pale Sausages.” but it just never quite got off the 
ground. Then again. I don't really believe that this campus needs a
school recognized organization for honkies. Nothing in that group 
could ever represent what I truly think anyway—that is, assuming 
that all other white guys don't spend their time thinking about 
quicker ways to get high off of paint fumes. (666)
Sexual H arassm ent: There's already been way too much written
about this stupid subject in the forum pages o f  this stupid paper, so 
I’m not going to bother writing anything even semi-intelligent 
about it. Instead I'll write this: Seeing as how it's almost impossible
to prove anything in a court of law regarding sexual harassment, 
why not save everyone a little time and heartache by...oh...lighting 
yourself on fire! Hell, why not? It's a quick and easy way to get
everyone’s attention, and you won't be around long enough for the 
public to get apathetic towards your case! Maybe, if  you're real
lucky, you’ll even die before they get your body to Health Services— 
the place where the real pain always begins. (666)
These first entries are typical of the content and style of
O'Neill’s writing.13 They are crude, juvenile, misogynist, racist, and
violent, but they are not without an effective use of mocking humor. 
The humor expresses a feeling a being "left out" and then a denial of 
that feeling— "Nothing in that group could ever represent what I 
truly think anyway." It ties references to the body to references of 
"the social" (Kipnis 376)—groups designed to give support to the 
marginalized in society are equated to a group of "lonesome little 
white guys" called "Pale Sausages." O’Neill's reduction of these 
support groups to his crotch effectively communicates his opinion of 
them—they aren't worth piss. Nevertheless, these entries are tame
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compared to what they will become. Even at this early stage.
however, O'Neill is obviously trying to be provocative. He wants a
response, a reaction, but he doesn't get it. Because of this lack of
response, he decides to end the column:
U N H : The whole friggin’ campus. Each and everyone of you suck.
You might think I’m kidding, but I’m not. I’ve been trying to get my 
ass kicked for the entire semester, but no one has even stepped 
forward~not even a cheesy letter to the forum pages . . . .  you 
politically correct liberal Nazis are still sitting, listening to your 
Counting Crows crap, and bitching about everything under the sun.
Well, you know what? Screw you all. I’m ending this dung-heap of a 
column for two reasons: 1) it doesn’t serve any purpose if I can't get
killed or laid. 2) I’m trying to take over the Arts pages. That's right.
The whole damn thing. 'Nuff said. (666est)
O'Neill’s departure will not last long however. After he ends the
column, he finally gets the response his is craving. A female student
sends the following letter to TNH  editor:
This is my reaction to Bryan O’NeiH's decision to end his "dung-heap
of a column." Do with it what you will, but at least make sure he sees
it . . .  . Evil is supposed to persist forever. Does Satan exist because he 
wants to get beat up or laid? Is he going to give up his eternal 
position as "Dark Lord” and all of its benefits to write for the Arts 
pages? I don't think so. Perhaps he knows the true key to evil- 
brainwashing. A few measly weeks of suggestive comments and a
numerical rating scale aren’t going to suffice. If  most of the
students at our fair UNH are human (which I can be wrong in 
assuming), then each one of us has a dark vein of evil inside. Most 
of us have been taught to suppress this vein for the "good of 
humanity." It is columns like yours that we read in private,
ingesting the inequity like nutrient deficient beggars; feeding the
deep vein o f  evil. The vein expands, the blood pumps with
increasing intensity, and we crave more evil to satisfy this new 
hunger . . . but what’s this? He’s quitting!? Oh well, that ought to help 
everyone go back to their ignorant, monochromatic, boring p.c.
lives. We can't do anything about the evil that persists around us 
unless we can see it. The real "good for humanity” exists in finding, 
pointing out. and dealing with the evil around us. You tried to point 
it out, giving us our first taste of blood, and then you left us starving 
for more. The quest for evil needs a competent guide to succeed, and 
I almost thought you were it. Thanks for nothing, quitter. You suck.
For O'Neill this was manna from heaven. He now has the 
purpose, the "mandate,” and the target he wants—become the leader
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for those who are fed up with calls for diversity, gender equality, 
and racial justice. A few issues later O’Neill does come back to be 
that leader. Before his writing had been merely offensive, now it
will be offensive with a mission. As Kipnis says of Hustler,  O'Neill's
mission is "to disturb and unsettled" his "readers, both psyhco-
sexually and socio-sexually" (375). Almost all of his entries now deal 
with issues of race, class, gender, or sexual orientation. He writes:
Author's note: Yeah, alright. So I’m too lame to dump the column
like I said I was going to. So what? This isn't the first time I've gone 
back on something I've sa id—not without sex being involved.
Besides, who really cares if I continue writing this piece o f  trash?
We're all going to die of boredom in about a week or two anyway.
"Race, Culture, and Power" minor: That's a good start, but why
stop there? I’m sure we could probably toss in a "Women and Sexual 
Paranoia" major somewhere. Hell, with a little extra encouragement 
from the student body, we might even be able to squeeze in an "All
Men Suck” minor into the program. Yes. That would all be very
nice. We could also get some key speakers from the Gestapo to help
out any students who wished to further their educational interests
outside of the classroom. (134)
Roger Brown: I don't understand why feminists would want to file
a sexual harassment charge against a German language professor
[Roger Brown was another professor accused o f  sexual harassment|.
How are they going to be able to read their Nazi literature without
his help? Jeez. Talk about shooting yourself in the foot. Oh, but, 
then again most of the self-proclaimed feminists on this campus 
probably don’t need to be educated to make irrational, paranoid
decisions about ending a teacher’s career anyway. (2)
National Coming Out Day: This is always the most upsetting
holiday of the year for me. It never fails. I constantly go out of my 
way to buy nothing but the best presents for my friends, and I 
always get stuck with crap. I mean...really. How many bad leather
suits and hand-cuffs can a guy deal with before he starts to feel like 
a complete slut? If this keeps up I’m just going have to resort back to 
the old edible boxer shorts until someone finally gets the point.
(345)
I think O'Neill's last entry on "National Coming Out Day" is especially 
revealing. It has the carnival’s degradation of the body, but also the 
vein of fear that motivates O'Neill's writing. National coming out day
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is an attempt to bring gays into the larger culture, to remove the 
stigma of perversion that keeps gays "in the closet." O’Neill's 
portrayal of homosexuality reasserts the perversion of gays, keeps 
gays in an image controllable by the larger community, lets the gay 
community know that it cannot come out into "normal" society.
O 'N eill’s increased exaggeration , misogyny, xenophobia, 
homophobia, and liberal use of the term Nazi do not go unnoticed or 
unchallenged. Indeed, at the end of another column, O'Neill 
addresses the growing pressure on T N H  editorial staff to pull his 
column from the paper:
Hi Mom, I 'm  in Ja il :  A pparen tly ,  some people have actually
complained about this stupid column. That’s very nice. I’m glad that 
those people are brave enough to come forth and voice their 
opinions in such a bold manner. [Most o f  the complaints to this point 
had been in the form of personal messages to the editors.] Hell, I
admire them so much that I'd like to present my little friends with a
simple five-step process that will guarantee that I am never printed 
in this rag again: 1.) Write a lame letter to the TNH editor. Make sure 
to include lots of harsh derogatory generalizations about my heinous 
criminal record and all the obscene party-tricks that I can do with 
my dirty underwear. 2.) Giggle like a schoolgirl when you see your 
letter in the newspaper, show it to all your friends, and then send a
copy to my apartment—but only after you've rubbed it on the men’s
bathroom floor at Nick's. 3.) Organize a boycott in front of the MUB 
to shut off all access to the TNH offices. If you don't get many people, 
steal one of the bulldozers out front and plow the building down . . . .
4.) Spread rumors that I bombed the SHARPP [Sexual Harassment And 
Rape Prevention Program! office and beat up Jared Sexton during 
the get-away. 5.) Call the police after I’ve slaughtered all of your 
friends. There. Simple enough. And celebrate when the column is 
finally pulled, have some nice Canadian Pork Pie with your lame 
friends at Philbrook. (0)
O'Neill's open acknowledgment of the controversy he is causing
signals the beginning of a deluge of student letters, for and against
him, to the editor of TNH. One student, in a letter entitled "Thank
God for Evil," thanks "God Bryan O’Neill is alive! His column . . .  is the
only thing worth reading in The New Hampshire." Another student.
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in a letter entitled "Hi Mom, I'm a Nazi," believes that "O'Neill . . .
should stop calling people whom he knows nothing of Nazis. In fact,
he should take a history lesson and learn what Nazis and Nazism is. 
If Bryan O'Neill thinks that women who feel obligated to protect 
themselves from Neanderthal men who seek to continue holding
down and degrading females are Nazis, he is mistaken." A similar 
letter, entitled "UNH loser," argues that "O'Neill's attitude stinks and 
his philosophy of life is damaging . . . .  if he had his way with the 
world would have people sell tickets to abortions." Finally, one 
letter, entitled "O'Neill exercises free speech," champions O'Neill as 
"one of the few people on this campus that has the ability to think
for himself . . . .  he is one of the few students that has the balls to
stand up against the pathetic political correctness movement."
These letters represent only a sample of the responses O’Neill’s
column began to generate. Typically the letters either praised O'Neill 
for standing up to the "PC Nazis," condemned him as writer of filth 
and hate, or claimed that they didn’t like him but defended his write 
to free speech. Eventually, the controversy grew to such a level that 
the University's student body president, Jared Sexton, dedicated his
weekly column to it. Sexton writes:
My first impulse was to simply dismiss his [O’NeiH's] writing as crude, 
absurd, and virtually inconsequential . . . .  However, upon second 
and th ird  readings I felt that his m essages , desp ite  the ir  
incoherences, illustrate something important about our student body
and the whole University. For some reason, or great number of 
reasons, Bryan O’Neill felt it necessary to ridicule every part of this 
campus that he can possibly think (momentarily) about . . . .  One 
them e is b la ta n t ly  m isogyn is ts  and c e n te r s  a ro u n d  his 
misunderstanding and subsequent hatred of women in general and 
the feminist movement in particular . . . .  Another motif . . .  is the 
continual denial of racial injustice in our society. He attempts to 
belittle the efforts of individuals and organizations that seek to 
express their cultural-racial heritage and break down barriers and
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discrimination . . . .  I am most outraged by his brazen racism and
advocacy for sexist thinking and practice . . . .  I find it hard to
believe that our campus newspaper alotted a space of such malicious 
commentary. I am not suggesting  that T N H  be biased or 
discriminatory o f  opinions. I am simply urging them to use
discretion in selecting the manner of writing they print each week. 
Finally, I would invite the readers o f  T N H  to respond to Bryan
O ’Neill's column.
Sexton's mistake was to misread the intention of O'Neill's column. 
O'Neill isn't interested in debate-only reaction. And the readers of 
TNH  do respond, though perhaps not all as Sexton intended. Though 
Sexton makes clear that he is calling for editorial responsibility and 
not censorship, he, those who support him, and the editors of T N H  
are accused of fascism over the course of the next several months. 
One especially impassioned student writes in about "freedom of the 
press":
the editors of T N H  should stick to their guns, wherever they might 
be pointed. The Constitution gives them, and them alone, sole 
editorial control of what is printed and what isn't. No one can force 
them to either print or not print material. Not the town of Durham.
Not the University of New Hampshire. Not the Dean. Not campus 
political hopefuls. No one. Popular or not, offensive or not. 
thoughtless or not, it can be printed . . . .  Regardless of what O'Neill’s 
intentions are, regardless of how offensive he is, regardless o f  how 
sensitive and delicate the groups he attacks are, he must be printed.
UNH wants him.
Another student argues, in a letter entitled "Fascism in T N H  ," that 
"Jared is not the only fascist on campus, as the editors of TNH  hold 
true to form. These wonderful individuals, who 'fight' for student 
rights, are, at the same time, destroying our constitutional right for 
free speech." A few weeks later, in a letter entitled "Leave O'Neill 
Alone," another student asks if the paper had "ever heard of 
censorship? . . . .  Well maybe where you're from they believe in 
censoring. I guess I'm from a more liberal state where they believe 
in the Constitution. You know that little piece of paper that
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guarantees us the freedom of speech?" And finally, in a letter 
entitled "Dear thought Police," a student thanks the editors for 
cleaning up the world for him: "To think that you are able to censor
out all that is bad, so by the time any information reaches my virgin 
ears, it is clean—much like the world itself." These letters signal a 
change in the responses to O'Neill. They are becoming more 
thoughtful, more intricate, about larger social issues than just 
whether an individual finds O'Neill offensive. In short, the argument 
really isn’t over O'Neill anymore but over what the UNH community 
values and should value.
O'Neill himself does not take Sexton’s criticism lightly. His next 
column both attacks Sexton and causes more controversy than any 
other he will write.
A u t h o r ' s  n o te :  Well. Jared Sexton didn't seem to like my other 
column, but maybe he'll get a rise in his pants for this one. I sure 
hope so. Feel the love, Jared. Feel the love.
" H i g h e r  L e a r n in g "  (m o v ie ) :  I went and saw this with Jared
Sexton. I thought it was a good movie but that it tried to accomplish a 
little too much. Jared told me that he couldn’t concentrate on the 
movie because he was still pissed at me, for ordering white bread at 
Subway. Silly Jared. Always getting mad at the wrong white guys.
He even tried to blame me when the condom broke. (puke green) 
[O’Neill decided to rate these "evils" on a color scale. He will often 
make such alterations].
M u r k la n d  C o u r ty a rd :  So many people, so few bullets, (sigh) I
can never decide if  I want to start my killing spree with the two 
jerks in the coffee tent, or the bazillion stinkin' alterna-hippies who 
sit around analyzing Fugazi lyrics. Donald Silva tells me that I 
should shoot all the femi-nazis first, but I have to say that I'm not
really com fortable with that idea. It might give people the
impression that I hate women. That would be terrible. I love those
militant UNH gestapo chicks sometimes, even when they're still
breathing. (banana red)
Alliance: Someone creates a special interest group for people with
alternative sexual orientations, yet, they never invite me and my 
necrophiliac friends into any of their parties. That's sort of like 
opening up a deli and not serving sausage because the manager is
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afraid that his vegetarian g irlfriend will beat him up. Uh...er. 
something. (Black Francis)
Letters to the Editor: For all you losers who agree with Mr. Jared
Sexton about how much I suck, but are too lazy to write a letter to the 
newspaper, here’s a form letter that you can just sign your name to 
and stuff in a mailbox: "Hey, Mr. Editor Guy: I’m, like, a stupid hippie 
who's been going to this school for a long time, and I got me 
som ething to say about this O ’Neill character that you’ve been 
p u b l i s h i n g .
These entries by O'Neill clearly reflect important dimensions of the 
carnival. They are tied to the functions of the material body: 
defecation, copulation, blood, snot, etc. They use violence and
degradation to pull down those parts of the student(s') body(ies) and 
the University structure that place themselves, O'Neill feels, above 
him or beyond him, to pull down "sanctified" bodies to a place where 
he can finger them, poke at them, split them open. As with the 
depictions of the body in Hustler , O’Neill's body is an "unromanticized 
body." It is "not a surface or a suntan: [it is] insistently material, 
defiantly vulgar, corporeal" (Kipnis 375). O'Neill writes of 
necrophilia, condoms, killing sprees, alternative sexual orientations. 
His body, like Hustler 's , is a "gaseous, fluid-emitting, embarrass ing  
body, one continually defying the strictures of bourgeois manners
and mores and instead governed by its lower intestinal tract—a body
threatening to erupt at any moment" (Kipnis 375). And while I am
hard pressed to read O'Neill as a champion of the working class, his 
erupting body is one that appeals to the UNH masses—or at least 
large parts of the masses.
Despite the disturbing quality of this column, especially its 
portrayal of violence against women, many students wrote in to
support O'Neill, many of them women. One young woman writes that 
"Bryan O'Neill is an angry, insulting, degrading, sexist, sarcastic.
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politically incorrect, intolerant, blasphemous, lewd, atheistic, pro­
nothing, disgusting, neurotic, nauseating, hopeless bastard. God, I 
love him." Another young woman encourages O’Neill to remain 
unrepentant "after he poked fun at just about everyone in last 
week's TNH. I'm sure there were plenty of people who felt 
uncomfortable and threatened, but isn't that O'Neill's whole point? . . 
. . The killing spree in Murkland Courtyard is a riot—not scary or 
threatening as some are bound to imagine it." These student 
responses give credence to Kipnis’ argument that expecting all 
women to react the same to pornography ignores differences among 
women based on class, race, and experience. Just as it is a "social fact 
that not all women do  experience male pornography in the same 
way" (Kipnis 380) not all women experienced O'Neill's writing in the 
same way. Indeed, another young woman writes a long, thoughtful, 
critical response on O'Neill. She argues that those who cry free 
speech and free thought in the defense of O’Neill have reduced these 
rights "to mere technical entities. . .divorced from the responsibility
associated with them." She defends Jared Sexton as merely 
suggesting "that there be a bridge between language and thought." 
She objects to the loose use of the word fascism in regard to either 
Sexton’s or O'Neill's columns: "I don’t believe that such a historically
significant term should ever be applied so freely to any public
disagreement or everyday issue." She also defends "PC" as simply
"being sensitive to the people around you and accepting that we live
in a multicultural society." Finally, she argues that
Bryan O'Neill does have the freedom of both the press and o f  speech, 
but we have to stop pretending that the issue at hand has anything 
to do with dialogue alone. Because O’NeiU's column appears in such a
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public forum as a university newspaper, he cannot utilize his rights, 
w ithout taking on the responsibility not to abuse them. A 
responsibility, which he clearly does not adhere to, and one which, 
through the publication of his recent column. The New H ampshire  
refuses to hold him to.
The responses are becoming even more thoughtful, eloquent, 
and rhetorical in their attempt to persuade. The last young woman 
even gives a rough definition of Bakhtin's notion of answerability. 
Some of these letters must have taken the writers hours to compose. 
It is a mark of how serious this supposed "dung-heap of a column” 
has become, but, of course, it's not about the column anymore. It's 
about issues of free speech, racism, censorship, women's rights, and 
civic responsibility. O'NeiH’s writing has become the catalyst or focal 
point for a Graffian debate on some of our campuses most pressing 
problems.
For example, student organizations begin to protest O’Neill, 
women's groups condemn his column in their speeches. Take Back 
the Night rally's cite his work as a prime example of misogynist 
literature. It is a pressure that O’Neill begins to feel.
A u th o r 's  n o te :  Theres a strong possibility that the Nazi powers
that be are going to successfully have my column banned like the 
plague—their supreme logic being that you boys and girls are too 
fragile to handle controversial material. That's too bad. I love
talking dirty to little children.
M ulticu lturalism  debate: Would've been cooler if somebody
puked. (pubic hair)
Take Back the Night: Hell, it almost seemed to be a privilege to
have my name brought up in Jane Stapleton’s [head of SHARPP1 
speech regarding "misogynists literature.” Thanks Jane. It's good to 
know that people are willing to make me the poster child of the 
hyper-paranoid delusion of male evil. I’ll be interested to see them 
take the garbage agenda a step further and explain why you have to 
d istinguish  yourse lf  as being a "feminist" rather than ju s t  a 
"woman"—do you find something so inherently wrong with being a 
woman that you have to label yourself? Tell you what, if you can
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think of a really clever answer. I’ll start leaving the toilet seat down 
for ya. (tampon commercials)
Dimond Library: It’s pretty easy to target me as being a woman-
hater because I have a dangling lump of skin and cartilage lodged 
in-between my legs. It’s also pretty easy to target me as being a 
racist because I'm a dumb whitey who wears flannels and drinks 
Meister-Brau voluntarily. But it's definitely easiest for me to target 
all the stinkin' hippies from the top of the library when I’m blowing 
their filthy heads all over the pavement, (toe cheese)
A uthor's post-note: In case anybody’s noticed, there's been quite
a change in tone for this article over the past few weeks. And it 
hasn’t been a good one. The new T N H  editing staff is much more
concerned  with avert ing  controversy  than confron ting  it, so
they’ve told me to "tone down” to get printed. This, of course, makes 
me sell out to the same system that I've been trying to butcher for 
the past year. But that’s OK. I figure in a couple of weeks I’ll be 
sitting down at the L icker Store with all the stinkin' hippies, 
gathering the support o f  all my feminist friends over having my 
penis surgically removed. That’s when we'll all sit back and laugh at 
the fact that I ever thought something was wrong with UNH.
The tone of O'Neill's columns have indeed changed but in more ways
than he admits. While the material body is still present in lines like
"lump of skin and cartilage lodged in-between my legs," "penis
surgically removed," "toe cheese," "tampon commercials," and "pubic
hair," the column spends more time defending O'Neill than in
attacking others. O'Neill is on the defensive. Those who he has
targeted have begun to fight back. The entire drama draws to a head
when a professor in the Communication department writes a full
page editorial against O'Neill. The article is eloquent and powerful. I
quote from it at length:
As I sit down to write, the official death count in Oklahoma City 
stands momentarily at 78, with 150 other victims still buried in the 
rubble that was once the Alfred Murrah Federal Building . . . .  
terrorism, like recent anti-abortion murders, is not 'random' at all 
but is politically motivated and fueled by enormous, irrational rage .
. . .  if the editors are concerned about the heinous consequences of 
hatred, and I take them at their word, I ask them to reconsider the 
wisdom of their decision to provide a regular forum on the campus 
for a columnist to vent his own contempt for selected groups and
individuals and to muse about embarking on murderous shooting
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sprees against them. Those of us who have expressed concern about 
the publication of fantasies of slaughter have been told by various 
individuals that we do not apprehend their inherent humor, that we 
have failed to understand them as attempt at satire, and that we 
object because we do not agree with this individual’s point o f  view. [ 
plead guilty on all counts . . . .  Beyond the obvious fact that 
newspapers are not bound to publish any and every opinion, speech 
that promotes harm or results in harm has always faced restriction 
(threats to kill people, bomb threats, or Justice O liver Wendell 
Holmes's famous reference to ’yelling’ "fire" in a crowded theater’ 
are salient examples) . . . .  Given that The New Hampshire  column in 
which these musings o f  murder appeared also contained ridicule 
leveled against women engineering  students, I had considered 
writing in about the politically-m otivated massacre o f  14 women 
engineering students at the University of Montreal in 1989. To me, 
this ’coincidence’ rendered the columnist's fantasies of a shooting 
spree even more disturbing . . . .  I confess that I did not relish the 
prospect of becoming a potential target for the contempt which had 
been rained on others who had spoken out . . . .  I readily concede 
that words and deeds are often not equivalent . . . .  Nonetheless, as 
the manufactured carnage in Oklahoma City, recent anti-abortion 
murders, and the horrors o f  the Holocaust all reveal, acts o f  bloody 
terrorism rarely, if ever, occur in some wordless vacuum. Rather, 
such acts are frequently  the logical consequences  o f  potent
rhetorical framing and argument. Some partial truth exists, after 
all, in claims by defense attorneys for the murderer o f  Dr. Gunn in 
Wichita and for New Hampshire’s own John Salvi similarly charged 
with two anti-abortion murders that extreme anti-abortion rhetoric 
contributed to their acts . . . .  Yet when voices at UNH express outrage 
over the reduction of groups or individuals on campus to ’’turds," 
"vomit," "scum," and worse, or when we object to the editor's choice 
to publish ponderings over beating women or musings over whom to 
start killing first on campus given that there are "so many people,
and so few bullets,” we are told by the editors of The New Hampshire 
and the columnist they have defended that we are overreacting, 
have m isordered  our p r io r i t ies ,  and are  su ffering  from "PC 
paranoia." Try telling that to the families o f  the dead in Montreal, 
Brookline, Pensacola, Wichita, and now, Oklahoma City.
The fact that this letter resulted from O'Neill's columns gives great
credence to Graffs belief in the pedagogical benefit of teaching the
conflicts. The professor's connection of rhetoric to violence, her
weaving of the personal and the political, her use of logos, ethos, and
pathos are all an education in themselves. Students' are exposed not
just to the professor's ideas but her beliefs. I would like to report
that the professor's letter changed O'Neill's attitude. However, the
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essay had little effect on him. His last column for the paper is a
thinly veiled response to the professor's editorial.
M ock Rape T ra i l :  Let's get real, people. We've already had our fun
with starting a nationwide panic over one bomb, why do we need to 
set o ff  another one? Is the UNH femi-nazi agenda so downtrodden by
the fact that they have no potentially explo itab le  rape victim
traumas in the news this year that they have to take the time to 
create a false rape scenario altogether? Gee. That sounds smart.
Let's create sexual paranoia  out o f  absolutely  nothing at all. 
Pbbbbbtttt. That really just sounds to me like somebody in some lame 
Women Studies class who can't get laid. The worst part of this 
particular sex-bomb, however, is that if  it blows up their aren’t
gonna [be] pieces o f  dead children anymore because the femi-nazis 
are secretly distributing heroin to all the Oyster River kids. C'mon. 
baby. Don’t do me like that. (Iuv 4 taco)
W o m e n 's  R ug b y  T ea m : Nice puke! Oh. Whoops. That’s a rugby
chick. Help me scrape her off the tar so we can eat her. (69)
O'Neill, like Kipnis’ reading of Larry Flynt, "is a man apparently both 
determined and destined to play out the content of his obsessions as 
psychodrama on our public stage" (384). His goal is to pull everyone 
into the muck with him. Why? Probably because discourses that 
challenge his view of how the world works had gained power at the 
University of New Hampshire. Student organizations were 
flourishing, a black student was elected student body president, 
football players were held accountable to the institution they 
represent. The culture O'Neill represents, a culture that wants to 
deny inequalities of race, class, and gender, is suddenly under attack 
on multiple fronts. O'Neill becomes the release value for the
pressure built up in those who see this change in cultural power as
threa ten ing .
Importantly, this eruption occurs outside of the classroom. 
Inside the classroom there is no intermediate barrier of a column.
Inside the classroom O'Neill would face direct rebuttal for what he
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has written. For example, whereas Doug was in a relationship of 
answerability with Kerry that developed overtime, O'Neill is immune 
to the one on one conference. While Doug had the restraint of a 
particular reader, O’Neill has the target of multiple, faceless groups. 
The classroom demands a level of (response)ibility that the student 
column does not. The classroom, in other words, does not allow for 
the sovereignty of position his column does.
So what should we make of all of this writing, this heteroglossia 
of competing voices? First, [ believe that any teacher would be 
justified in not allowing O'Neill to write this way in his or her 
classroom. O'Neill does not meet the ethical standard for being 
treated in a open, respectful, dialogic, experimental manner. He is 
interested in neither being answerable to the people who disagree 
with him nor in making his arguments in ways that show any respect 
for the opposing side. He dismisses any critique of him as PC 
paranoia, femi-Nazi hatred, or hippie freak stupidity. Second, his 
writing represents a very real danger to minorities, women, and 
homosexuals. As the professor of communication wrote, "acts of 
bloody terrorism rarely, if ever, occur in some wordless vacuum." To 
grant O'Neill’s writing equal treatment in a classroom, to sanction it 
with the power of the University, is dangerous and unethical.
Still, I think there is an ethical and educative role that O'Neill’s 
writing can serve in the classroom. O'Neill's writing does have a kind 
of hybrid carnivalesque power to it. It is able, through mockery, to 
show how those of use who care about issues of race, class, and 
gender and the issues themselves are seen by large segments of the 
student population. In fact, what struck me most about the letters to
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the editor was how many students felt that O'Neill was a champion of 
the oppressed, of those whom PC fascism was silencing. Students 
wrote of O’NeiU's courage, perseverance, and, most revealing, balls. 
O'Neill was so popular, in fact, that there was a movement to draft 
him for student body president. To which O’Neill responded:
Let’s face it, folks, there was no way for me to realistically compete 
in this year’s election. No matter how amazing my ideas would have 
been or how well I could have presented them, the PC paranoia that’s 
been built up on this campus has hit a level that has completely 
transfered  our attention away from intelligent academic discourse 
into condescending rhetorical nothingness. Now. when I say this, I 
am openly condemning the bland, empty and self-serving spiels that 
accuse us day in and day out of being close-minded and culturally 
ignorant. Why, you may ask? Because I’m a dumb whitey who lives
by Natural Light and P en th o u se  F orum  letters.
Though O'Neill wraps the response in his typical crude humor, 1 think
it speaks to a real feeling of anger among many students. Whether
this feeling is the result of conservative rhetoric on the dangers of
political correctness, actual authoritarian teachers, the demands of
marginalized groups for more power, or a combination of all three,
the ideas masked by the label of politically correct are failing to be
internally persuasive to many students. Instead of experiencing calls
for diversity, justice, and sensitivity as "tightly interwoven with
’one’s own word’" (Bakhtin The Dialogic  345), these students
experience it as a form of authoritative discourse, as discourse that
"demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own." These
students perceive the argument for diversity, gender equality, and
racial justice as condescendingly having "its authority already fused
to it" (342).
Further, the amount of discussion and debate that resulted 
from O'Neill’s writing was tremendous. By the time he was done.
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professors and students had debated issues of crucial importance: 
the relationship of rhetoric to action, thought to language, rights to 
responsibilities, and the role of a free press. In short, the students 
were given access to the process and not merely the product of 
participatory democracy. When the editors of The New Hampshire 
discredited the amount of letters and complaints they received about 
O'Neill as a "truly amazing" waste of time and effort that could have 
been directed at "the real issues of today," they missed the point 
entirely. The controversy over O’Neill had done just that.
But should we allow this kind of writing in the classroom? I 
would argue that we should not~at least not in its first form, not as 
an equal member of a classroom community. But perhaps, as I have 
argued, we could use O'Neill's writing as a kind of negative ethics, as 
a kind of pedagogical tool. We could bring his column into our 
classrooms to open up the debates on racism, sexism, homophobia,
and classism that are so often kept silent, sterile, or authoritarian. 
The writing does have great pedagogical potential for the politically 
oriented writing classroom. However, to tap into that potential 
would require an ethics of the political. There is a real danger in 
O'Neill's writing as there is a real danger in the rhetoric of any group 
that encourages or humorizes violence against others—namely, that
others might put words to action. We must, therefore, proceed with 
caution. Moreover, to use ethics in the way I suggest requires the
revival of historical consciousness. Without this consciousness the 
reasons why O'Neill was both effective and offensive have no
explanation and provide no way to come at the issue from any 
intellectual distance. And yet, the most devastating aspect of radical
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postmodernism is its destruction of history. The necessity of 
reclaiming a notion of history, therefore, is to what I would now like 
to turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR NOTES
1. Even though I agree with most of Lazere’s argument, [ find it necessary to 
distance myself from his belief that "the major emphasis in theory, courses, 
and textbooks has been on basic writing and the generation and exposition of 
one's own ideas, to the neglect of more advanced levels o f  writing that involve 
critical thinking in eva lua ting  o ther 's  ideas (particu larly  in the public 
discourse of politics and mass media)~i.e., semantics, logic and argumentative 
rhetoric, and th e ir  app l ica t ion  to writing crit ica l,  a rgum enta tive ,  and 
research papers and other writing from sources" (194). I do not believe that 
emphasizing basic writing or the exposition of one's own ideas resulted in the 
neglect of other ways o f  writing. Far from "imposing crippling restrictions 
on our field” (194) this emphasis represents the most prolific, diverse, and 
radical pedagogy we have so far produce. The scholars o f  this emphasis have 
thrown away more innovations for the classroom than the proponents of
"advance writing” have thought of implementing. I also have a problem with 
argumentation being the "more advanced level o f  w rit in g .” Why is 
autobiography and narrative so respected everywhere but first year English?
2. Of course, constructing ethical guidelines is beyond the scope of Lazere's 
p ro jec t .
3. See Bizzell’s "Marxist Ideas in Composition Studies" page 67 footnote I for a 
discussion of Fredric Jameson's attempt to escape the ethical binary opposition
discussed by Nietzsche.
4. It is postmodern both in terms of the figures I draw upon to create it and the
content of what is created. My ethics is not grounded in a universal human
nature, an unchanging set o f  physical or ideal laws, or a distanced and unified 
subjectivity. Like the postmodernists, I do not "reduce the other to categories 
of the self" (Nealon 129). Instead, my ethics attempts to embrace a dialogic
intersubjectivity that recognizes the incommensurability of the other. For
like the postmodernists, I believe that "Any ethical system that understands
the other as simply 'like the selF will be unable to respond adequately to the 
other’s uniqueness and singularity; indeed, such a reduction amounts to a kind
of subjective colonialism, where all the other's desires are reduced to the
desires of the 'home country,’ the self" (Nealon 129).
5. Like the term postmodernism itself, Foucault is often hard to place.
However, just as com positionist often use postmodernism synonymously for 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism, Foucault is often defined by all three
areas when he really doesn’t fit neatly into any of them. I prefer to think of
Foucault as a philosopher of postmodernity. His work, in other words, is part
of the larger rupture of modernism’s central tenets of self, language, and their
relationship, but the term postmodernism is too limiting to encompass the
scope of that work. Yet because of current parlance and the legitimacy of
seeing postmodernism, in its broadest sense, as the critique of modernism, I 
will label Foucault with the term. See Hubert L. Dreyfus’ and Paul Rabinow’s
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics  for a discussion of
the uniqueness of Foucault’s work.
6. Beside the works I cite, see "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of
Work in Progress" and "Technologies of the Self.”
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7. However, this freedom to choose does not result from a pre-existing self,
from libera ting  an innate se lf  from system s o f  oppression, but from 
constructing the conditions in which cho ice  is possible and sustainable. 
Foucault has "always been somewhat suspicious of the notion o f  liberation, 
because if it is not treated with precautions and within certain limits, one runs
the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base
that, as a consequence o f  certain historical, economic, and social processes,
has been concealed, alienated, or im prisoned in and by mechanisms of 
repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these 
repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his 
nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and positive 
relationship with himself. I think this idea should not be accepted without 
scrutiny. I am not trying to say that liberation as such . . . does not exist . . . .  
But we know very well . . . that this practice of liberation is not in itself 
sufficient to define practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people,
this society, and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and
acceptable forms o f  existence or political society" ("The Ethics" 283).
8. Indeed. G raff points out that "there is something truly astonishing about 
the degree o f  exaggeration, patent falsehood, and plain hysteria attained by 
the more prominent" accounts of supposed PC fascism (3). See pages 16-25, 34- 
36, and note 5 on page 197 in Beyond the Culture Wars for a discussion and list 
of sources that exaggerate the "PC crises." For example, see Michael Kingsley's 
"P.C. B.S.” in the May 20, 1991 New Republic  for a rebuttal to the PC hysteria 
whipped up by conservative pundits. In the article Kingsley notes, in his wry 
style, that "many anti-PC diatribes are jus t lists of things the writer finds 
objectionable and would like—in the spirit o f  toleration and free inquiry—to
expunge from the college curricula" (8).
9. This statement is meant in no way to imply that Graff is insensitive to these 
issues. Indeed, his work shows a strong commitment to rectifying inequalities 
in race, class, and gender. It is merely meant to show that whatever the depth 
of Graffs feelings, he is, at least on an intellectual and pedagogical level, able 
to distance himself from them
10. Harkin’s original texts reads as follows: "The objective is not to achieve a
totalizing metatheory but rather to see where theories intersect, where they 
contradiction, where they form constella tions, and, perhaps what is most 
important, where they form lacunae" (136).
11. See Nealon pages 135-42 for the argument that there is still an 
imperialistic element in Bakhtin's work, an element that Nealon counters with 
L ev inas
12. I interviewed Doug in preparation for writing this chapter and received 
his permission to use his writing and information from the interview for this 
chapter. Indeed, Doug was very willing to talk with me. He felt that his 
experiences and his culture were not given adequate space or respect in our 
English departm ent.
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13. I am. of course, selecting the most offensive of O’Neill's writing. Not all of 
his work focused on issues o f  race, class, and gender; however, it was to these 
entries that praise or scorn was directed.
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CHAPTER V
FOUCAULT AND THE PHAEDRUS :
THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE AND THE INESCAPABILITY OF
HISTORY
In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye . . . .  this corruptible must 
put on incorruption, and this mortal m u s t  put on immortality."
The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians
We are far from having exhausted the significance o f  the few 
symbols we use. We can come to use them yet with a terrible 
simplicity. —Ralph Waldo Emerson "The Poet"
While history may be marked by no inherent plan or progression, it 
is the product o f  complex interactions of disparate groups, social 
institutions, ideologies, techno log ica l conditions, and modes o f  
production. To abandon the attempt to make sense of these forces in 
the unfolding of history is to risk being victimized by them. —James 
Berlin Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures
In "Slacking Off: Border Youth and Postmodern Education,"
Henry Giroux welcomes us "to the backlash against postmodernism" 
(349). He explains the backlash as a kind of "deep-seated anti- 
intellectualism" (348). He argues that "while conservatives . . . see in
postmodernism the worst expression of the radical legacy of the
1960s, an increasing number of radical critics view postmodernism 
as the cause of a wide range of theoretical excesses and political 
injustices" (349). It seems that from both the left and the right there 
has arisen "a kind of reductionism that is both disturbing and 
irresponsible in its refusal to engage postmodernism in any kind of
dialogical, theoretical debate" (350).1
While I agree with Giroux's explanation for the backlash, 1
believe it needs to be expanded. The current backlash against
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postmodernism stems not only from an anti-intellectualism that 
refuses to engage it but from the often hostile and fearful ways it is 
engaged. For many theorists postmodernism is a radical and 
dangerous break with the progressive forces of history. For example, 
in his article "Consequences" Stanley Fish quotes a critique of
postmodernism by Israel Scheffler. Scheffler argues that to accept 
the postmodern world view—as encapsulated by Thomas Kuhn—is to 
accept that
Independent and public controls are no more, com munication has
failed, the common universe o f  things is a delusion, reality is itself
made . . . rather than discovered . . . .  In place of a community of 
rational men following objective procedures in the pursuit o f  truth, 
we have a set of isolated monads, within each of which belief forms 
without systematic constraints, (qtd. in Fish 113 )
While those of us more sympathetic to postmodernism might cringe
at Scheffler's unproblematized use of terms like "community of
rational men," "objective procedures," and the "pursuit of truth" and
even laugh at his caricature of what might replace that community of
rational men, the passion of Scheffler's feelings, the nostalgia for a
world where objective, disinterested investigation is unchallenged
points to how frightening the postmodern world view can be if it is
based solely on the destruction of the previous one.
For Scheffler, postmodernism not only leads to an impasse but 
shatters the sacred program of the Enlightenment and its
corresponding notions of truth, progress, m ethodology, and 
rationality. As Lester Faigley has argued, generalizing from the work 
of Jane Flax, for many people postmodernism means that "there is
nothing outside contingent discourses to which a discourse of values 
can be grounded—no eternal truths, no universal human experience,
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no universal human rights, no overriding narrative of human
progress" (Fragments 8).
And, to be fair, the idea of postmodernism as a radical break 
with history is one that many of its proponents relish. For example,
Baudrillard has consistently maintained that history is no longer able 
to provide us with meaning. He writes:
Postmodemity is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It is a game with 
the vestiges of what has been destroyed. This is why we are ’post’:— 
history has stopped, one is in a kind of post-history which is without
meaning. One would not be able to find any meaning in it . . .  . We
can no longer be said to progress . . . .  But it is not at all unfortunate.
I have the impression with postmodernism that there is an attempt to
rediscover a certain pleasure in the irony o f  things, in the game of
things. Right now one can tumble into total hopelessness—all the
definitions, everything, it's all been done . . . .  postmodernity is the
attempt . . .  to reach a point where one can live with what is left. It is
more a surv ival am ong  the rem nants than any th ing  e lse .
(Laughter.) (B a u d r i l la rd  95)
Not only is there no historical meaning in Baudrillard's postmodern
world, there is no plan of positive action to resist this state. Instead,
we must learn to play with the pieces of our hopelessness. Given
such a nihilistic tone, it is not surprising that so many theorists, be
they from the left or the right, find this notion of postmodernism
frightening.2
For theorists like Stanley Fish, however, both the extreme
nature of Baudrillard's theory and the hostile and fearful view of
postmodernity which it inspires rests on the same erroneous belief.
It is the belief that in postmodernism all constraints on human action
are no more, that one can play with the pieces of the deconstructed
universe in any way one wishes. Fish argues instead that
antifoundationalism or postmodernism is not
an argum ent for unbrid led  subjectiv ity , for the absence o f  
constraints on the individual . . .  it is an argument for the situated
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subject, for the individual who is always constrained by the local or 
community standards and criteria  o f  which his judgem ent is an 
extension. ("Consequences” 113)
It is the community, Fish believes, that supplies the "systematic
constraints," the controls needed for values and methodology.
However, while Fish's argument works well in refuting those,
like Scheffler, who fear that postmodernism removes all constraints,
it does not remove either the fear written of by Faigley or the 
radicalism expressed by Baudrillard. In fact, it is exactly the idea 
that the individual is "always [and only] constrained by the local or 
community standards" that Faigley says so many people fear. They 
fear that "there is nothing outside contingent discourses to which a 
discourse of values can be grounded." The constraints of the local 
community do not tell us whether this community's way of doing 
something is more or less ethical than another community's way— 
except, of course, from within the community. Further, Baudrillard's 
argument does not "demonstrate the contextual source of 
convictions" (Fish 114) but maintains that there no longer is a 
contextual source for convictions. As Faigley points out,
Baudrillard's critique is far more extreme than merely arguing that
students are situated within their culture and that any conclusions 
they reach will be circumscribed by that culture. Baudrillard rejects 
the idea that we can somehow get outside the flow o f  codes, 
simulations, and images to discover any space for social critique.
(213)
For Baudrillard, context no longer provides us with meaningful
constraints. We are bombarded with so many images, codes, and 
signs from the media that the object has become free-floating— 
"everything comes from the object and everything returns to it"
(Baudrillard Fatal Strategies 111). The result of this bombardment
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is that the "model is truer than true" and no longer needs either to 
refer to a model maker or the social material of which it was made 
( 8 ).
To answer both Baudrillard a n d  those who fear values 
grounded only in the narrowness of the local, therefore, we must 
conceive of history in a way that both acknowledges the postmodern 
critique yet provides a larger system of restraints for deciding values 
and methods than just the local community. Moreover, it must be a 
conception that reclaims a form of agency, a plan of positive action, a 
means of resistance within this history. I believe this conception of 
history can be formed from the concepts of intertextuality and the 
anxiety of influence.
Joseph Harris has criticized the concept of intertextuality as 
"little more than a metaphor, a shorthand label for a hermetic weave 
of texts and citations" ("The Idea" 15) when it comes to explaining 
the idea of a literate community. For Harris, intertextuality replaces 
"the sense of community as an active lived experience . . . [with] a 
shadowy network of citations" (14). When combined with the 
concept of the anxiety of influence and applied to the idea of history, 
however, intertextuality provides us with the means for shared 
meaning and agency within a postmodern frame, a means for setting 
postmodernism in productive, dialogical, and critical tension with the 
goals of the Enlightenment and traditional liberal humanism.
James Porter explains intertextuality as the belief that "Not 
infrequently, and perhaps ever and always, texts refer to other texts 
and in fact rely on them for their meaning. All texts are 
interdependent: We understand a text only insofar as we
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understand its precursors" ("Intertexuality" 34). This interdependent 
and historical intelligibility creates a web of meaning which ties one 
community to another through shared texts, and it eliminates both 
the validity of absolute relativism and the tyranny of objectivism. 
We cannot make any  interpretation of a text nor can we make an 
interpretation free from our situatedness. We can only make 
interpretations that the web of texts prefiguratively constitutes. 
However, given the fact that an intertexual situatedness is by 
definition located in multiple communities, our situatedness and our 
interpretations are not restricted to a single, determined monologic 
community. There are almost a limitless number of ways in which 
communities manifest themselves within the multiple, overlapping, 
fractured, and fluid identities of the individual. Thus, interpretation 
becomes a matter of drawing on a multi-communal intersubjectivity, 
and agency comes from our ability to "encounter and learn new 
codes, to intertwine codes in new ways, and to expand our semiotic 
potential" (Porter 41). Agency becomes what Bakhtin would call the 
ability to reaccentuate texts. For as Peter Mortensen reminds us, 
"Texts do not exist . . .  in the absence of people to make them—and 
neither does intertextuality" ("Analyzing" 118). The anxiety of being 
dominated by master tropes forces us to read or misread texts in 
ways that make room for our own interpretations.
Viewing history as a series of inescapable yet malleable textual 
influences does not necessitate a return to history as linear, 
progressive, or universal. It is not a return to history as "the story of 
disembodied ideas freely floating in an intellectual ether" (Berlin, 
"Revisionary" 50). Neither, however, is it the surrendering of history
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to a game in which we can play with the broken pieces of the 
universe in any way we want. Intertextuality sees history as "a 
plurality of micro-narratives, limited and localized accounts that 
attempt to explore features of experience that the grand narratives 
typically exclude" (Berlin, "Postmodernism" 172), yet it maintains 
that these localized and limited accounts are connected—not in a 
"Great Chain of Being” ("Towards" 16) as Susan Jarratt might object— 
but in a great web of overlapping texts.
This web, while neither an actual space outside the flow of 
codes nor a "neutral space from which to record a historical thing-in- 
itself," (Berlin, "Revisionary" 56) provides at least the lines for a 
continual dialogue on human values not grounded solely in one 
community. It creates a shared, if conflicted, space out of multiple 
knowledges, values, and histories that do not belong to any one 
community. Therefore, while the web is not outside contingent 
discourses, its sum is greater than its parts. History becomes not so 
much a progression from the past as an ability to make a meaning in 
the present using materials that are owned, interpreted, and fought 
over by multiple communities.
Baudrillard is wrong: history is neither as overdetermined nor
as easily escaped as he thinks. History, the intertextual anxiety of 
influence, lives in and makes breathe the words we write, the 
arguments we make, the arguments we are able to make. Despite 
Baudrillard's argument that the intelligibility of the object escapes 
context, his own argument is understandable only through a lens of 
historical influence. Baudrillard is made intelligible through his 
connection to and our understanding of the works of Marx, Freud,
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Saussure, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and others. To paraphrase Foucault, 
those writers initiated the discursive practices that made 
Baudrillard's texts possible, and those initiators’ texts were, in turn, 
made possible by previous initiators of texts like Plato.
To accept Baudrillard’s argument is to accept the dubious 
notion that history no longer provides context or meaning within an 
argument that depends on a continual reference to and critique of 
history for its own intelligibility. If there truly were a complete 
break with history, a collapse of history's ability to provide meaning, 
then we could never come to that historical realization. To notice 
that history has disappeared is possible only from a historical 
perspective. To argue that history is no longer capable of providing 
meaning is only possible by having the historical perspective that it 
once did.
Postmodernism is not a radical break with but a radical 
critique of what history is and how it is used. As Giroux argues, and 
I have agreed,
Rather than proclaiming the end of reason, postmodernism can be 
critically analyzed for how successfully it interrogates the limits of 
the project of modernist rationality and its universal claims to 
progress, happiness, and freedom . Instead of assum ing  that 
postmodernism has vacated the terrain of values, it seems more 
useful to address how it accounts for how values are constructed 
historically and relationally  . . . .  instead o f  c la im ing that 
postmodernism's critique of the essentialist subject denies a theory 
o f  subjectivity, it seems more productive to examine how its claims 
about the contingent cha rac te r  o f  identity, cons truc ted  in a 
multiplicity of social relations and discourse, redefines the notion of 
agency. ("Slacking O ff ' 350-51)
Within the intertextual frame, postmodernism does not destroy
human rights, democracy, and science—it problematizes them. As
Fish has argued, "The fact that we now have a new explanation of
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how we got our beliefs~the fact, in short, that we now have a new 
belief—does not free us from our other beliefs or cause us to doubt 
them" ("Consequence" 114). Instead, it requires us to use our 
intelligence to hold contradictory ideas and values in our head at the 
same time, to play them off each other in an anxiety of influence. 
The benefit of holding contradicting ideas in dialogical, dialectical, 
and critical tension is that one value or view cannot hold supremacy 
in our minds without the voice of another chewing away at it. 
Postmodern history, like a postmodern ethics, encourages a lack of 
dogma, continual interpretation, and openness.
I am aware, of course, that the most radical postmodernists and 
anti-foundationalists will object to my notion of intertextual history 
as unresponsive to the power inequities inherent in any system of 
relations. Texts, they might argue, do not influence each other 
through the free-flow of egalitarian play but through strategically 
biased structures of power. Intertextuality not only actively 
privileges certain texts (usually those from privileged community 
members) but, through conscious and unconscious hostility or 
indifference, marginalizes still other texts (usually those from 
already marginalized groups). Moreover, they might point out that 
many groups did not and do not have equal or any access to the 
means of producing texts, that intertextuality privileges literacy over 
orality, ignores class exploitation, and reinforces gender inequalities. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the examination of Plato and Foucault 
that I will soon turn to once again preserves the dead white male 
canon.
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I have two responses. First, this objection ignores the role of 
anxiety based agency to refigure the intertextual story. As 
Mortensen has pointed out, the intertexual community is not a call 
for consensus, "But in so far as communities . . . contain conflict, the 
outcome of negotiation can be the subversion of convention, a move 
that challenges authority" ("Analyzing" 120). Scholars like Jarratt, 
Quandahl, Miller, Crowley, Berlin, and Bizzell, each driven by the 
desire to change social conditions, have shown that the meaning of 
texts is as much created as it is received. Accordingly, they have 
woven disruptive texts into the intertext in an attempt to refigure its 
content and reception They have sought out the voices of the 
u n rep resen ted , re f igu red  accep ted  in te rpreta tions of the 
marginalized, and challenged the dominance of the master tropes. 
They have, in short, written ruptures, discontinuities, and revisions 
into the inherited structure of the intertext in hopes of presenting 
new ways of knowing. For these scholars, writing within the 
intertext is not a capitulation to the status quo but an act of micro­
level resistance.
Second, like Terry Rassmussen, "I'm weary of anti- 
foundationalists crying foul everytime someone approaches anything 
that slightly resembles an attempt to establish a foundation or, for 
that matter, a promising persuasion" ("Antifoundationalism" 157). 
As Berlin so eloquently reinforced in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, 
there is a price to pay if we simply give up on our attempt to make 
meaning out of history and history meaningful. For example, if we 
do not reclaim history in the way I argue, then much of the nuance 
and wonder of the influences that breathe life into texts, connect
2 1 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communities to shared values, and complicate those communities’ 
views on those values will be ignored. In my comparison of Foucault 
and Plato, I will try to show some of the often ignored echoes that 
exist between these two thinkers and that complicate our 
understanding and use of them. I do this not to reinforce the cannon 
but to bring one of the twentieth century’s most controversial, 
creative, and frightening thinkers into productive tension with one of 
antiquity's most dominant figures. I want to subvert how Foucault 
and Plato are viewed by reflecting Foucault in the mirror of Plato's 
thought, thereby changing both the mirror and its reflection. For I 
maintain that Foucault is in many ways a product of Plato, a seed 
planted by Socrates, and a good example of the intertexual anxiety of 
history for which I am arguing.
Foucault and the P h a e d r u s
It seems a peculiar comparison at first: the ancient philosopher
who "established" the security of the unchanging transcendental 
forms with the contemporary theorist who "took" all forms of 
transcendental security away. As Bruce Herzberg has pointed out, 
Foucault located and lamented the loss of discourse as an event "in 
the defeat of the Sophists by the model of philosophy associated with 
Plato" ("Michel" 70).3 And as Sheldon Wolin has written, Foucault 
identified Platonic philosophy as one "of the most horrendous 
examples of totalizing" theory in human history ("On the Theory" 
199). It would seem that if ever two thinkers were at opposite ends 
of the intellectual and political spectrum, it is Plato and Foucault.
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Nevertheless, while granting their deep and important 
differences, there is also a strange symmetry between the mind of 
Plato and the mind of Michel Foucault,4 a similar penetrating gaze 
which convicts all that falls beneath it, a shared passion to reveal 
how blind, conditioned, and ultimately complicit we are in our own 
suffering. In the Republic  , the Gorgias, and the Phaedrus  Plato bans 
corruptive poets, condemns false rhetoric, and belittles the 
importance of writing. In Madness and Civilization, The Birth o f  the 
C lin ic ,  and Discipline and Punish Foucault argues that efforts to 
reform the fields of psychology, medicine, and corrections actually 
transformed systems of oppression into new and more subtle 
technologies of control.
In effect, both men are cultural terrorists: Plato with his
realities surpassing and categorizing all human works and humans 
themselves; Foucault with his power emanating from everywhere, 
infecting everyone and every "good" action they do and know. 
Indeed, I argue that Michel Foucault is a Platonic philosopher 
without the guiding and constitutive light of the forms, a moralist 
without morals. His work purposefully and inescapably echoes 
Plato's in interest and personality if not always in theory and 
conclusion.5
The purpose of this comparison is to examine the often 
disregarded echoes between these two thinkers, to examine the ways 
and degrees to which they complement and complicate each other. It 
is an attempt, borrowing Susan Jarratt’s project for the rhetorical 
historian, to "see the sophist in Plato, Augustine, and Bacon: the 
hidden Platonist in Nietzsche" ("Toward" 16). For despite Jarratt's
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call, little work has been done to make such a comparison between 
Plato and Foucault.
Richard Marback has rethought "Plato’s legacy" by examining 
"how the reconstruction and exegesis of Plato's writings" 
("Rethinking" 31) constitutes the way we see Plato, his works, and his 
influence, but he limits the scope of this refiguring to figures like 
Plotinus, Proclus, and St. Augustine—thinkers already securely 
situated within the Platonic legacy. Ellen Quandhal has used 
Foucault’s concept of the "author-function" to question the "ways in 
which Plato has been appropriated and summarized" ("What" 347), 
but she does not use the concept to connect Foucault to Plato. 
Instead, she uses Foucaudian thought to recast Plato as "a writer 
whose text acknowledges, both theoretically and by example, the 
power of contextualized and contingent elements in rhetoric" (347). 
In other words, Marback and Quandhal try to open a space in which 
Plato's works can be seen as sympathetic to sophistry.
While supporting both Quandhal's and Marback’s projects, I am 
concerned with expanding the question of who is seen as having 
appropriated or been appropriated by Plato's legacy, with making 
explicit the connection between Plato and Foucault that Quandhal’s 
work makes implicitly. I undertake this project because Foucault's 
work, and postmodernism in general, is often feared as a dangerous 
and radical break with history. It should not be. Foucault's work is 
not an aberration that dropped fully formed out of a radical break 
with history but an "apostate's" critique of that history. It is fully 
understandable and useful only when seen as a continuation of, 
albeit mostly through critique and confrontation. Western thought.
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In making explicit the connections between Foucault and such texts 
as the P h a e d r u s  and the Gorgias, I hope to make visible the 
connections to history that make Foucault's work intelligible and 
Plato's work relevant. Instead of dismissing Foucault as too far 
outside of the Western tradition to be taken seriously, or demonizing 
him as too dangerous to the West’s projects of democracy and human 
rights to be useful, we should recognize him as part of that historical 
tradition and set him in dialectical, dialogical, and critical tension 
with it.
Specifically, Foucault's relationship to Plato might be viewed, 
using Harold Bloom's terminology, as one of an "anxiety of influence" 
(5). While Bloom's concept is or can be used ahistorically, it still 
provides a useful frame for understanding the relationship between 
Plato and Foucault. Foucault reads and misreads Plato's theory "so as 
to clear imaginative space" (5) for his own. Yet in doing so. he 
inexorably ties himself to Platonic philosophy. Plato becomes the 
initiator "of discursive practices" which "produced not only" his "own 
work, but the possibility and the rules of formation" of Foucault's 
("What" 189).6 He becomes Foucault's intertextual bogey man; the 
figure Foucault must at once invert and  support if he is to be "free" 
of him: invert because if Foucault's theory is to ascend, then the
interpretation of important shared interests must be wrested from 
Platonic domination; support because while Foucault can criticize 
Plato's conclusions on those shared interests, he cannot criticize the 
validity of the interests without invalidating his own. In short, I am 
arguing that we should look at Foucault as the sort of man Diogenes 
was looking for—"a Socrates gone mad."
2 2 0
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The In version  o f  S im ila r ity
That Foucault saw himself and his work as part of the Western 
tradition, especially its classical Greek roots, is evident in the kinship 
he felt for Diogenes.7 In The Passion o f Michel Foucault, biographer 
James Miller argues that Foucault saw him self as Diogenes 
"masturbating in the market place" (363). According to Miller, 
Foucault interpreted this gesture as an approach to philosophy "as a 
field of limit-experience, pushing thought to its breaking point . . . . 
Putting truth to the test" in a completely public and bodily way 
(363). That Foucault felt a kinship with Diogenes is important not 
only because it ties Foucault to one of Plato's contemporaries, but 
because it encapsulates Foucault's relationship to Plato succinctly. 
The Oracle at Delphi instructed Diogenes to "change the value of the 
currency." This change in the value of the currency is exactly what
Foucault attempts to do to Plato. He inverts the value, the
interpretation of Platonic subjects, while maintaining their use as 
currency.
For example, in one of the most famous passages from Plato's 
Phaedrus, Socrates8 tells Phaedrus that the soul is "entombed in this 
which we carry about us and call the body, in which we are 
imprisoned like an oyster in its shell" (126). For Plato the perfection
of the soul is trapped within the weakness of the flesh. The body is a
prison of appetites which dims the soul's memory of heaven. In 
Discipline & Punish Foucault argues the exact opposite:
A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a 
factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is
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the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the 
prison of the body. (30)
In this passage Foucault inverts Plato's prison, changes the value
assigned both the body and the soul but maintains the binary as
rhetorically useful currency. It is not the appetites of the flesh that
cause humans to suffer but "the interrogation of man's interiors"
(Coles S e l f  54). It is the socially constructed and politically useful
concept of the soul, the "illusion of the theologians" (Foucault,
Discipline  30) which subjects the body to a variety of disciplines and
technologies of truth.
This inversion of Platonic thought reveals both Foucault’s 
opposition to Plato and his resulting place within the Platonic 
tradition as a kind of dialectic adversary.9 Plato "started" the 
discourse, set the terms of the debate and their relationship; Foucault 
continues the discourse, accepts the importance and validity of using 
its terms, but then changes their meaning and relationship. 
Foucault's terms, therefore, can be fully understood only in relation 
to Plato's, only in an intertextual play of an anxiety of influence.
Foucault commits a similar inversion of Platonic thought in his 
treatment of madness. In the Phaedrus Socrates argues that 
madness, "when it is sent as a gift of the gods," is not an evil but "in 
reality the greatest of blessings" (122). Madness gives humans a 
special kind of knowledge, a special kind of insight, which the purely 
rational, sensory bound mind cannot achieve. For example, it is 
while Socrates is under the influence of a "madness . . . .  given by the 
gods" (123) that he is able to communicate a figure of the soul’s form 
to Phaedrus. In Madness and Civilization Foucault also argues that 
madness offers humanity a special kind of knowledge, a special kind
m
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of insight. However, Foucault’s madness is more of a blasphemous
temptation than a divine gift:
The gryllos [statues with grotesques faces set in their bellies) no
longer recalls man, by its satiric form, to his spiritual vocation
forgotten in the folly o f  desire. It is madness become Temptation; all
it embodies o f  the impossible, the fantastic, the inhuman, all that
suggests the unnatural, the writhing o f  an insane presence on the
earth's surface. (20)
Here again Foucault inverts Platonic thought by changing the value
assigned its subject—while simultaneously agreeing with its most
basic assumption. Plato is right. Madness can represent an escape
from prevailing normalcy, a liberation from the limitations of sanity.
thought, and discourse. Only now madness no longer recalls humans
to divine wisdom but shields them from its oppression. Madness
becomes a state of "unthought" or "limit-experience", to borrow
Heideggerian terminology, away from both rationality and the
tyranny of the soul.
Also once again, Plato's theorizing initiates a discursive practice 
within, through, and by which Foucault must produce his. Foucault 
wrote Madness and Civilization in an attempt to understand how 
madness became a subject of rational discourse, how madmen 
became knowable subjects. During the Age of Reason, he argues, the 
West stopped viewing madness as a sign of divine touch or as "la
Folie" and started viewing it as a subject which could be known, 
measured, and treated. This change in view, however, also 
empowered a desire for a kind of madness which escaped the 
rational discourse on madness. Ironically, it was Plato, according to 
Simon During, who started both this discourse and the resulting 
desire to escape it.
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During argues that in Plato's division o f  madness into the 
secular and the divine, "Plato is already telling Foucault's story of 
madness's secularization; its split between insanity and la Folie" 
(F oucau lt  194). In other words, it was Plato who made madness a 
subject that could be discussed. It was Plato who began the 
historical process by which madness became divisible and knowable, 
and, therefore, which led to the desire to escape it. Foucault is drawn 
to, indebted to, and, to some degree, controlled by Plato as the 
initiator of the historical discourse that he is investigating. He cannot 
describe the existence of madness, validate the importance of 
studying it, or invert Plato's definition of it without drawing 
historical connections to Plato.
Not all of the similarities between Plato and Foucault, however, 
are inversions of shared interests. Some similarities come from 
actual shared ideas on those interests, a nuance of similarity that is 
lost if Foucault and Plato are not held in historical tension. For 
example, both men have similar understandings of the price of 
power and the danger of writing.
S tra n g e  B e d fe llo w s
In Plato's G o r g ia s  Socrates warns Callicles that he is "ill- 
advised" if he believes that one can "have great power in this state 
without conforming to its government either for better or worse" 
(103), and that this conformity is not merely cosmetic. Callicles 
"must be no mere imitator, but essentially like them" (103). Plato's 
use of the word essentially is important.10 To be recognized as part 
of a power structure's ethos, to gain access and wield its power, one
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must actually be or become  part of that ethos. It is a transformation 
which, Plato believes, can taint the soul. The person who tries "to be 
like his unjust ruler, and have great influence with him" finds 
"himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul 
depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and 
the power he has got" (102). Much like Hairston's view of the 
corrupting influence of literary theory, Plato warns against following 
those who do understanding the nature of moral behavior. Thus, for
both Hairston and Plato seeking power risks one's virtue.
While Foucault denies the existence of an innate virtue that can 
be maimed, he offers a similar theory of power in The Discourse on 
Language:
Disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of 
discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking 
the form of a permanent reactivation of rules . . . .  none may enter 
into discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain 
conditions or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. (224-25)
Like Plato, Foucault believes that to enter and employ a system of
power one has to be or become enough like it to be recognized by it.
One must assume or be assumed by a sanctioned identity, embody a
form of rules in order to enter a discipline's discourse, in order to
speak and be heard within a structure of power.1 1
Also like Plato, Foucault believes there is a potential danger in 
this transformation. We must confess the truth of the disciplines we 
enter:
We are subjugated to the production of truth through power and we 
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth . . .  we 
are forced to produce the truth o f  power that our society demands 
. . . .  we m u s t  speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to 
confess or to discover the truth. (P o w e r /K n o w le d g e  93)
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Power demands the confession of its truth as the price for exercising 
it. Disciplines need the subjugation of subjects in order to function- 
like Callicles' unjust ruler needs true subjects or subjugated beings to 
rule. And while Foucault does not believe in a soul that can be 
tainted, he does believe in a political identity that can be co-opted, 
and that this co-optation is every bit as "profound" as Plato's tainted 
soul.
For example, Foucault's use of the word confess  echoes Plato's 
use of the word s o u l—not in metaphysics but in ethos. Foucault 
draws on religious vocabulary to create the "textual image" that this 
confession is "forced out" from "within" a subject by an external 
p o w er .12 Moreover, his use of violent and restrictive language belies 
the idea that this transformation is any more cosmetic than Plato’s. 
While Callicles' soul is "possessed," "depraved," and "maimed," 
Foucault's being is "subjugated," "forced," "constrained," and 
"condemned" by the demands of power. In short, Foucault's language 
purposefully takes on the tone of damnation in order to strike the 
same profundity of horror in Western readers as Plato's maimed soul 
does.
Power's demand for transformation and the corresponding 
danger of co-optation, either the corrupting of the soul or the 
production of a subjugated identity, is why, for both theorists, so few 
"revolutions" actually change a discipline’s power structure. People 
believe, as Callicles does, that they can use power, attain power, 
enter into a power structure without it using, attaining, and entering 
into them. Like the oppositional pedagogues, too many 
revolutionaries believe that once the palace is seized, once the reigns
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of power are in ideologically correct hands, then the structure will 
automatically change. For both Plato and Foucault resistance to state, 
economic, or cultural power structures is much more complex, and 
our actions are much more complicit in maintaining that power.
Power structures presuppose and feed off resistance to
maintain, rearrange, and even expand themselves. Resistance which
does not change the structure of power only reproduces that which it
is fighting. As Victor Vitanza has argued "the overthrow of a political
position . . .  is only a capitulation to eventual recapitulation . . . .
Revolutions-against-fascism only end up being new (political, critical.
cultural, historiographical) fascisms" ('"Notes'" 107). This complicity
in maintaining what you are resisting results from the fact that
power is exercised rather than possessed. We do not own power so
much as it owns us; we are transformed by it rather than it being
transformed by us:
Power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on
those who 'do not have it’; it invest them, is transmitted by them and 
through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves,
in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This
means that these relations go right down into the depths of society. 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish  27)
Power structures create an identity and a purpose for resisters and,
in doing so, exert control over them. If the system did not exist, then
neither would the resisters. Moreover, if the resisters are able to get
inside a system of power and seize control of its operation, then they
too will pay the price of transformation and confession. And, like
Callicles, they too will discover that this transformation is not merely
cosmetic but constitutive, that in changing to acquire power they
have changed in being.
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Consequently, Foucault believed, according to Janies Miller, that 
the nature of power demanded that "resistance" begin at the level of 
the "micro-politic," at the level of what Victor Vitanza has called 
"individual cells . . .  of critical authority" ('"Notes'" 109). Miller 
writes:
To change the world required changing our selves, our bodies, our 
souls, and all of our old ways o f  ’knowing,’ in addition to changing 
the economy and society. To ’seize’ and exercise a dictatorial kind of 
pow er m ight thus s im ply rep ro d u ce  the o ld  pa tte rns  o f  
subjectification under a new name. {The Passion 234)
Changing the ideology of a power structure does not necessarily
change all of its functions. For example, many socialists societies still
treat homosexuals, women, drug addicts, illegal immigrants, and
minorities harshly. A power structure's main purpose is to
promulgate itself, not to adhere to any specific ideological content.13
What has to change is the restrictive yet productive practices that
constitute thought and being. What must be changed is not only
what is known and how it is known but what can be known and how
knowing can be. Since these practices go down to the very depths of
society, they must be resisted at that micro-level. This laser like
focus is why attempts to change student ideology must focus on
individual classrooms rather than on applying a predetermined
political outlook. The predetermined outlook is too gross an
understanding of operations of power. It risks turning itself into
another oppressive structure in the name of liberation.
The death of Socrates provides a good example of a Foucaudian 
understanding of power and a corresponding enactment of resistance 
at the micro or individual level. The Socrates of Plato's The Apology 
refuses to both escape as Crito pleads and to defend himself in the
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way of "clever" rhetoricians. He does not assume, in other words, 
that he can use rhetoric in a manner he opposes without it using him; 
he does not assume that he can change himself in order to survive 
without corrupting himself. He refuses, in effect, to resist in ways 
that sanction the power structure’s ways of knowing and make him
complicit in maintaining and validating those ways.
Instead, Socrates presents his being, his way of knowing, as an 
alternative and superior way of existing in the world. He becomes a 
seducing object trying to persuade others to want to be like him.
Nietzsche, Foucault's great teacher, makes this point in The Birth o f 
Tragedy:
From this point onward Socrates conceives it his duty to correct
existence, and with an air of irreverence and superiority, as the
precursor of an altogether different culture, art, and morality, he 
enters single-handed into a world, to touch whose very hem would
give us the greatest happiness. (253)
Socrates’ seeming act of submission in drinking the hemlock is
actually an act of micro-level resistance. It creates a new way of
being by transforming death into a different way of understanding
the value of life. Indeed, Foucault believes that Socrates, in freely
embracing death, establishes '"the roots of what we could call the
"critical" tradition in the West"’ (qtd. in Miller 462 n.15).14 Foucault
believes that Plato's Socrates establishes the way in which power
structures can be resisted.
Of course, for Plato knowledge of the realities allows one to
avoid the risk of co-optation. With knowledge of the realities in 
place, one does not seek a corrupt state's power. One may not be
able to avoid the state's wrath in refusing to be co-opted (as Socrates 
could not), but one's innate self does not have to be tainted if that
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self is understood. The revolution of the selfs ways of knowing 
would begin and end with rem em bering innate being and 
transcendent knowledge. Revolution for Foucault, however, would 
begin with the recognition of how oppressive the idea of an innate 
state o f being is, by creating ways of being not already 
overpopulated with the language and power relations of others. And 
while Foucault is not very optimistic about our ability to create these 
"uncontaminated" ways of being, he draws inspiration from the being 
of Plato's Socrates. For while rejecting the specifics of Socrates’ way 
of knowing, a way all too well known in our time, Foucault is drawn 
to it as an example, in its time, of an achieved alternative state of
being, as a form of critical resistance. In any event, both Foucault
and Plato believe that a price must be paid in order to enter and 
wield structures of power, that this price is often the transformation 
of being into a more subjugated entity, and that revolution begins at 
the micro-level.
The T yranny o f W riting
Jasper Neel has argued that Plato saw writing as "an innocuous 
pastime" at best and "a dangerous distraction" ("Dichotomy" 306) at 
worst. He has further argued that Foucault represents a modern 
sophist's view of writing as an "unfinished and unfinishable process"
that "permeates every aspect of whatever would like to present itself
as outside of and prior to writing" (308). While not disagreeing with 
Neel, I maintain that there is also a similarity between the two in 
that each man fears writing.
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Plato fears that writing weakens both the memory and the 
dialectic . W riting, he believes, subjugates the mind to the 
conventions and traditions of the transitory and external. In the 
P haedrus  Socrates warns that writing "will produce forgetfulness in
the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice 
their memory” (140). Worse, it causes humans to put "their trust" in 
"external characters which are no part of themselves" instead of in 
the memory inside of them (140). Lost in this lack of practice and
outward placement of trust is the liberating knowledge of the eternal
forms lying dormant within memory.
Plato also fears that writing weakens the power of the dialectic.
The exchange of ideas between persons (interlocuters) with a telos of
truth has power because it allows us to perfect syllogism in order to
examine statements about the world. Writing, Plato believes, does
not allow for this kind of continual examination:
W riting, Phaedrus, has this strange quality ,  and is very like
painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but
if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so 
it is with written words . . .  if you question them, wishing to know 
their  sayings, they always say only one and the same thing.
(P h a ed ru s  140-41)
Within the dialectic one can continually question, requestion, and re- 
re-question the other person. Answers can be nuanced and pushed 
to their limits. Whereas writing, Plato would argue, is a dead thing. 
The written word is always bound to culture, to the past, to the fixed, 
never changing text. The person can question it, but it makes no
reply but what is already stated. Worse, writing, like painting, is 
twice removed from the ideal forms, a copy of a copy. The traces of 
the forms within it are even weaker than in the objects of nature. It
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is harder, therefore, to see the truth of the forms within the object of 
writing. Writing is limited as a tool that can point beyond itself to 
the forms. One can only focus on its materiality and not through it.15
That Foucault fears writing is evident in his actions before his 
death. Before he died, Foucault "hurriedly destroyed hundreds of 
pages of notebooks, letters, and manuscripts" (James Miller 357). 
And "In his will, he prohibited the posthumous publication of 
anything he might have missed" (357). Foucault fears writing, 
however, not because it threatens transcendent knowledge but 
because it simultaneously threatens and fixes identity. In his often 
quoted essay "What is an Author?", Foucault defines an "'author' as a 
function of discourse" (180). Instead of there being an innate or 
eternal role for the author, the author's relation to the text changes 
historically. The author-function is socially constructed. In our era 
"Writing is now linked to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself: it 
is the voluntary obliteration of the self . . . .  Where a work had the 
duty of creating immortality, it now attains the right to kill, to 
become the murderer of its author" (Foucault 180). Whereas for 
Plato the true rhetorician "destroys the very medium in which he 
works" (Leff, "The Form" 22), for Foucault the very medium destroys 
the author in which it works. The author becomes "a victim of his 
own writing" (Foucault, "What" 180). Writing is now an act of 
suicide.
Foucault, however, sees this self annihilation as double-edged. 
On one hand, violence to the self is threatening. While Foucault 
claims that this writing is a "voluntary obliteration," his use of the 
words "attains the right to kill" belies the idea that this violence is
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under the writer's control, an extension of his or her will. One is not 
granted a right in Western thought—as Foucault well knows—rights 
are "naturally" the property of free human beings. That writing has 
attained the right to kill, therefore, suggests it is a separately existing 
entity not morally under the control of the writer. In fact, it is the 
writing which has the moral authority, the agency to control the 
writer. The word right denotes both moral correctness and a 
politically conservative ethos.
On the other hand, Foucault sees writing as a way to disappear,
to erase himself, and he seeks such a disappearance: "I am no doubt
not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who
I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our
bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At
least spare us their morality when we write" {Archeology  17). A nd,
in his famous opening to The Archaeology o f Knowledge & The
D iscourse on L anguage , Foucault dreams of a total lack of
identification within any discursive form:
I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture, as
into all others I shall be delivering, perhaps over the years ahead. I
would have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond 
all possible beginnings. At the moment of speaking, I would like to 
have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me 
merely to enmesh myself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge 
myself, when no one was looking, in its interstices as if it had paused 
an instant, in suspense, to beckon to me. (215)
Foucault desires a kind of anonymous oblivion out of which he can
write or speak without being subjected to the rules of a discursive
practice, but the words betray him and reveal that he does not
believe this possible.
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In the passage quoted from page seventeen of The Archeology 
o f Knowledge, Foucault is responding to an inquisitor who suddenly 
appears in his text and subjects him to a series of questions: "'Aren't
you sure of what you're saying? Are you going to change yet again, 
shift your position according to the questions that are put to you, and 
say that objections are not really directed at the place from which 
you are speaking?" (17). In a sense Foucault seems to mimic the
dialectic here. He confronts his fear of the "bureaucrats" and "police" 
by giving them presence in the form of interlocuters. However, his 
attempt to banish these "bureaucrats" and "police" who want to make 
sure his "papers are in order." also succeeds in revealing his fear of 
their presence. In the very act of trying to disappear, Foucault can 
already feel an audience whose interpretation of his writing might 
fix an identity onto him with which he is not comfortable. Much like 
Plato he feels the need to defend him self against erroneous or
injurious interpretations, to attempt to control how the reader can
read his work. Rather than see interpretive communities as shared 
and congenial as Bruffee does, Foucault and Plato both see them 
more as the conflicted and dangerous places that Berlin, Bizzell, and 
other critical theorists do. However, rather than trying to shape
those interpretive communities in hopes o f encouraging social 
transformation, Foucault and Plato try to create written documents
that will p ro tec t them from an in te rp re tive  com m unities
conceptualizing power.
In the second passage quoted, Foucault's use of the words
"would really like to have" and "would have preferred" denote a wish
that cannot be fulfilled. If he had the choice not to begin, then he
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would not begin. But he does not believe he has such a choice. 
Indeed, since his wish for no beginnings comes at the beginning of 
his text, it must be read ironically. Moreover, his use of the words 
"slipped imperceptibly" implies the existence of a panopticon-like 
presence watching over his beginnings and use of language, a
presence he "would really like to have" avoided but cannot. He must
begin, and no voice is nameless. Writing, speaking, all discourse 
demands a public naming in Western culture. Just as systems of
power force one to confess the systems' truth, so writing and 
speaking force the writer and the speaker to confess their truths.
Writing is a perilous game for Foucault. Unlike Hairston, 
Foucault cannot see writing as ever being low-risk. Personal
narrative does not lower the stakes of writing—it raises them by 
allowing the interpretive community to have even more authority in 
constructing who the writer is through what he or she has written. 
Writing is always a perilous exercise in self presentation. It offers a 
certain anonymity through self annihilation, but it also threatens to 
subjugate through the interpretations and judgments of others. It 
simultaneously allows one to escape and threatens to bring one into 
public existence. Foucault is produced as knowable through what he 
has written. Worse, he is produced as knowable through our 
interpretations of what he has written. Worse still, he is produced as 
responsible for our interpretations of what he has written, for the 
positions to which we assign him with respect to certain political or 
social causes. Foucault, after all, was very aware of what the Nazis 
did to Nietzsche's work and the Stalinists to Marx's.
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I believe each man’s fear of writing is traceable to this deeper 
fear of being identified with suspect, dangerous, fixed, or revealing 
interpretations. It is as if both men, understanding the damage that 
people and power structures can do by "corrupting" writing, tried to 
remove the possibility of being held responsible for how others 
interpret their writing. In the P h a ed ru s  we have the irony of Plato 
disdaining writing in writing and then through the mouthpiece of 
Socrates. And while Jasper Neel has correctly pointed out the 
shrewdness o f making such an argument in w riting,16 Plato's 
displacement of authorship also reveals his genuine apprehension of 
this new form of communication. Plato writes:
And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike 
among those who understand it and those who have no interest in it. 
and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated 
or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no 
power to protect or help itself. (P h a e d r u s  14 1)
Plato discredits writing and plays games with authorship because he
fears the interpretive presence of the reader.
S im ilarly , Foucault’s writing, while often eloquent and poetic, is 
also at times so unintelligible that certainty of interpretation is 
impossible. He admits in The Archeology o f Knowledge that he uses 
writing to create "with a rather shaky hand~a labyrinth into which I 
can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up 
underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding 
overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary" (17). Foucault 
purposely makes his writing difficult, "deforms its itinerary", to 
reduce the possibility of readers assigning one meaning to it and to 
him.
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In fact, James Miller speculates that Foucault enjoyed these 
kind of games with writing. On his death bed, Foucault may have 
purposely confided life long secrets to his friend Herve Guibert 
because he knew the young novelist would fictionalize the 
accounts.17 This way Foucault could expect "that his confession would 
be made public~and know as well that the artist would reveal the 
truth only after it had been veiled in 'fiction'" (James Miller 372). 
Thus, while there are vast differences between Plato's concept of 
writing and Foucault's,18 there are also similarities in their fear of it. 
Both men fear how others will interpret their writing. Both men fear 
what kinds of identities these interpretations will construct for them. 
And both men play games with writing, try to hide within it, to 
lessen the damage of interpretation.
These are the echoes I hear between Plato and Foucault, but 
they are echoes that can be fully heard only if the two are held in 
historical tension, in a kind of historical intertextuality. History 
provides a method for negotiating their texts that is more powerful 
than simply drifting from one text and another, but only if we grant 
that historical consciousness is still possible. If Foucault's work is 
viewed instead as simply part of a larger postmodern break with 
history, then such a comparison as I have made makes little sense.
A Lover o f  W isdom , A Seeker o f Truth
I would like to end this chapter with a story James Miller tells 
about Foucault and a young artist named Philip Horvitz.19 It seems 
that while Foucault was teaching at Berkeley, Horvitz went to hear a 
lecture Foucault was delivering. After the lecture Horvitz decided to
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go to Foucault's open office hour and ask him a question. Not well 
versed in Foucaudian jargon, Horvitz asked Foucault the following 
questions:
Does the artist have an identity, or is he a powerless ’type.’ who in 
the last fifty years has become more powerless than ever, due to the 
manipulation o f  technical media like television? Can the artist 
transcend ’The S tructure?’ Or is he doomed to com m oditization, 
puppetizatio? (qtd. in James Miller 352)
Foucault could not answer the young man and told him to return the
next day. The next day, however, Foucault still could not answer the
question and so asked to meet Horvitz for coffee that Friday.
Foucault's answer on Friday, according to Horvitz, was the following:
Freedom can be found, he said—but always in context. Power puts 
into play a dynamic o f  constant struggle. There is no escaping it.
But there is freedom in knowing the game is yours to play. Don't 
look to authorities: the truth is in your self. Don't be scared. Trust
your self. Don't be afraid of living. And don't be afraid of dying.
Have courage. Do what you feel you must: desire, create, transcend—
you can win the game. (qtd. in James Miller 353)
The great destroyer of subjectivity telling us to "trust in ourselves?
The man who took all forms of transcendental security away telling
us to "transcend"? The theorist obsessed with revealing the unseen
ways in which knowledge binds us telling us there is "freedom in
knowing the game is yours to play"? Yes—because Foucault's work
was not an attempt to destroy Western thought, human rights, and
democracy but to revitalize those domains through critique. It is a
savage critique to be sure, but one, nonetheless, that ties Foucault
inexorably to the Western tradition, one that makes him useful to the
project of making our classrooms more socially just and our teaching
more self-conscious.
Perhaps the most telling moment in Foucault's life, when it 
comes to understanding his relationship to that Western tradition,
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came on his death bed. As he lay dying, according to Miller. Foucault 
confessed to Herve Guibert that he did not see himself as a historian, 
an intellectual, or a revolutionary but as "a philosopher —a lover of
wisdom, a seeker of truth" (358). These are not words one expects to
hear from Michel Foucault. They sound strange coming from his 
mouth. Indeed, they sound more like words that would come from 
the mouth of Plato, but they are Foucault's words. Of course, they
are also Plato's. The seeds that Socrates planted have grown in
strange places.
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CHAPTER FIVE NOTES
1. Giroux is quick to distinguish between this relatively new backlash and the 
more serious critiques by theorists like Jurgen Habermas, Perry Anderson, 
David Harvey, and Terry Eagleton. He also points out that "one can find a great 
deal o f  theoretical material that refuses to dismiss postmodern discourse so 
easily” (364 n.5).
2. For a different view of postmodernism and its relationship to history and 
meaning see Lyotard’s Just Gaming in which he tries to uphold both the 
heterogeneity o f  language games and a "justice o f  multiplicity"; Habermas'
"Modernity versus Postmodernity” and "Modernity—An Incomplete P ro ject” in 
which he views modernity as an incomplete project that postmodernism can 
help to complete: and Stuart Hall's and Frederic Jameson's "Clinging to the 
Wreckage: A Conversation” in which Jameson believes both in the existence
of a postmodern capitalism and that a new class logic will emerge to confront
it.
3. See Foucault's "The Order of Discourse."
4. By using the word mind I do not intend to imply that somehow I have access 
to the authors' intentions. Instead. I mean the personality, the shared interest, 
the similar feeling that my reading of each author’s text evokes.
5. For example, see Foucault's History o f  Sexuality  vol 2 pages 230-246 for his
reading o f  the concept o f  homo-erotic love in the P h a e d r u s  and the 
S y m p o s iu m .
6. Foucault, of course, wrote this line in reference to Marx and Freud. I am
expanding the concept by applying it to Plato.
7. See James Miller's The Passion o f  Michel Foucault pages 359-375 for a more
in-depth discussion o f  Foucault's relationship to and last lectures on Socrates. 
Diogenes, the Stoics, and especially the Cynics.
8. All references to the Socrates found in this essay assume that he is a 
mouthpiece for Plato's ideas.
9. See Roger Moss's "The Rhetoric that Dare Not Speak Its Name" for an 
examination of how Oscar Wilde inverts the P h a ed ru s  in his work.
10. Here and in other places in this chapter I am forced to rely on translations 
of Plato’s and Foucault's work. There is, therefore, an inevitable slippage 
involved when I do close readings o f  individual words. However, I would 
maintain that my readings are of good translations and that they reflect the 
"spirit" of each passage if  not always the nuance of the words in the original 
texts.
11. David Bartholomae, influenced by Foucault’s post-structuralist thought, 
eloquently encapsulates this view of power for composition. According to 
Bartholomae. "the student must, by writing, become like us . . . .  He must 
become someone he is not. He must know what we know, talk like we talk; he
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must locate him self convincingly in a language that is not his own . . . .  The 
struggle of the student writer is not the struggle to bring out that which is 
within; it is the struggle to carry out those ritual activities that grant one 
entrance into a closed society ("Writing Assignments" 300).
12. Foucault, of course, rejects such a Descartian split between outer and inner 
being as itself oppressive. Yet his point is that restriction is productive.
Power restricts the ways in which a thing can be known or a person can be; 
however, since there is no innate state of being to maim or stunt, this
restriction builds an identity rather than deform s one. Repression is 
productive. The danger to the individual is that he or she might suffer under 
and be complicit in making a marginalized identity within a structure. See
Foucault's History o f  Sexuality  volume I pages 10-12 for his evaluation of the 
"’repressive hypothesis'" and the role o f  repression in producing identity.
13. See Foucault’s Discipline and Punish  pages 257-292 for his belief that the
political issues o f  the penal system are not ideological but mechanical. 
Specifically, he argues that "if there is an overall political issue around the 
prison, it is not . . . whether it is to be corrective or not; whether the judges,
the psychiatrists o r  the sociologists are to exercise more power in it than the 
administrators or the supervisors; it is not even whether we should have 
prison or something other than prison. At present, the problem lies rather in
the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-
ranging powers which, through the proliferation o f  new disciplines, they 
bring with them" (306).
14. Foucault felt that it was only in the moment of death that true individuality 
was possible: "It is in death . . . that the individual becomes at one with
himself, escaping from monotonous lives and their leveling effect; in the slow, 
half-subterranean, but already visibly approach o f  death, the dull, common 
life at last becomes an individuality; a black border isolates it, and gives it the 
style of its truth" (—as quoted in Miller 20). Consequently, he was interested in 
suicide as a moment of transcendence and agency. See Ludwig Binswanger’s 
"The Case o f  Ellen" and Foucault’s introduction to Binswanger’s "Dream and 
Existence" to examine the beginnings of Foucault’s interest in suicide as an act
of agency. See also Miller’s chapter "The Heart Laid Bare” pages 66-93.
15. In fact, Carol Poster argues that "Plato considers his philosophical doctrine
unwrittable." See "Plato's Unwritten Doctrines: A Hermeneutic Problem in
Rhetorical H is to riography ."
16. See Jasper Neel’s Plato, Derrida, and Writing.
17. It seems that on his death bed Foucault revealed three incredibly private
secrets about his life. The outline of them is that: I) when Foucault was a boy 
his father, a stern man and brilliant surgeon, forced Foucault to watch the 
amputation of a man's leg in order to toughen him up; 2) that Foucault may 
have been haunted by the story of a woman known as 'the Sequestered of
Poitiers’. She went mad and was kept locked up in a room for some twenty- 
five years with little food. When found she was covered with excrement, lice, 
maggots, and rats; and 3) that during World War II Foucault was threatened by 
the sudden appearance of a small group of Jewish students at his school. 
Foucault supposedly cursed them for challenging his position as the smartest 
boy in the class. Later they were taken away to camps. These secrets, if true.
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subject Foucault to the kind of Freudian analysis which he, an intensely 
private man. feared all his life. What Miller finds interesting is that Guibert
writes o f  these secrets in a fictionalized account. Therefore, we have no way 
of knowing the "truth" of Guibert’s accounts and no way of knowing the truth 
of Foucault's secrets. See pages 363-374 for a more detailed account of these 
events and the controversy surrounding them.
18. For example, despite Plato's disdain for writing he does believe it can be 
used correctly. According to David White, Plato believed that "the writer must 
know the truth about the subject matter treated,” and more importantly, the 
"writer’s knowledge of truth entails knowledge o f  the method for arriving at
truth” ( 8). Foucault might agree with this statement, but truth would be
exactly the cultural practices produced by a situated discourse o f  knowledge 
that Plato wants to avoid. Moreover, John Johnston argues that Foucault sees 
"writing as a transitive intervention, a means by which the hardly visible 
coercive powers of discourse are confronted, wrestled with, even subverted, 
thereby revea ling  the ultimate inadequacy  o f  d iscurs ive  knowledges,
categories, and their rules of formation" (800-1). Thus, while writing is to be 
feared, Johnston believes Foucault also sees it as politically useful. While I 
believe he is correct. T tend to think he is not problematizing how complicit 
the writer is in producing the inadequacy of discursive knowledges.
19. See James Miller pages 351-53 for a fuller account of this event.
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